Anne E. Spafford

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against a hospital, nurses, and doctors following the birth of a child who suffered severe brain damage due to oxygen deprivation prior to an emergency Caesarean section.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that while there were shortfalls in care, the cause of the oxygen deprivation was unknown and therefore not caused by the defendants' negligence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on liability, holding that the trial judge erred in law by deciding the issue of factual causation before determining whether the standard of care was breached, and that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient to explain why the plaintiffs' theory of liability was rejected.

Following the release of reasons for judgment, the parties submitted written costs submissions.

The respondent consented to an award of costs in favour of the appellant Board in the amount of $10,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The Crown appellants did not seek costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs in the agreed amount.

The plaintiff commenced two identical actions for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation against the police and the Crown.

Both actions were dismissed by the registrar as abandoned due to delay.

Almost two years later, the plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal orders under Rule 37.14.

The master dismissed the motion, finding inordinate delay and deemed prejudice to the defendants due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The Divisional Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal and reinstated the second action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants' appeal and restored the master's order, holding that the master did not err in finding that the expiry of a limitation period gives rise to presumptive prejudice, which the plaintiff failed to rebut.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision dismissing his motions to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of two actions for delay.

The Master had held she had no discretion to extend the time for bringing the motions and that the expiry of the limitation period created deemed prejudice.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law by ignoring the overarching discretion in Rule 2.03 and by presuming prejudice solely from the expiry of the limitation period when the respondents had early notice of the claims.

The dismissal order for the second action was set aside.

The Children's Lawyer appealed two orders of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the Children's Lawyer lacked standing to bring the appeal as she had only appeared on the motion below to request an adjournment and did not seek to be appointed Litigation Guardian or intervene as a party.

The actual Litigation Guardian did not appeal the orders.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

As success was divided, the court ordered that each side bear its own costs for both the motion and the appeal, making no order for costs in the Court of Appeal or before the lower court judge.

The plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident and initially named the municipality as a defendant in their notice of action.

They subsequently filed a statement of claim and simultaneously filed a notice of discontinuance against the municipality.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiffs sought to add the municipality back as a defendant, citing the discoverability principle upon learning that a dangerous shoulder drop-off may have contributed to the accident.

The motion judge declared the notice of discontinuance invalid but alternatively allowed the municipality to be added as a defendant.

The Court of Appeal held that the notice of discontinuance was valid, but upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision to add the municipality as a defendant based on the discoverability principle.

The plaintiff sued a doctor and an assessment company for bad faith, intentional interference with economic relations, and negligence arising from an independent medical examination report that led to the termination of her statutory accident benefits.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the report was protected by witness immunity and absolute privilege, and that they owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the scope of the duty of care in the context of the statutory scheme and whether immunity applied to allegations of intentional injury.

The Divisional Court dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that the plaintiff's claims raised important policy issues and genuine issues of fact that required a full trial.

The appellant, a police Staff Sergeant, sued her employer and colleagues for discrimination and defamation.

The motions judge dismissed the action, finding the essential character of the dispute was workplace-centred and governed by the collective agreement and the Police Services Act.

On appeal, the appellant limited her claim to defamation, arguing it belonged in the courts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the essential character of the dispute was workplace discrimination and harassment, not defamation, and was therefore subject to the collective agreement's grievance procedure.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her medical malpractice claims against the respondent doctor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The negligence claim failed due to a complete lack of expert evidence to support standard of care and causation.

The battery claim failed because the respondent did not conduct the procedure and never touched the appellant.

The claim for lack of informed consent also lacked a genuine issue for trial.