Andrew Pinto

The applicant, Thomy Baez-Eusebio, brought two applications: a disclosure application for the Information to Obtain (ITO) for a search warrant under the Liquor Licence Act, and a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained from a Honda Civic, alleging a breach of his section 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the applicant lacked standing to challenge the Liquor Licence Act search warrant and that the police had reasonable grounds to seize and search the Honda Civic.

The court also denied leave to cross-examine the affiant of the ITO, finding no misleading statements or deficiencies in the warrant process.

The applicant, charged with violent offences arising from an alleged stabbing, sought disclosure of complainant conviction-related and non-conviction police records to support a self-defence theory.

The court applied the first-party disclosure framework and held that records of prior violent incidents involving the complainants, including withdrawn or stayed charges, acquittals, uncharged occurrences, related domestic incidents, and any existing videos of prior altercations, were obviously relevant to credibility and self-defence.

The court emphasized that relevance is assessed at the disclosure stage, not by reference to ultimate admissibility, and that a sufficiently close connection existed between the requested materials and the live issues at trial.

The disclosure application under the first-party regime was granted.

This decision addresses Charter applications by Tutshuma (Paul) Munda and Ade Munda, who were charged with firearms offences following a police search.

The court found that police used excessive force against Paul Munda when he was kicked in the face while handcuffed, breaching his s. 7 Charter rights, and that there was a 22-minute unreasonable delay in facilitating his right to counsel, breaching s. 10(b).

However, the evidence was not excluded, though a sentencing reduction was ordered if convicted.

The court dismissed all Charter claims by Ade Munda, finding the police use of force and delay in providing rights to counsel reasonable, and that inaccuracies in a police synopsis did not materially affect his bail hearing.

The court acquitted A.B. of all charges of sexual assault and sexual touching against Y.Z., finding that the complainant's evidence was not sufficiently reliable or credible to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The decision turned on significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, implausibility in the mechanics of the alleged assaults, and contradictions with other evidence, including the timing and circumstances of the alleged events.

The court also found the accused's evidence to be generally credible and reliable.

The court sentenced Ronald Joseph, a Toronto police officer, for his role as the architect of a multi-participant insurance fraud scheme involving staged vehicle thefts and accidents.

Joseph pleaded guilty to three counts of attempted fraud over $5,000 and one count of public mischief.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, to be served in the community, with house arrest, curfew, and GPS monitoring, reflecting the gravity of the offences, breach of public trust, and Joseph’s status as a police officer.

The decision reviews aggravating and mitigating factors, the principle of parity, and relevant case law.

This decision concerns the conviction of Stephen William Koritar on eight charges, including possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, assault of a police officer with intent to prevent arrest, attempt to take a weapon from a police officer, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court found that Mr. Koritar had knowledge and control of the drugs found in the master bedroom and kitchen of a Toronto condominium, and rejected his evidence as not credible.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of constructive and joint possession, circumstantial evidence, and the application of the W.D. framework for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt.

The court dismissed Stephen William Koritar’s Charter s. 7 application alleging excessive use of force by police during his arrest.

The decision reviews the evidence of both the applicant and four police officers, finding the officers’ testimony more credible and consistent than the applicant’s.

The court concludes that the force used was reasonable in the circumstances, given the applicant’s resistance and the officers’ safety concerns.

The court also addresses, in the alternative, the legal standards for a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence under ss. 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, finding neither remedy warranted.

The offender, a youthful first-time offender, was convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and related offences after acting as the driver of a vehicle involved in a shooting.

The court found he did not have foreknowledge of the shooting but became aware of the firearm in the glove compartment during the five-minute drive before police intercepted the vehicle.

Weighing the gravity of firearm offences against the offender's strong rehabilitative prospects and limited moral culpability, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day to be served in the community, followed by two years of probation.

The applicant, Marcus Bryan, facing charges including human trafficking, sought a Stage 2 ruling under s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding the admissibility of evidence concerning the complainant's prior sexual activity.

The court granted the application in part, allowing limited questioning on the complainant's prior and ongoing involvement in sex work, her use of advertising websites, earnings, and work for other individuals, as well as the nature and conclusion of her relationship with the applicant.

The court found this evidence relevant to the defence narrative and to challenge the complainant's credibility, provided it did not engage the "twin myths" and had significant probative value.

The offender was sentenced after a jury conviction for repeated sexual offences against his stepdaughter over several years and physical and sexual offences against his biological daughter.

Applying the governing sentencing principles for sexual offences against children, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, the extreme breach of parental trust, the duration of abuse, the youth of the complainants, the offender's prior sexual assault record, and his absence of remorse or rehabilitative insight.

The court fixed consecutive component sentences totalling 12 years, but reduced the aggregate sentence to 10 years under the totality principle.

The court also imposed DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA, non-communication, and s. 161 prohibition orders.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, brought a Stage 2 application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity, specifically a "morning after" consensual sexual encounter.

The court allowed the application, finding the evidence relevant to explain the presence of semen and to the coherence of the defence narrative, without engaging "twin myth" reasoning.

The court limited the scope of questioning to the source of the ejaculate, prohibiting its use to generally impugn the complainant's credibility based on omissions in her police statement.

The appellant, Carlos Zamora, appealed his sentence for criminal harassment and failing to comply with a release order, seeking a conditional discharge instead of the conditional sentence of 90 days and 21 months probation imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal was based on two grounds: that the sentencing judge placed undue emphasis on deterrence and failed to properly consider a conditional discharge, and that the judge misapprehended evidence regarding aggravating factors.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the sentencing judge's decision, affirming that the possibility of a conditional discharge was considered and that the aggravating factors were appropriately assessed.

The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence was upheld.

The defendant, Kelvon Clarke, was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime not exceeding $5,000.

Police executed a search warrant at an apartment, finding controlled substances and cash.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on video evidence showing Clarke entering the building with a distinctive purple bag, which was later found in the apartment containing the bulk of the drugs.

The court found Clarke guilty, concluding that the only reasonable inference based on the totality of the evidence was his knowledge and control of the drugs, either through physical possession, constructive possession, joint possession, or aiding.

This pre-trial ruling addresses the applicability of the s. 276 regime of the Criminal Code to charges including human trafficking, firearm offences, kidnapping, and uttering threats.

The defence sought an order that s. 276 does not apply or, alternatively, to permit cross-examination on the complainant's past sexual history.

Following the guidance from R. v. A.M., the court determined that while the charges are not explicitly listed in s. 276, the Crown's allegations of violence and threats compelling sexual services implicate sexual assault, thereby engaging the s. 276 regime.

The court directed the parties to proceed to a Stage 1 / Stage 2 s. 276 hearing to determine the scope and admissibility of evidence related to the complainant’s sexual activities.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code to admit the complainant's videotaped statement in a sexual assault and sexual interference trial.

The respondent opposed, arguing the statement, recorded two years and two months after the last alleged incident, was not made within a "reasonable time." The court, applying a holistic interpretation of "reasonable time" considered the complainant's age at the time of delay, the relationship with the accused, and the common reasons for delayed disclosure in sexual abuse cases.

The court found the delay reasonable and allowed the application, concluding that admitting the video recording would not interfere with the proper administration of justice.

This decision addresses three pre-trial applications in a criminal proceeding involving charges of human trafficking, firearm offences, and kidnapping.

The court granted the Crown's application for the complainant to testify via CCTV, finding it would facilitate a full and candid account given the nature of the offences and the complainant's expressed anxiety.

The court also ruled that the complainant's 911 call was admissible under the res gestae exception, the principled approach to hearsay, and as narrative circumstantial evidence.

However, the admissibility of the complainant's statements to her aunt was deemed premature.

The Defence's application regarding the applicability of the s. 276 regime to human trafficking was deferred pending a Court of Appeal decision.

This is a sentencing decision following the conviction of S.S. for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and making sexually explicit material available to a child, involving his biological daughter.

The offences occurred over approximately three years when the victim was between five and eight years old, constituting an extreme breach of trust.

The Crown sought an eight-year global sentence, while the Defence proposed three to four years.

The court imposed a global sentence of seven years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the severity and duration of the abuse and the profound impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's first-time offender status, young age at the time of the offences, and family support, but these were balanced against the lack of remorse.

Ancillary orders, including DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA registration, communication bans, and a tailored s. 161 order, were also imposed.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a Motion to Change brought by the respondent, John Craig Fielding, to terminate his child and spousal support obligations following his retirement.

The applicant, Victoria Fielding, opposed the motion and sought to increase spousal support and continue child support.

The court found the respondent to be the significantly more successful party on the Motion to Change, particularly regarding the termination of spousal support due to his reasonable retirement.

While the applicant had some success on child support issues, her overall conduct was deemed unreasonable, including attempts to re-litigate issues under the guise of clarification.

Consequently, the court ordered the applicant to pay the respondent 80% of his overall costs, fixed at $295,000, enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) rights during the execution of a search warrant at an apartment where he was a found-in.

The police discovered approximately 1.3 kgs of fentanyl in the apartment and smaller quantities of drugs and cash on the applicant.

The applicant alleged police used excessive force by tackling and punching him, and conducted an unreasonable search.

The Crown conceded a s. 10(b) breach due to a 30-minute delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court dismissed the other Charter claims, finding the police use of force and manner of detention were reasonable given the dynamic and potentially volatile situation.

The court declined to stay the proceedings or exclude the evidence under s. 24, concluding the physical evidence was not obtained as a result of the s. 10(b) breach and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, Wasitt Izaz, was charged with nine firearms-related offences as the driver of a vehicle from which two occupants exited and committed a shooting.

The Crown sought to establish criminal responsibility based on party liability and constructive possession.

The court found the accused not guilty of the first six counts, which related to aiding the shooting and possession of one of the firearms (Glock 30), due to reasonable doubt regarding his knowledge of the firearms and intent prior to the shooting.

However, the court found the accused guilty of counts 7, 8, and 9, related to the constructive possession of the second firearm (Glock 21) found in the glove compartment, concluding that he had knowledge and control of it after the shooting occurred.