R. v. Day, 2025 ONSC 2043

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-30000414-0000

DATE: 20250402

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Respondent

– and –

BRITTANY DAY

Applicant

Shalini Gunawardhane, for the Crown

Chris Rudnicki, for the Applicant

HEARD: February 6 and April 1, 2025

pinto j.

RULING ON APPLICANT’S REQUEST FOR

DISCLOSURE OF COMPLAINANTS’ RECORDS

Overview

1The applicant, Brittany Day, is accused of stabbing Arthur Burt and brandishing a knife at Jeremiah Henry-Hunter on April 16, 2023. Mr. Burt and Mr. Henry-Hunter are the complainants in this case. The applicant faces charges of aggravated assault, two counts of assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose. The applicant asserts that this case will turn on findings of credibility and self-defence. She seeks disclosure of the conviction and non-conviction records of the complainants under the following categories of disclosure:

(a) Convictions: A current copy of the complainants’ adult criminal records, including the general occurrence report and police synopsis for each offence.

(b) Outstanding charges: If the complainants are currently before the courts on any charges, a copy of the general occurrence report for each offence.

(c) Discharges: If the complainants have been discharged conditionally or absolutely for any offence, the date of disposition and a copy of the general occurrence report and police synopsis for each offence.

(d) Withdrawn or stayed charges: A list of all charges that have been withdrawn or stayed against the complainants, along with the general occurrence report and police synopsis for each charge.

(e) Acquittals: A list of all charges that resulted in an acquittal against the complainants, along with the general occurrence report and police synopsis for each charge.

(f) Uncharged offences: If the complainants have been investigated for a crime, but never charged, the general occurrence report relating to those investigations.

2I turn to the first two categories: complainant convictions and their accompanying synopses, and outstanding charges and their accompanying synopses. The Crown agrees to disclose these materials and acknowledges that they constitute first party disclosure. They are disclosable pursuant to the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Pascal, 2020 ONCA 287, 387 C.C.C. (3d) 236. These items have been disclosed.

3Regarding the third category – discharges – the Crown agrees to disclose the synopses relating to the convictions that would have been on Mr. Burt’s record at the time of the stabbing on April 16, 2023.

4However, the Crown objects to disclosing records in categories d) withdrawn or stayed charges, e) acquittals, and f) uncharged offences. The Crown submits that these records ought to be subject to a third party records application.

5The records in question are before the court pursuant to a subpoena issued by the applicant to the Toronto Police Service. However, the parties agree that the question of whether the records ought to be disclosed and under which disclosure regime remains a live issue on this application.

6Additionally, the applicant seeks:

1. The disposition date and outcome for Mr. Burt’s two occurrences. The Crown does not object to this disclosure.

2. The disposition date and outcome for Mr. Henry-Hunter’s third occurrence (not listed on the first page). Again, the Crown does not object to this disclosure.

3. The prior occurrences, disposition dates, and outcomes for the two domestic incidents referred to in Henry-Hunter’s occurrence referring to the victim S.A. The Crown opposes disclosure.

4. The video, if any, of the altercation referred to in Henry-Hunter’s occurrence pertaining to the victim V.H. The Crown opposes disclosure.

5. The video, if any, of the altercation referred to in Henry-Hunter’s occurrence pertaining to victims A and B. Again, the Crown opposes disclosure.

7These additional five items, to the extent that they exist, fall into categories a) - f) above.

8For the reasons that follow, the application for disclosure under the first-party regime is granted.

Background

9I will briefly set out the circumstances of the alleged offences. On April 16, 2023, Ms. Day and the complainants drank and smoked marijuana together in Ms. Day’s apartment on Kingston Road in Toronto. The three drank heavily throughout the night. At some point, Ms. Day stabbed Mr. Burt in the abdomen. Mr. Burt says that the stabbing was an unprovoked attack. Mr. Henry-Hunter says that he did not see the stabbing because he was in the washroom. When he came out, he saw that Mr. Burt had been stabbed and saw Ms. Day brandishing a knife. He alleges that she threatened him. Ms. Day’s position is that both men are lying and that the two men attacked her, not the other way around. She admits to stabbing Mr. Burt but claims that she acted in self-defense.

10A preliminary inquiry in this matter took place on May 30 and 31, 2024 before De Freitas J. in the Ontario Court of Justice (“OCJ”). Both Mr. Burt and Mr. Henry-Hunter testified at the preliminary inquiry.

11A trial before a judge and jury in the Superior Court is scheduled to commence on April 7, 2025.

12Mr. Burt does not have a criminal record. However, at the preliminary inquiry, he testified that he was on bail at the time. He was charged with failure to comply with probation. He testified that he had completed a program and probation but failed to pay the restitution fee. He was on probation for an assault that he believed occurred in 2020. The victim was his cousin. He broke his cousin’s nose in a fight. His sentence involved completing a year-long John Howard Society program and a year of probation. The Crown advises that it is prepared to provide the disposition date(s), sentence, underlying occurrence reports, and police synopsis for the 2020 occurrences.

13Also, at the preliminary inquiry, Mr. Burt recalled being charged with assault around 2015. He was arguing with the mother of his children and her father. The argument “got out of hand” and he pushed her father. He believed that he had pled guilty to that offence and completed a period of probation. The Crown advises that there is no evidence of a 2015 occurrence. I direct that if the Crown becomes aware of any such information, she shall advise defence counsel. However, the Crown maintains that this request should be pursued through third party disclosure. It is therefore necessary that I rule on this request.

14Mr. Henry-Hunter has a criminal record with two entries. On October 26, 2023, he was found guilty of assaulting S.A. by choking, suffocating, or strangling contrary to s. 267(c) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46. He received a conditional discharge and was placed on probation for a period of 12 months. He was also subject to a weapons prohibition for 3 years. The Crown advises that the occurrence report and police synopsis for this offence has been provided to the defence. On January 5, 2024, he was found guilty of assaulting V. H. The Crown advises that the occurrence report and police synopsis for the second offence has also been provided to the defence.

15In Mr. Henry-Hunter’s occurrence report with respect to S.A., there is a reference as follows:

There is one previous Domestic Incident on file [redacted] and one previous Domestic Assault [redacted]. [t]he previous Domestic Assault has been dealt with in the courts. The victim is legally blind even with her prescription glasses on.

16The parties advise that these two references to domestic incident / assault are also in respect of S.A. The Crown has not disclosed records in respect of these domestic incident/ assault references and maintains that they should be requested via a third party records application.

Applicable Legal Principles

17The applicable legal principles concerning the Crown’s duty of disclosure in criminal proceedings were aptly summarized by Presser J. in R. v. Haley, 2025 ONSC 265, at paras. 43-50:

Disclosure in criminal cases is governed by two different regimes: R. v. Abdella, 2021 ONSC 3932, 2021 CarswellOnt 7852, at para. 11.

The first, known as first-party disclosure, requires the prosecuting Crown to provide the defence with all material in its possession that is not “clearly irrelevant” or privileged: R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at p. 339; R. v. Gubbins, 2018 SCC 44, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 35, at para. 29.

The defence has a right to first party disclosure on request: Abdella, at para.11. The right is ongoing and constitutional, protected by s. 7 of the Charter: Stinchcombe, at p. 342; Gubbins, at paras. 18-19; R. v. Pascal, 2020 ONCA 287, 387 C.C.C. (3d) 236, at para. 100. It “helps to guarantee the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence”: R. v. Taillefer; R. v. Duguay, 2003 SCC 70, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307, at para. 61.

In Abdella, at paras. 12-13, Schreck J. gave the following helpful explanation of the two ways in which the Crown can come into possession of material that triggers its first party disclosure obligations:

First, the police have a duty to provide the Crown with all of the information pertaining to its investigation of the accused, which is sometimes referred to as the “fruits of the investigation”: R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66, at paras. 14, 24; Gubbins, at para. 21; Pascal, at para. 104.

Second, where “obviously relevant” material is in the possession of some other governmental agency and the Crown is put on notice of its existence, the Crown has a duty to make reasonable inquiries of that agency and obtain the material if it is feasible to do so: McNeil, at paras. 48-50; R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390, at para. 12; Gubbins, at para. 23; Pascal, at paras. 104, 106. Once the Crown comes into possession of such material, it must be disclosed.¹

Material will be “fruits of the investigation” where it was “generated or acquired during or as a result of the specific investigation into the charges against the accused”: Gubbins, at para. 22.

Material will be “obviously relevant” where it “relates to the accused’s ability to meet the Crown’s case, raise a defence, or otherwise consider the conduct of the defence”: Gubbins, at para. 23.

The second disclosure regime governs material that is in the hands of third parties. This regime governs the disclosure of material that is not in the possession of the prosecuting Crown, the investigating police service in relation to its investigation of the accused, nor another governmental body that is required to provide the material to the Crown because it is “obviously relevant.” The Crown is not required to seek out or disclose such material from third parties. Instead, the defence must bring an application for third party production and establish that the material is “likely relevant”: R. v. O’Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.

In order to determine which disclosure regime applies to any material, a reviewing court must consider two questions. As set out in Pascal at para. 107, these questions ask whether:

i. the information sought is in the possession or control of the prosecuting Crown; and

ii. the nature of the information sought is such that the police or another Crown entity in possession or control of it should have supplied the information to the prosecuting Crown.

The second question will be answered affirmatively where the information is part of “the fruits of the investigation” or is “obviously relevant”. An affirmative response on either of these issues means that the first party or Stinchcombe disclosure regime applies: Gubbins, at para. 33.

18Haley, citing R. v. Abdella, 2021 ONSC 3932, also confirms the principle that material is either relevant or it is not, at para. 56:

Relevance, for the purpose of triggering the Crown’s first party disclosure obligations, is defined broadly: Stinchcombe, at p. 339; Taillefer, at paras. 59-60. Moreover, as noted in Abdella, at para. 22:

In determining whether the material in question is “obviously relevant” such that the Crown’s duty to inquire is engaged, it is important [to] recall that relevance is a binary concept. As pointed out in R. v. Jackson, 2015 ONCA 832, 128 O.R. 161, at para. 121, “[t]he law of evidence knows no degrees of relevance” and evidence is either relevant or not: see also Gubbins, at para. 23. Evidence will be relevant where “as a matter of human experience and logic, the existence of a particular fact, directly or indirectly, makes the existence or non-existence of another fact more probable than it would be otherwise”: Jackson, at para. 122; R. v. Cloutier, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 708, at p. 731.

Discussion

19I need only deal with the requested disclosure that the Crown has refused to disclose. For the reasons that follow, I shall first collectively address the following records pertaining to the complainants:

(a) Withdrawn or stayed charges.

(b) Acquittals.

(c) Uncharged offences.

20As set out in Pascal, at para. 107, I must ask whether:

i. the information sought is in the possession or control of the prosecuting Crown; and

ii. the nature of the information sought is such that the police or another Crown entity in possession or control of it should have supplied the information to the prosecuting Crown, either because the information is part of “the fruits of the investigation” or is “obviously relevant.”

21It is not contested that the information sought is not in the possession or control of the prosecuting Crown. Moving on to the second question, I find that the information sought does not constitute the “fruits of the investigation” since it was not “generated or acquired during or as a result of the specific investigation into the charges against the accused.” The real debate is whether the information sought is “obviously relevant”. Does it relate to the accused’s ability to meet the Crown’s case, raise a defence, or otherwise consider the conduct of the defence”: R. v. Gubbins, 2018 SCC 44, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 35, at para. 23.

22Both Crown and Defence rely on R. v. Paciej, 2024 ONSC 4140, an unreported decision of Schabas J. In Paciej, the applicant accused was charged with assault with a weapon, assault by choking and uttering threats, all in relation to his domestic partner. In a pre-trial application, the applicant sought disclosure of three categories of documents insofar as they pertained to the complainant:

• Outstanding charges and supporting synopsis / police reports;

• Any occurrence reports / police reports where the complainant was a suspect, person of interest, or an accused person; and

• A Crown brief pertaining to the charge of assault against the complainant from December 2021, including police notes, any statements, SOCO photos, and police reports.

23The Crown in Paciej did not object to disclosing the first category of records but objected to disclosure of the second and third categories of records, submitting that the latter two were subject to the third-party disclosure regime in accordance with the decision in R. v. O’Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. The applicant in Paciej, as in the within case, argued that all the items sought constituted first-party records which must be disclosed in accordance with the requirements in R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.

24Schabas J. commented that:

The tension arises in determining whether information sought is relevant, or potentially relevant, in that it may assist the defence, or whether the defence is simply on a fishing expedition or should be obliged to pursue information through the third-party records process. (at para. 69)

25Schabas J. cited R. v. Abdo, 2016 ONSC 7240, where K. Campbell J. discussed the scope of challenging the credibility of a Crown witness. K. Campbell J. noted that the defence may attack a witness “by exploring, within reasonable limits, all manner of past acts of alleged misconduct.” Not only does this include criminal records and findings of guilt, but it also permits “cross-examination on details of alleged misconduct that did not result in a criminal charge or for which a witness has been charged but not yet tried”: Abdo, at paras. 6-9.

26I note, parenthetically, that Abdo is not a case about disclosure. Rather, it is about the scope of cross-examination. There is a relationship between disclosure and cross-examination in that the cross-examiner will generally benefit from having greater disclosure about the witness or the subject matter of the cross-examination. However, disclosure and cross-examination serve different purposes and occur at different stages in the trial process. The principles and scope of each may inform the other, but should not be conflated.

27In Paciej, Schabas J. also commented that:

As Watt J.A. discussed in R. v. Jackson, 2015 ONCA 832 at para. 124, the term “obviously relevant” refers to “information that would not fall within the compass of ‘fruits of the investigation’, but would be of importance to the defence case.” In McNeil the material sought was police discipline records which were “obviously relevant” to the credibility and reliability of the arresting officer’s evidence, and were central to the Crown’s case. (at para. 67)

It is worth reiterating, nevertheless, that the scope of such cross-examination is always subject to limits imposed by a trial judge “who must balance the probative value of such cross-examination against its prejudicial effect.” Further, and perhaps more significantly for purposes of this case, there mere fact that a witness has been charged with an offence in the past, or was a suspect or person of interest in an occurrence report, does not mean that the facts of that event or occurrence are relevant or probative if raised in cross-examination. More than a bald request is needed. (at para. 73)

28Schabas J. went on to comment on several cases where disclosure under first-party principles was ordered or denied depending on the specific facts of the case. In R. v. Pompey, 2018 ONSC 1003, Nakatsuru J. noted that just because there have been past incidents between a complainant and an accused, it “does not automatically mean the Crown briefs automatically fall within Stinchcombe” where the two are involved. The court in Pompey explained that “this would be extremely onerous in cases such as domestic assault” where there is often a past history. In Pompey, material regarding a prior incident between the accused and the complainant was ultimately ordered to be disclosed for the purposes of a Gardiner hearing, because the accused put in issue whether there was provocation or an element of self-defence involved. In R. v. Chaudhry, 2020 ONSC 6022, Goldstein J. ordered disclosure as he considered it specifically relevant to a third-party suspect defence the accused advanced and that had an “air of reality” as the witness had provable connections to the offence. There was a “reasonable possibility” that the occurrence reports sought could assist the accused in “making full answer and defence.”

29Schabas J. held in Paciej, at para. 74, that self-defence was not an issue in that case. Here, in Ms. Day’s case, she submits that since self-defence is an issue, Paciej supports her disclosure request. Conversely, the Crown argues that Paciej affirms the principle that past incidents involving Crown witness are not “obviously relevant” without a clear nexus to the accused’s case at bar. I agree with the applicant that because self-defence is an issue, the holding in Paciej would support her first-party disclosure request.

30I find further guidance is provided by two other decisions referred to in Paciej, namely MacGarvie and Abdella.

31In R. v. MacGarvie, Nagy and Wilson, 2017 ONSC 2745, three co-accused were indicted for first-degree murder. One co-accused, Nagy, made an application for an order requiring the production of criminal records and occurrence reports relating to all Crown witnesses. The Crown resisted disclosure submitting that the occurrence reports in the circumstances of the case did not form part of its first-party disclosure obligations. Reid J. held that credibility was a significant matter in the trial and that “prior contacts between witnesses and the police, depending on the circumstances, may be a fruitful source of challenge to the reliability of the evidence presented.” Reid J. held that the police occurrence reports involving Crown witnesses could reasonably be expected to contain information that may assist an accused in the exercise of the right to make full answer and defence. Reid J. ordered disclosure of the police occurrence reports as contained in the computerized records of the relevant police service within the broad scope of the Crown’s first-party duty of disclosure.

32In Abdella, the accused was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking. The marijuana was found in a gym bag seized during the search of an apartment that did not belong to the accused. The bag contained a passport belonging to an individual who did not live there. Abdella applied for disclosure of any criminal record or outstanding charges in relation to the passport’s owner as well as any occurrence reports in which the owner was identified as a suspect, person of interest, or accused. Ultimately, Schreck J. ordered that “any information that [the passport owner] has a record for drug offences or is facing outstanding charges of that nature would be ‘obviously relevant’ because the passport was found in the same bag as the marijuana.” Schreck J. came to the same conclusion with respect to any record of the passport owner having a criminal record or outstanding charges in relation to firearms offences, because the accused was also charged with possession of a handgun seized in the apartment. However, Schreck J. took a different view about the passport holder’s other types of criminal offences. He held that, should the Crown become aware of the existence of such material, it should notify the applicant, who could then determine whether he wished to bring a third party records application.

33In R. v. Landriault, 2019 ONSC 2020, the accused was charged with criminal negligence causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The context of the charges was that a disagreement over parenting time had occurred between Landriault and Ashford – the mother of the couple’s then seven year old daughter. As Landriault drove away, Ashford had put her arm inside the driver’s side window and was hanging onto the truck. She fell from the truck and Landriault ran over her, fracturing her legs. Ashford was anticipated to testify as part of the Crown’s case. She had a criminal record which was disclosed to defence counsel. In response, a request was made for disclosure of documents related to the entries in Ms. Ashford’s criminal record. Corthorn J. canvassed a number of authorities which post-dated the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66.

34In particular, Corthorn J. referenced the Saskatchewan case of R. v. Pinacie-Littlechief, 2017 SKQB 392 which referred to certain factors that should be taken into account on disclosure applications. I find the following commentary from Pinacie-Littlechief, at paras. 33-34, helpful:

While each case must be decided on its own particular facts, the general thread I glean from the jurisprudence is that there are not rigid categories into which records that are not held by the Crown, and not fruits of the investigation, invariably fall. Whether such records are first party or third party records for disclosure purposes depends upon whether the information sought is obviously relevant in the sense that it could realistically have a bearing on the accused’s case. This is a determination which must be made in light of the particular facts of the case, with consideration given to a number of factors, including (i) the nature of the charge(s); (ii) the nature of the defence(s) being raised; (iii) the role that the witness or witnesses to whom the records relate play in the investigation and trial; and (iv) the evidence led on the application.

It seems that where the accused can demonstrate (1) that the credibility and/or reliability of the evidence of the witness is crucial to the Crown’s case (and that access to the records sought can shed light on credibility and reliability); and (2) that there is a close connection between the subject matter of the witness’ previous dealings with the police and the subject matter of the current charge (either in the sense of there being a connection or past history between the parties, or that the witness’ previous dealings with police are obviously relevant to a particular issue or defence being raised at trial); then there is a much greater likelihood that such records will be seen as having a bearing on the accused’s case, such that they are first party records under the principles set out in McNeil.

Decision

35In light of the principles identified in the above authorities, I find that the nature of the charges faced by the applicant involve allegations of violence. The applicant is alleged to have stabbed one complainant and threatened the other, but claims that the complainants attacked her. The nature of the defence being raised is self-defence, so incidents involving the complainants’ alleged violent behaviour are relevant. The disclosure is sought in respect of key Crown witnesses, namely the complainants. Based on the material that the Crown has disclosed, it appears that Mr. Burt may have been involved in assaultive incidents in 2015 and 2020. The occurrence reports, if any, related to those entries should be disclosed. As well, any occurrence reports involving violence in respect of withdrawn or stayed charges, acquittals or uncharged offences should be disclosed under first-party principles to defence counsel.

36Moving on to the defence request for “the prior occurrences, disposition dates, and outcomes for the two domestic incidents referred to in Mr. Henry-Hunter’s occurrence referring to the victim S.A.” I find that these records should also be disclosed by the Crown as first-party disclosure. The domestic incidents relate to violence and have a sufficiently “close connection” to the subject matter of the trial and the applicant’s self-defence claim. The Crown argues that it is doubtful that there is an “air of reality” to the applicant’s self-defence claim and for that reason, disclosure of the sought-after records is not “obviously relevant.” Perhaps the trial judge will agree with the Crown but, at this point, the issue is whether disclosure under first-party principles is warranted. I agree with Schreck J. that relevance cannot be defined entirely in relation to the Crown’s theory of the case. Of course, neither does a record automatically become “obviously relevant” merely because defence counsel has brought its existence or potential existence to the attention of the Crown. There must be a reasonable possibility that the records sought may assist the accused in the exercise of their right to make full answer and defence: McNeil, at para. 17; Stinchcombe, at pp. 343-44. Yet, the phrase “obviously relevant” does not set a new, more demanding standard in relation to first party disclosure: R. v. Jackson, 2015 ONCA 832, 128 O.R. 161 at para. 113.

37Next, I will deal with the videos, if any, mentioned in the occurrences of the altercations involving Mr. Henry-Hunter and the victims V.H., A and B.

38Haley was an appeal from a summary conviction in the OCJ. The appellant in Haley had been convicted after trial of assault with a weapon for spraying bleach on a neighbour, Raymond Whyte, and assault for pushing another neighbour, Justin Zaza. Presser J. found that the OCJ judge erred in refusing to order disclosure of a video of an altercation between the complainant Mr. Whyte and another neighbour. The altercation took place 16 months earlier in the same building where the appellant assaulted Mr. Whyte and Mr. Zaza. The video showed Mr. Whyte chasing a neighbour, pushing him to the ground, and punching him twice in the head when he was on the ground.

39Presser J. held that there was a reasonable possibility that the contents of the video directly or indirectly made it more probable that Mr. Whyte was not credible, or that there was an air of reality to self-defence and the video was therefore relevant. Presser J. also held that the video was potentially relevant as independent evidence of Mr. Whyte’s propensity for violence: R. v. Scopelliti (1982), 1981 CanLII 1787 (ON CA), 34 O.R. (2d) 524 (Ont. C.A.). Therefore, it was potentially relevant to the claim of self-defence.

40Here, the parties take opposing views about Haley’s significance to the present application. The applicant submits that Haley is directly on point. The videos, if any, concerning Mr. Henry-Hunter should be disclosed as they assist in demonstrating that Mr. Henry-Hunter had a propensity for violence and would provide independent evidence of what transpired during the altercations. The videos could be used in the cross-examination of Mr. Henry-Hunter, particularly if he provides an alternate description of the incidents. The Crown submits that disclosure of the videos was ordered in Haley because of the close nexus between the video in that case and the issues at trial. The video in Haley showed the complainant’s involvement in an altercation with a neighbour in the same building where Haley allegedly committed the assaults. The connection is not as close in this case.

41I find that the Crown should provide disclosure of the videos, if any, in respect of the altercations referred to in Mr. Henry-Hunter’s occurrences pertaining to the victims V.H., A and B. On balance, I find that there is a sufficiently close connection between the subject matter of Mr. Henry-Hunter’s previous dealings with the police and the applicant’s current charges. It is important to remember that we are at the disclosure stage and not the admissibility stage. The relevance of the video(s), if any, for the purposes of admissibility shall be made by the trial judge. My view is that if the video(s) do exist and relate to incidents where Mr. Henry-Hunter was violent, it is “obviously relevant” to two significant issues at trial, namely: who was threatening whom, and whether the applicant was acting in self-defense when she allegedly stabbed Mr. Burt and threatened Mr. Henry-Hunter. This material shall therefore be disclosed.

42I understand that the trial in this matter is scheduled to commence the week of April 7, 2025. The parties may contact me through my judicial assistant if further clarification is required.

Pinto J.

Footnotes

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