Andrew McNaughton Porter

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application seeking to set aside employment agreements between the respondent corporation and an employee, alleging the agreements were oppressive and breached a family law undertaking.

They also appealed the refusal to remove the respondent as a trustee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings that the undertaking had expired, the negotiations were not secretive, and the agreements were beneficial to the corporation.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the discretionary decision not to remove the trustee.

The plaintiff suffered a fractured femur and a pulseless leg following a motorcycle accident.

He was treated in the emergency room by the defendant physician, who failed to urgently transfer him to a trauma centre or communicate the pulseless nature of the limb to the trauma team leader.

Due to the delay in transfer, the plaintiff's leg became unsalvageable and was amputated.

The court found the defendant physician breached the standard of care and that this breach caused the amputation.

The court awarded the agreed-upon damages without deduction for statutory accident benefits or OHIP subrogated claims.

The defendants brought a motion to strike paragraphs of the plaintiff's amended statement of claim that sought an oppression remedy against the individual directors under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

The plaintiff, a former employee suing for wrongful dismissal, alleged the directors acted oppressively by withholding vacation pay and dismissing him.

The court found that the plaintiff's pleaded reasonable expectations were held in his capacity as an employee, not as a creditor, and that the oppression remedy cannot be used as a surrogate for a wrongful dismissal claim.

The court struck the impugned paragraphs without leave to amend and awarded the defendants $8,500 in costs.

The College of Psychologists of Ontario appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board ordering the College to register the respondent as a psychological associate.

The respondent had completed an online master's degree, which the College's Registration Committee found did not meet the resident study requirement and was not substantially similar.

The Board found the Committee acted improperly by not following the Board's prior recommendation that the program was substantially similar.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal, holding that the Committee was not bound by the Board's recommendation and that the Board erred in finding an improper exercise of power.

The matter was remitted to a newly constituted panel of the Registration Committee.

In a medical malpractice action alleging lack of consent to a tubal ligation, the defendant physicians brought a motion under Rule 31.10 to examine the plaintiff's husband as a non-party.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that her husband had already provided written answers and that other parties present during the consent discussions had been examined.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff's inability to recall certain discussions did not amount to a constructive refusal, and the defendants failed to establish they were unable to obtain the information from other sources.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision refusing him a certificate of registration as a psychologist.

He failed to comply with previous court orders requiring him to order and pay for transcripts and to perfect his application.

Instead, he requested that the court schedule a hearing.

The court refused to schedule the hearing and ordered the applicant to provide a reasonable explanation for his non-compliance by a specified date, failing which the proceeding would be dismissed.

The defendants sought to dismiss two actions brought by the self-represented plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The actions involved allegations of improper disclosure of medical information and forged consent, which had already been conclusively dismissed in a prior summary judgment motion.

The court found that the new actions were an attempt to relitigate the same issues, constituting an improper collateral attack and res judicata.

The actions were dismissed as an abuse of process.

The applicants brought a motion to enforce an interim settlement agreement with the City of Toronto regarding physical distancing standards in the city's shelter system during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The City had asserted compliance with the agreement on June 15, 2020, which would trigger the termination of the agreement.

The court found that the City breached the agreement by asserting compliance when it had not used its 'best efforts' to achieve the required physical distancing standards across all sites.

The court ordered the City to continue its pre-compliance reporting obligations until it fully met its obligations under the agreement.

The applicants brought a refusals motion to compel answers and document production from the City of Toronto and Ontario in a Charter application challenging shelter standards during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The motion sought to enforce an Interim Settlement Agreement regarding physical distancing and bed capacity in shelters.

The court granted the motion in part, finding many of the City's refusals improper regarding system-wide compliance data for the May 15-June 15, 2020 period, but upheld other refusals based on proportionality, particularly concerning the Central Intake service, daily capacity data, and information outside the specified period.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a decision refusing him a certificate of registration as a psychologist.

He brought a motion for a fee waiver under the Financial Administration Act to cover the costs of hearing transcripts.

The case management judge found the motion appeared doomed to fail as the issue had already been decided by another judge, and the applicant refused to engage constructively.

The court directed the Registrar to issue a notice under Rule 2.1.02 that the court was considering dismissing the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellant sought to set aside a motion judge's order dismissing her motion to set aside the administrative dismissal of her appeal.

The appeal had been administratively dismissed twice due to the appellant's repeated failure to meet perfection deadlines, despite extensions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretion, noting the extensive delay, the unconvincing justification for non-perfection, and the lack of proof for the appellant's claims of material tampering or respondent non-cooperation.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant brought a motion to disqualify the plaintiffs' expert epidemiologist, Dr. Michael Freeman.

The court granted the motion, finding that Dr. Freeman lacked specialized knowledge in the specific medical areas (metabolics and neurology) relevant to the causation question.

His "comparative risk" methodology was deemed outside the mainstream study of epidemiology for specific causation, and his reports indicated a lack of objectivity by primarily critiquing other experts rather than offering independent analysis within his own expertise.

The court also noted that his proposed evidence was not necessary, as the plaintiffs' other expert covered the same points.

The defendant in a medical malpractice action brought a motion at the outset of trial to strike the plaintiffs' jury notice.

The defendant argued that the complex scientific evidence relating to the minor plaintiff's rare metabolic disorder and the issue of causation made the case unsuitable for a jury.

Applying the principles from Kempf v. Nguyen, the court declined to strike the jury notice prior to trial, opting instead for the preferred 'wait and see' approach.

The motion was dismissed with leave to renew after the evidence is completed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board upholding the College of Psychologists' refusal to register him for supervised practice.

The appellant held a PhD in Developmental Psychology that was not accredited by the Canadian Psychological Association.

The Board found that under the 2015 regulation, it could only consider the appellant's doctoral program itself, not his extensive subsequent clinical experience, to determine equivalency.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's interpretation of the regulation was reasonable, despite expressing concerns about the fairness of the rigid regulatory requirements.

The Canadian Hearing Society (CHS) brought a motion seeking to dismiss the application of the corporate applicant, The Campaign for the Inclusion of People who are Deaf and Hard of Hearing (the "Campaign"), for lack of standing, and to stay the application of the individual applicants, Ian Silver and Keith Golem, pending arbitration.

The court found that the Campaign was not a "complainant" under the Canada Not-for-Profit Corporations Act as it lacked a private right and reasonable expectation, and its representative authority was questionable.

The court also determined that the individual applicants' oppression claims were subject to arbitration clauses in the CHS by-laws.

Consequently, the Campaign's application was dismissed, and the Individual Applicants' application was stayed pending arbitration.

Costs were awarded to the CHS.

The plaintiff transportation brokerage sought an interlocutory injunction to enforce a non-solicitation clause against former employees who resigned to join a competitor.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, requiring a strong prima facie case because the injunction would restrict the defendants' ability to earn a living.

The court found the non-solicitation clause was likely too broad in duration and scope, and the departing employee was not a fiduciary.

The motion for an injunction was dismissed, but the court declined to award costs to the successful defendants due to their flagrant disregard for the spirit of the employment agreement and inappropriate handling of confidential information.

A lawyer appealed a professional misconduct finding based on in-court incivility during a securities prosecution.

The majority held that reasonableness review applied and accepted the disciplinary framework, but found its application unreasonable on the record.

The Court concluded the allegations were made in good faith with sufficient factual foundation in context.

The appeal was allowed and the complaints were dismissed.

The plaintiff sued numerous lawyers, insurers, medical assessors, experts, and court reporting parties arising from the handling of underlying motor vehicle accident tort and accident benefits litigation.

The court applied the summary judgment framework and held that the claims were either statute-barred, defeated by the absence of any duty of care, barred by expert witness immunity, unsupported by admissible evidence, or lacking any proof of compensable damage.

Claims against former counsel failed for limitation and lack of expert support and causation; claims against opposing counsel and insurers failed because no duty was owed to an adverse party; claims against expert assessors failed because their litigation-related reports were immune from suit.

Allegations that discovery transcripts had been doctored were unsupported and did not disclose any triable issue.

Summary judgment was granted to all defendants and the action was dismissed.

The defendant sought costs of $29,522.82 following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

The defendant argued for substantial indemnity costs from the date of an offer to settle.

The court found that the plaintiff's motion was not unreasonable, as it had an arguable case and the motion served to narrow the issues and shorten future discoveries.

Consequently, the court exercised its discretion to order costs in the cause, fixing the amount at $22,500 all-inclusive.

The plaintiff landlord brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce an indemnity under a commercial property insurance policy following a fire loss.

The parties disputed the amount payable for cleanup costs, with the plaintiff relying on its contractor's invoice and the defendant insurer relying on a lower estimate from its preferred contractor.

The court found significant confusion and miscommunication between the parties regarding which contractor was to provide the control estimate and whether the plaintiff breached the policy by denying access to the insurer's agent.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed as there were genuine issues requiring a trial that could not be resolved on the documentary record.