Alison Elizabeth Craig

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference arising from admitted sexual intercourse with a complainant under 16.

The court found the complainant's evidence on non-consent insufficiently credible and reliable to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt under the W.(D.) framework.

However, the court held that the statutory defence of honest but mistaken belief in age was unavailable because the accused failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain age, having relied only on the complainant's statement that she was 18 despite multiple warning signs.

Convictions were entered on both counts.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping and sexually assaulting a 12-year-old girl, designated a dangerous offender, and given an indeterminate sentence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended eyewitness identification, cell tower, and DNA evidence, and erred in rejecting a determinate sentence with long-term supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and noting the overwhelming case against the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's risk could not be managed in the community.

Sentencing decision for a first offender who pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm after police observed him discard the handgun following a crash arising from street racing.

The court treated the public possession and abandonment of a loaded handgun near a roadway and sidewalk as a serious aggravating circumstance engaging denunciation, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and public protection.

While the offender's guilty plea, youth, lack of record, employment history, and community support were mitigating factors, the offence was placed near the true-crime end of the spectrum described in the firearm sentencing jurisprudence.

A penitentiary term of three years was imposed, with credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive house arrest, together with a DNA order and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The applicant, convicted of sixteen counts of fraud, brought an application for a mistrial alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in her representation.

The central issue was whether the applicant or his counsel made the decision that he would not testify in his own defence.

The court found that trial counsel made the decision contrary to the applicant's express wishes and without adequately informing him that the decision to testify was ultimately his to make.

The court declared a mistrial, finding that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The appellant appealed a conviction and sentence for assault arising from an altercation with his spouse during a separation and custody dispute.

The appeal court held that the trial judge failed to adequately explain the rejection of the appellant's evidence, particularly by relying on unspecified 'other serious improbabilities', and appeared to subject the appellant's evidence to a different level of scrutiny than the complainant's evidence.

Applying appellate principles governing unreasonable verdicts, errors of law, and credibility analysis, the court concluded that the conviction and sentence had to be set aside.

A new trial was ordered, and the ineffective assistance ground was not addressed.

The appellant appealed a net sentence of two years and seven months imposed following a guilty plea to possession of a prohibited firearm with ammunition.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in drawing unwarranted inferences, imposing an excessive sentence, and failing to give adequate credit for harsh bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fell within the appropriate range given the appellant's prior record, breach of a weapons prohibition, and the nature of the firearm (a sawed-off shotgun stored with ammunition).

The appellant, a long-time member of the Hells Angels, appealed a decision by the Licence Appeal Tribunal revoking his liquor licence.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the Tribunal erred in law by failing to articulate adequate reasons for rejecting an order imposing conditions as an alternative to revocation.

The Divisional Court determined the applicable standard of review was reasonableness and found that the Tribunal's reasons were sufficient, as the proposed conditions would not overcome the concerns regarding the licensee's membership in a criminal organization.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempted robbery of a bank.

At age 55, with a criminal record including twelve prior bank robbery convictions and 32 years of cumulative sentences, the accused attempted to rob a Bank of Montreal branch on August 23, 2013.

The attempt was abandoned when the teller hesitated, and the accused left without obtaining any money.

The accused had been in custody for 11.5 months pre-trial.

The Crown sought 8-10 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 18 months plus probation.

The court imposed one year imprisonment followed by three years probation, considering the low-end nature of the attempted robbery, the accused's genuine remorse, guilty plea, and evidence of rehabilitation efforts during a three-year period of release prior to the offence, balanced against the serious criminal record and need for deterrence.

The offender was convicted of breaching his Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by consuming alcohol and cocaine.

The Crown sought a sentence of four to five years, while the defence sought a non-carceral sentence.

The court noted the offender's significant rehabilitation efforts, including maintaining steady employment, establishing a stable family life, and avoiding violent behaviour for over a decade.

Applying the principles from R. v. Ipeelee, the court found that a further prison term would be detrimental to the offender's rehabilitation and that he did not pose a current danger to the community.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by two years of probation.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The charges involved two counts of assault arising from incidents on October 3 and October 13, 2012.

The trial was scheduled for August 2, 2013, but was adjourned when the complainant failed to appear despite being subpoenaed.

A second trial date was set for December 4, 2013.

The total delay from the date of the alleged offences to the second trial date was 13¾ months.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the delay was substantial, it was not unreasonable when all factors were considered holistically.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, finding that his exercise of authority vitiated her consent, and rejecting his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's credibility findings were justified and supported by the evidence of the appellant's reign of terror and religious indoctrination in the household.

The court concluded the appellant's exercise of authority vitiated the complainant's consent and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault involving alleged sexual touching of a 13‑year‑old complainant.

The trial judge had accepted the complainant’s evidence and rejected the accused’s testimony, relying heavily on inferences that the accused had consumed significant alcohol which undermined his reliability.

On appeal, the court held that these inferences were unsupported by the evidence and amounted to speculative reasoning affecting the credibility assessment.

Because the trial judge relied on those unsupported conclusions in rejecting the accused’s denial, the verdict could not stand.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarding him $1,000 for injuries sustained in a bar fight.

The Board had reduced the compensation under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act due to the appellant's criminal lifestyle, and under s. 17(2) for his failure to cooperate with police.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Board erred in law by applying s. 17(1) without establishing a nexus between the appellant's conduct and his injuries.

The matter was remitted to the Board to reconsider the compensation amount based solely on the s. 17(2) finding.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for a single act of sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old by a person in a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal noted that the upper end of the range for this type of offence is more than five years.

The court concluded that while the sentence imposed was high, it was not manifestly unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was invalid due to a mental disorder and equivocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made the necessary inquiries to ensure the plea was informed and voluntary.

Fresh evidence, including medical records without expert interpretation, did not demonstrate the plea was involuntary or unequivocal.

The appellant pleaded guilty in 1992 to criminal negligence causing the death of his infant son, based on flawed expert evidence from Dr. Charles Smith regarding Shaken Baby Syndrome.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, fresh expert evidence revealed that the infant's death was likely caused by natural disease processes or birth trauma, and that the triad of symptoms relied upon by Dr. Smith was not diagnostic of non-accidental head injury.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea to prevent a miscarriage of justice, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's questioning of a recanting Crown witness demonstrated a prejudgment of the witness's credibility and the appellant's guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the manner and timing of the questions, the absence of objection by trial counsel, and the nature of the witness's testimony did not establish prejudgment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle, arguing that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof and based the decision on how long it takes a person to wake up.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge that the trial judge's decision was properly based on factual findings.

The appellant appealed his 15-year sentence for robbery, aggravated assault, and firearms offences, arguing unjustifiable disparity with his co-accused's 11-year sentence and that his firearms sentences should have been concurrent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity fully justified by the appellant's extensive criminal record, age, and parole status at the time of the offences.

The court also held that the sentencing judge was entitled to impose consecutive sentences for the firearms offences to reflect the invasion of different legally protected interests.