Alison Elizabeth Craig

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation against the offender for historical sexual offences committed against his children.

The court reviewed psychiatric evidence indicating the offender had pedohebephilia and a moderate risk of sexual recidivism, but found he did not meet the criteria for a dangerous offender as his conduct was not intractable and the risk would decline with age.

The court instead designated him a long-term offender, imposing a sentence of 7.5 years imprisonment (with credit for pre-trial custody leaving 6 months and 1 day to serve) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The applicants, charged with firearms offences, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a forensic search of their cellphones.

They argued the Information to Obtain lacked reasonable grounds and the police failed to file a report to justice regarding the data analysis.

The court denied leave to cross-examine the affiant and upheld the validity of the warrant despite minor misstatements.

Although the court found a section 8 Charter breach due to the failure to file a report to justice for the data analysis, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) as the breach was minor and technical.

The appellant, D.L., sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of serious offences including sexual assault, assault, mischief, extortion, unlawful confinement, criminal harassment, and breach of probation, and pleading guilty to possession of cocaine for trafficking, receiving a six-year sentence.

His initial bail was granted but later denied after he was charged with uttering a death threat and trial transcripts became available, weakening the appeal's perceived strength.

D.L. reapplied for bail after the threat charge was withdrawn and he entered a peace bond.

The Court of Appeal denied the application, finding that the withdrawal of the threat charge did not constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to revisit the prior denial, and that public interest concerns, including the seriousness of the offences, the lengthy sentence, and the appellant's criminal history, justified his continued detention.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal order for a new trial on sexual assault charges arising from a camping trip on which the two accused engaged in sexual activity with a 16-year-old complainant who had consumed substantial alcohol.

The majority held that capacity to consent is a precondition to subjective consent, not a vitiating factor, so a trial judge need not address consent and capacity separately or in any particular order.

The majority further held that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient in the context of the case, as all parties agreed that the complainant's evidence — if accepted — established both incapacity and non-consent.

The concurring judges agreed on the result but found the trial judge's reasons insufficient on the capacity question, applying the curative proviso on the basis of overwhelming evidence of non-consent.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, concluding that the trial judge's errors were not trivial and the evidence was not sufficiently overwhelming to apply the curative proviso.

The appellant, P.D.C., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, criminal harassment, and breach of recognizance.

He raised five grounds of appeal, primarily concerning the trial judge's refusal to grant a mistrial or appoint amicus curiae after he discharged his counsel mid-trial, and the adequacy of the trial judge's guidance as a self-represented accused.

He also challenged the similar fact evidence ruling and the jury instructions on consent for the sexual assault charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding the mistrial and amicus appointment, noting the appellant's voluntary decision to discharge counsel at an advanced stage of the trial.

The court also found that the trial judge provided sufficient guidance to the self-represented accused and that the jury instructions on consent were adequate given the evidence and theory of the case.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including break and enter, aggravated assault, and robbery with a firearm, following a home invasion where the homeowner was shot.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data, DNA found on a marijuana roach at the scene, and eyewitness identification.

The court found the eyewitness identification to be general and weakened by the witness's inability to identify the accused in a photo lineup.

Furthermore, the court accepted a plausible alternative theory for the presence of the accused's DNA at the scene.

Concluding that the cumulative circumstantial evidence did not prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, the court found the accused not guilty.

The accused, charged with assault and sexual assault, applied to vary his bail conditions to allow him to leave his residence without his surety.

He had been on strict house arrest for seven months without any breaches, despite 50 police compliance checks.

The court considered the accused's lengthy criminal record and the serious nature of the charges, but found that his unblemished compliance and the delayed trial date justified a modest loosening of his conditions.

The application was granted, and the release order was amended to permit the accused to leave the residence on specific days with his surety's written permission.

S.B.S., currently serving a sentence and detained on other serious charges including human trafficking, applied for a second bail review.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to a strengthened supervision plan.

Despite the serious nature of the charges and a reversed onus, the court determined that the revised plan, including 24/7 surety supervision and electronic monitoring, sufficiently attenuated the risk to public safety and maintained confidence in the administration of justice.

The detention order was vacated, and S.B.S. was released on stringent conditions.

The applicant, facing extradition to the United States for identity theft and misrepresentation, applied for judicial interim release pending the Minister of Justice's decision on surrender.

The applicant had previously fled the United States to Canada while on bail and made a refugee claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he would surrender himself into custody, given his history of using fraudulent identification and breaching bail conditions to avoid returning to Ghana.

The applicant, S.B.S., convicted of drug offenses and serving a sentence, sought a bail review of his continued detention on new charges including human trafficking, breach of recognizance, and drug trafficking.

He proposed a stringent release plan with three sureties and electronic monitoring, citing his nearing parole eligibility and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown opposed, arguing an unacceptable risk to public safety.

The court found that the applicant had not met his onus to establish that continued detention was not justified on the secondary ground, citing the egregious nature of the new allegations, his prior flagrant breach of recognizance, and the inadequacy of the proposed surety plan.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

C.O., charged with serious offences including sexual assault and breach of probation, applied for a bail review after consenting to detention.

The application was based on new evidence, including a proposed surety and the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional facilities.

The Crown opposed release due to C.O.'s lengthy criminal record and public safety concerns.

The court found material changes in circumstances, including the new surety plan and the pandemic's impact on detention conditions and trial delays.

Despite C.O.'s significant criminal history, the court was satisfied that the proposed surety plan, offering 24/7 supervision, sufficiently attenuated public safety risks.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic as a factor tipping the balance in favour of release, vacating the detention order and releasing C.O. on a $10,000 recognizance with specific conditions.

The accused were jointly charged with offences arising from a gunpoint robbery at a Husky truck stop on Highway 401 near London, Ontario, and a subsequent attempted break-in and stabbing at a car wash near Warden Avenue in Scarborough, Toronto.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the London robbery and the Toronto attempted break-in and assault.

However, the Crown failed to establish the motive for the Toronto incidents as robbery, and therefore the accused were acquitted of the joint robbery charge relating to the car wash owner.

The accused were convicted on most counts but acquitted of the Toronto robbery charge.

The accused was charged with two separate counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit confessions obtained during a lengthy undercover 'Mr. Big' operation.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Hart, assessing the threshold reliability of the confessions against their prejudicial effect.

The court found the confessions to be highly detailed, internally consistent, and corroborated by holdback evidence, establishing strong probative value.

The moral prejudice arising from the accused's involvement in the simulated criminal organization was deemed mitigable through editing and jury instructions.

The confessions were ruled admissible.

The Crown sought to commit the accused to trial on several charges, including attempted murder, aggravated assault, and discharging a firearm with intent, arising from a home invasion robbery.

The preliminary inquiry judge found sufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial on the charges of robbery, break and enter, aggravated assault, and discharging a firearm, based on party liability.

However, the judge discharged the accused on the attempted murder charge, finding no evidence that the accused was the shooter or had the requisite subjective intent to kill.

In a pre-trial ruling for a first-degree murder trial, the accused applied to exclude security video surveillance recordings obtained by police from the common areas of his apartment building.

The accused argued the warrantless seizure violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the 246-unit building.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and important to the case.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and indignity to a dead body, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence seized from his apartment during warranted searches, alleging multiple Charter breaches.

The police had initially made a warrantless entry into the accused's apartment under exigent circumstances after discovering a dismembered body nearby.

The court found that while looking through the mail slot and failing to provide the right to counsel upon initial detention violated the Charter, the warrantless entry itself was justified under s. 487.11 of the Criminal Code.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the cumulative effect of the Charter breaches did not warrant exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2), as the police acted in good faith, the impact on protected interests was minimal due to discoverability, and society's interest in adjudicating the serious charges on the merits was high.

The application was dismissed.

This pre-trial ruling addressed the admissibility of the defendant's statement to the police.

The court found the statement to be voluntary, rejecting arguments of exhaustion, physical discomfort, mental state, or police trickery.

However, the court determined that the defendant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated in two ways: first, when the defendant expressed confusion about whether he had spoken to a lawyer, triggering a duty for police to offer a second consultation; and second, when the police questioning shifted to a significantly more serious offense (murder) without re-advising the defendant of his right to counsel.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court concluded that the Charter-infringing state conduct, despite not being in bad faith, was serious and had a significant impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests.

On balance, the admission of the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, leading to its exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and forcible confinement.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of seven years' imprisonment.

The appellant abandoned his sentence appeal and challenged only the convictions on three grounds: (1) the trial judge's instructions on the timing of complaints in sexual assault cases; (2) the trial judge's review of evidence relating to two separate incidents on both sexual assault counts; and (3) the overall fairness and balance of the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions when considered in the context of the trial as a whole.

The applicant, Raymond Burke, sought a stay of proceedings for charges including kidnapping and sexual assault, laid over 30 years prior.

He argued unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and denial of the right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 due to lost evidence.

The court found a 12.5-year period of Crown delay, from when an extradition treaty came into force in 2003 until his return to Canada in 2015, during which Canadian authorities failed to seek his extradition despite knowing his whereabouts and incarceration in the U.S. This delay, coupled with significant inferred and real prejudice from destroyed evidence, was deemed unreasonable under both the Jordan and pre-Jordan (Morin) frameworks.

The application for a stay of proceedings was granted.

The applicant pleaded guilty to impaired driving and driving with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

At sentencing, the applicant sought a declaration that Ontario's failure to proclaim section 255(5) of the Criminal Code—which would allow for a curative discharge for those in need of treatment for alcohol or drug addiction—violated sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued that the unavailability of this provision in Ontario, while available in other provinces and territories, constituted discrimination and cruel and unusual punishment.

The court dismissed all constitutional challenges, finding itself bound by prior appellate authority and determining that the applicant's arguments amounted to indirect attacks on mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.