William V. Sasso

In CCAA proceedings arising from the wind-down of a national retail chain, a pharmacy franchisee association moved to set aside disclaimer notices delivered in respect of franchise agreements for in-store pharmacies, and sought representative status, counsel, a financial advisor, and estate-funded professional fees.

The court held that the statutory factors under s. 32(4) of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act favoured permitting the disclaimers to stand, as store closures were inevitable, the monitor had approved the notices, setting them aside would delay liquidation and divert estate value from unsecured creditors generally, and no evidence showed continued operation in dark stores would improve the franchisees’ financial circumstances.

The court nevertheless found limited collective representation would assist with transition issues including regulators, inventory return, and claims, and appointed the association as representative, with counsel and a financial advisor.

Funding of up to $100,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST was approved, but no administrative charge was granted.

The plaintiff developer and the defendant municipality entered into a supplementary agreement regarding the enhancement of a sewage system.

The trial judge found that the municipality breached the agreement by allocating sewage capacity to a competing developer before the plaintiff's subdivision was completed, and awarded damages for lost commercial tenancies.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of the agreement.

The court found that the clause granting the plaintiff a monopoly over sewage capacity was ultra vires as it conflicted with the municipality's statutory obligation under s. 86(1) of the Municipal Act, 2001 to supply sewage services where sufficient capacity exists.

The court severed the offending clause and concluded that the municipality did not breach the revised agreement.

Furthermore, the court held that the damages claimed for lost commercial tenancies were too remote.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his civil wrongful-conviction action as an abuse of process and alternatively staying it under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action alleged negligence, misfeasance, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, misrepresentation, and Charter breaches arising from the non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory alibi evidence in a murder prosecution.

The court held that the prior criminal reference did not determine all issues raised in the civil action and was not intended to bind future proceedings after the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The motion judge also erred in relying on delay and changed positions by the appellant to justify a stay.

The appeal was allowed and the dismissal and stay orders were set aside.

The plaintiff moved to amend its Statement of Claim shortly before trial in a commercial dispute arising from the termination of a racetrack slots program agreement.

The defendant opposed the amendment on grounds including alleged limitation issues, withdrawal of a prior admission, expansion beyond the agreed issues list, and the inclusion of argumentative pleading.

The court reviewed the principles governing amendments under Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and concluded that amendments should generally be granted unless non-compensable prejudice is demonstrated.

Finding no such prejudice, the court allowed the amendments but imposed conditions restricting further discovery and requiring the amendments to be filed in black‑line format.

The court also rejected arguments that the amendments improperly altered the character of the action or were barred by limitation on the record before it.

The defendant tobacco companies brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' proposed class actions as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants breached their contracts by participating in smuggling duty-free tobacco back into Canada, avoiding higher domestic prices.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the alleged smuggling long before commencing the actions in 2009 and 2010.

The court dismissed the motions, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the plaintiffs discovered the constituent elements of their claims, particularly given the defendants' consistent denials of involvement in smuggling.

Following a major appellate decision regarding the tolling of limitation periods in securities class actions, the successful parties in two of the appeals sought their costs.

The opposing parties argued for reduced costs on the basis of public interest, over-lawyering, and the fact that the court had overruled its own prior jurisprudence.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the claimed amounts to be fair and reasonable given the complexity and significance of the proceedings.

Costs of $151,250 and $100,000 were awarded to the respective successful parties on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action alleging that Air Canada improperly collected U.S. transportation taxes on tickets purchased in Canada and between Canada and the U.S., thereby giving extra-territorial effect to U.S. tax laws.

The motion judge found the Ontario court had jurisdiction but stayed the claims of passengers who paid in the U.S. on the basis of forum non conveniens.

On appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while Ontario courts have jurisdiction to determine if a foreign law is being enforced extra-territorially, the entire action should be stayed on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The principle of comity requires that the interpretation of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code be undertaken by U.S. authorities first.

The defendant, APP Capital Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for breach of an employment contract and unjust enrichment.

The plaintiff, the former CFO of the co-defendant corporation, claimed entitlement to compensation under a 2008 employment agreement following the sale of the corporation.

The court applied the framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin and found that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed regarding whether the moving party was bound by the 2008 agreement.

The court declined to use its fact-finding powers due to incomplete documentary discovery and the potential for inconsistent verdicts, dismissing the motion.

In three related securities class action appeals, the court reconsidered whether a statutory secondary-market misrepresentation claim under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act is time-barred unless leave is obtained within the s. 138.14 limitation period.

The court overruled Timminco and held that, for purposes of s. 28 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the statutory claim is asserted when the representative plaintiff pleads the statutory cause of action, the supporting facts, and an intention to seek leave within a timely commenced class proceeding.

The court also upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the s. 138.8 leave standard as screening out hopeless claims, while holding that the Green certification decision erred in failing to consider certifying common negligent misrepresentation issues other than reliance.

The plaintiffs' appeal in Green was allowed in part and the defendants' appeals in Silver and Celestica were dismissed.

Minority shareholders sought relief under the oppression remedy and dissent and appraisal provisions of the Business Corporations Act after a majority shareholder attempted to restructure the corporation by reducing common shares and issuing scrip certificates that would effectively eliminate the minority’s interests.

The court determined the fair value of the dissenting shareholders’ shares as of the valuation date and rejected a proposed defence of laches, holding that the Limitations Act, 2002 applies to oppression claims and that laches does not apply where the claim is brought within the statutory limitation period.

While some alleged acts of misconduct, including removal of a director and management fees, were not oppressive, the proposed share restructuring scheme was found to be oppressive because its real purpose was to squeeze out the minority shareholders without fair compensation.

The court fixed the fair value of the shares based on a hotel valuation and awarded limited damages for oppression given that the dissent remedy already compensated the shareholders.

The appellant, Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, appealed an order declaring that a claim brought by the Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers' Marketing Board in a proposed class action was not a 'Released Claim' under a 2008 Comprehensive Agreement.

The 2008 Agreement settled claims between tobacco companies and government entities regarding tobacco smuggling.

The Court of Appeal held that while the claims might fall within the definition of 'Released Claims', the Board was acting as an agent for tobacco producers to enforce contracts, not as an agent for the Crown.

Therefore, the Board was not a 'Releasing Entity' under the agreement, and the claims were not released.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of a civil action alleging negligence and wrongdoing by police and the Crown arising from a historic murder conviction later quashed, certain police defendants sought substantial indemnity costs against the plaintiff.

The court considered the extraordinary circumstances of the case, including the miscarriage of justice that resulted in the plaintiff serving decades in prison and the role of state actors in the events leading to that outcome.

Although the action had been dismissed as an abuse of process due to the inability to re-litigate factual findings already determined by the Court of Appeal and the prejudice caused by the passage of time, the court held that ordering costs would be unfair and contrary to the interests of justice.

Exercising its discretion, the court declined to award costs to the successful defendants.

The plaintiff, whose murder conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal after a reference, brought a civil action against the Crown and police alleging negligence and wrongdoing related to an undisclosed alibi.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the action.

The court dismissed the action as an abuse of process, finding that it sought to relitigate factual findings already made by the Court of Appeal regarding the absence of wrongdoing by the Crown and police.

The court also held that, alternatively, a permanent stay under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act was warranted due to the impossibility of a fair trial given the passage of over 40 years, faded memories, and lost evidence.

A developer sued a municipality alleging breach of a supplementary subdivision agreement governing allocation of sewage capacity for a commercial and residential development.

The agreement provided that additional sewer capacity in the municipal system was reserved for the developer’s subdivision and that the municipality would not allocate capacity to lands outside the subdivision until the development was fully built out.

The municipality nevertheless allocated capacity to an adjacent development and expropriated a one‑foot reserve to allow connection.

The court interpreted the contractual language in light of the factual matrix and held the agreement granted the developer priority to available capacity.

The municipality breached the agreement by allocating capacity to the neighbouring development before completion of the subdivision.

The plaintiff proved loss‑of‑chance damages for lost leasing opportunities and was awarded compensatory damages, but punitive damages were denied.

The applicant sought a declaration that a proposed class action brought by a tobacco growers’ marketing board against a tobacco manufacturer was not barred as a released claim under a comprehensive settlement agreement resolving governmental claims relating to tobacco smuggling and unpaid taxes.

The respondents argued that the class action fell within the broad release provisions and that the marketing board was effectively a Crown entity bound by the agreement.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation governing releases, including contextual interpretation and the rule that general release language is limited to matters within the parties’ contemplation at the time of execution.

It concluded that the settlement agreement addressed governmental tax‑related claims arising from smuggling and did not extend to private claims by growers for price differentials.

The class proceeding was therefore not a released claim by a releasing entity.

The plaintiffs sought damages arising from the termination of a memorandum of understanding and a subsequent agreement relating to the proposed development of an 80 MW wind energy project on the defendant's industrial lands.

The court held that both documents were largely agreements to agree and therefore unenforceable with respect to the broader development and lease arrangements.

However, the documents imposed limited binding obligations, including a requirement to provide 60 days’ notice before termination of the memorandum and an obligation to allow access for wind measurement under the second agreement.

The defendant breached those obligations by terminating immediately and preventing continued wind testing.

Claims for fiduciary duty, breach of confidence, unjust enrichment, partnership, and loss of chance damages were rejected.

In a securities class proceeding, the plaintiffs sought costs following successful motions in which they opposed summary judgment and obtained nunc pro tunc relief permitting pursuit of a statutory claim despite the expiry of a limitation period under the Securities Act.

The defendants argued that no costs should be awarded due to alleged delay by the plaintiffs, the alleged unnecessary nature of the cross‑motion, and the claim that the plaintiffs succeeded on grounds not advanced by their counsel.

The court rejected these arguments, finding no delay attributable to the plaintiffs and confirming that the cross‑motion seeking nunc pro tunc relief was appropriate.

The court held that the plaintiffs succeeded on their arguments regarding the court’s nunc pro tunc authority and the interpretation of the Court of Appeal’s Timminco decision.

Applying the general rule that costs follow the event, the court awarded the plaintiffs their claimed partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs contracted HIV from the defendant after he had unprotected sex with them without disclosing his status.

The plaintiffs sued the Windsor Health Unit and the Windsor Police for negligence, alleging they knew of the risk the defendant posed but failed to take steps to prevent it.

The health unit and police moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing they owed no private law duty of care to the plaintiffs.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that the issue of whether a duty of care existed was complex and required a full trial to determine proximity and policy considerations.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The court rejected the respondents' request for substantial indemnity costs and the appellants' request for no costs.

Instead, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, ordering the appellants to pay a total of $64,000 to the various respondents.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a carriage decision in competing securities class proceedings under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

A prior motion judge had granted carriage to one group of plaintiffs and stayed the applicant’s action after comparing factors such as causes of action, class definitions, representative plaintiffs, and litigation strategies.

The applicant argued the motion judge improperly conducted a substantive comparison of the competing theories and failed to give sufficient weight to factors such as conflicts of interest and retainer arrangements.

The court held that there was conflicting jurisprudence regarding the proper scope of analysis on carriage motions and that the issue warranted appellate clarification.

Leave to appeal was granted on the question of whether the motion judge erred in assessing the theories and attributes of the competing class actions and in determining carriage.