William V. Sasso

Following dismissal of an application alleging that a municipality and its mayor and councillors conspired in bad faith to block a bridge expansion project through heritage and demolition control by-laws, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found the allegations of conspiracy, illegality, and bad faith against the municipal defendants to be entirely without merit and emphasized that unsubstantiated allegations of dishonesty justify elevated costs.

Applying the principles in s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded substantial full indemnity costs to the successful municipal respondents and individual councillors, subject to proportionality considerations reflecting differing levels of participation.

The court held that both the applicants and the Canadian Transit Company—though formally a respondent but aligned with the applicants—were jointly and severally responsible for the costs award.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' statutory claims for secondary market misrepresentation under the Securities Act, arguing the claims were statute-barred by the three-year limitation period in s. 138.14.

The plaintiffs had brought a motion for leave to assert the statutory claims within the limitation period, but the limitation period expired while the court's decision on the leave motion was under reserve.

The court held that it had inherent jurisdiction and authority under the Rules of Civil Procedure to grant the leave order nunc pro tunc (retroactively) to the date the leave motion was argued, applying the actus curiae maxim to prevent injustice caused by the court's delay.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the plaintiffs were permitted to amend their statement of claim effective the date the leave motion concluded.

Following a successful application concerning governance of a religious society, the applicants sought full indemnity costs of $280,000 against numerous respondents.

They argued that the respondents engaged in reprehensible conduct by refusing to comply with the society’s constitution, attempting to undermine election results, and advancing questionable evidence during litigation.

The court held that elevated costs require either a Rule 49 offer or reprehensible conduct in the litigation itself, and that most of the criticized behaviour occurred outside the conduct of the litigation.

Applying the reasonableness principles under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and r.57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court determined that partial indemnity costs were appropriate.

Costs of $160,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes were awarded.

Following the partial dismissal of an appeal and the remittal of a breach of contract issue for trial, the parties made written submissions on whether security should remain in place pending the trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the issue of security should be decided by the trial court.

The court ordered the security to remain in place for 60 days to allow the appellant to move for security in the trial court.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellant lost on the primary issue of oppression but succeeded in obtaining a new trial on an unresolved breach of contract issue.

The court found that responsibility for the failure to litigate the contract issue was divided between the parties.

Given the unusual circumstances and divided success, the court concluded that a fair costs award was for each side to bear its own costs throughout the proceedings.

The applicants invested in a Ponzi scheme through their companies.

They received payments that were reported as income and paid taxes on them.

After discovering the fraud, they applied for an order rectifying their corporate and tax records to show the payments as a return of capital, and for a declaration to that effect.

The court dismissed the claim for rectification because the documents accurately reflected the applicants' intentions at the time they were prepared.

However, the court granted a declaration that the moneys were a return of capital, without prejudice to how the payments should be treated for tax purposes by the tax authorities.

The defendants brought a motion to strike out the plaintiffs' statement of claim, which alleged breach of a settlement agreement, civil conspiracy, and interference with economic relations arising from the defendants' implementation of new real estate rules that effectively prohibited the plaintiffs' flat-fee brokerage model.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had properly pleaded all necessary elements for breach of contract, predominant purpose conspiracy, unlawful means conspiracy, and interference with economic relations.

The court held that it was not plain and obvious that the claims would fail, and that the individual defendants could be held personally liable despite being officers or directors of the corporate defendants, as the pleadings alleged they acted maliciously, outside their authority, and for their own personal business interests.

The appellant real estate company sued the respondents for oppression under the Business Corporations Act and for breach of contract after being locked out of a condominium project following a corporate restructuring.

The trial judge found oppression and awarded compensation but did not address the breach of contract claim.

The Divisional Court reversed the oppression finding and dismissed the entire action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the oppression claim, finding the restructuring was not unfairly prejudicial because the appellant was indemnified.

However, the Court found the Divisional Court erred in dismissing the unadjudicated breach of contract claim and remitted it for trial.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to stay its application in favour of arbitration.

The dispute arose from a comprehensive settlement agreement regarding tobacco smuggling, which contained an arbitration clause.

The appellant sought declarations regarding whether a class action brought by a tobacco board constituted a released claim under the agreement, affecting the respondent's right to escrow settlement payments.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that while the arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine issues under section 7 of the agreement, the court must determine issues under section 15 because the tobacco board was not a party to the arbitration agreement and its rights were directly implicated.

The appellant insurer appealed an order requiring it to defend a defendant in a class action.

After the order was made, the class action against the defendant was dismissed on consent.

The appellant argued the appeal was not moot because the dismissal allowed one plaintiff to potentially bring a future action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, finding that the order appealed from would have no relevance to any future action.

The appellant, a real estate broker, created a website that provided the public with direct access to the Toronto Real Estate Board's (TREB) MLS Database.

TREB suspended the appellant's access without notice, arguing he breached the Authorized User Agreement (AUA).

The trial judge found the appellant breached the AUA by not confining his use of the database to exclusive and internal use, and that TREB was justified in suspending access without notice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the AUA and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a user of the drug Paxil, brought a proposed class action against the respondent pharmaceutical companies alleging abuse of process, conspiracy, and waiver of tort.

The appellant claimed the respondents misused the Notice of Compliance proceedings under the Patent Act to delay the entry of a cheaper generic equivalent into the market, forcing consumers to pay supra-competitive prices.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim, finding it disclosed no viable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, concluding that the appellant was not a party to the legal process initiated by the respondents, the respondents' predominant purpose was to advance their own economic interests rather than injure the appellant, and there was no predicate wrongdoing to support a waiver of tort claim.

The appellants appealed a decision granting a bar order in a class proceeding.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction under ss. 12 and 13 of the Class Proceedings Act to make the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bar order appropriately limited the plaintiff's claim against non-settling defendants to their proportionate liability, in accordance with established principles.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent real estate broker an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The trial judge had found that a corporate reorganization by the appellants was designed to defeat the respondent's claim for real estate commissions.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the respondent was not a 'creditor' at the time of the reorganization because no commissions were yet payable under the listing agreement.

Furthermore, the reorganization did not constitute oppression as the successor entities had provided indemnification, ensuring the original corporation was not judgment-proof.

The action was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a Norwich order, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to explicitly set aside the underlying December Order.

The Court also determined the costs of the proceedings below.

Departing from the general rule that costs follow the event, the Court ordered that no costs be awarded to any party for the Superior Court proceedings, citing the appellants' shifting legal positions, the unsettled nature of the law regarding Norwich orders, and the underlying conduct of the appellants.

The respondent obtained a Norwich order for pre-action discovery against the appellants to investigate alleged fraudulent conveyances and misrepresentations following a failed corporate acquisition.

The appellants appealed the order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Norwich order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to consider whether the pre-action discovery was necessary.

The Court held that the respondent already possessed sufficient information to formulate a pleading and that the extraordinary equitable remedy of a Norwich order was not required.

The plaintiffs brought an action including a claim for oppression under the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) alongside eight other causes of action.

The defendant obtained an order for security for costs from a master, which was upheld by a Superior Court judge.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 249(2) of the CBCA, arguing the CBCA governed the appeal route.

The defendant moved to quash the application, arguing the proper route was to the Divisional Court under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the core of the action was not an oppression claim and the plaintiffs had already initiated the appeal process under the civil rules.

The appellant appealed an order finding that its proposed location for a railway line easement over the respondents' lands did not comply with the terms of an Option Agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the proposed location significantly departed from the parameters set out in Schedule A of the agreement.

However, the Court disagreed with the application judge's secondary finding that the location issue should consider business interference, noting that business interference relates to the use of the easement, not its location.

The appeal was dismissed, leaving it open for the appellant to propose a new location conforming to the agreement.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement regarding costs and the calculation of interest following its judgment on an appeal and cross-appeal.

The court clarified that interest on excessive management compensation should be calculated at the lower of the presumptive rate under the Courts of Justice Act or the prevailing chartered bank prime lending rate, using a floating rate for simple interest.

Due to divided success on the appeal and cross-appeal, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The appellants, majority shareholders of a family company, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for oppression and breach of trust against the minority shareholders.

The trial judge found they breached their fiduciary duties by purchasing their sisters' shares and by paying themselves excessive management compensation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding no breach of trust in the share purchase given the company's precarious financial position at the time and the minority's failure to complain.

However, the Court upheld the finding that the retroactive management compensation was oppressive and excessive.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part to award prejudgment interest on the excessive compensation.