William V. Sasso

The appellants appealed an order excising references to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from their statement of claim.

The parties had entered into the MOU for a wind energy project, which the respondent later purported to terminate while under CCAA protection.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in determining the validity of the termination notice on a Rule 21 motion and in concluding that the appellants were precluded from pleading a good faith obligation arising from the MOU.

The plaintiffs and an intervenor sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis against James W. Curran and his former solicitor, J. Perry Borden, following the dismissal of a motion to set aside a consent order.

The motion to set aside was based on unfounded allegations of fraud and deceit against another solicitor, David A. Seed.

The Divisional Court found that Mr. Curran and Mr. Borden acted as joint venturers in pursuing a meritless claim and making groundless fraud allegations.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs against both Mr. Curran and Mr. Borden jointly and severally, and to Mr. Seed against Mr. Curran.

Following an appeal, the successful appellants sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded partial indemnity costs to the appellants for both the motion and the appeal.

The costs awarded to two of the appellants were made payable only upon their satisfaction of a prior judgment, while the costs awarded to the third appellant were made payable within thirty days.

The plaintiffs brought an action for breach of trust and fiduciary duty against the former executor of an estate and related parties.

The plaintiffs moved to strike parts of the statements of defence, arguing the issues were already determined in a prior passing of accounts proceeding.

The motions judge struck the pleadings but refused to grant summary judgment.

The defendants appealed the striking of their pleadings, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed the refusal of judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the passing of accounts dealt with executor compensation, not damages for breach of fiduciary duty, and that the prior judge made no specific findings of breach.

The cross-appeal was dismissed.

Randy Oram, an unsecured creditor and shareholder, sought leave to appeal an order sanctioning a secured-creditor-led plan of arrangement under the CCAA and a related vesting order.

The plan involved selling the debtor companies' assets to a new company owned by an affiliate of a secured creditor, leaving no recovery for unsecured creditors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no serious and arguable grounds.

The court held that a plan exclusively benefiting secured creditors and not continuing the debtor as a going concern is not necessarily contrary to the CCAA, especially where there is no equity for unsecured creditors and no viable alternative plan.

In the context of CCAA proceedings, the responding parties requested that a motion for leave to appeal be transferred from a single judge to a panel of the Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 7(4) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The single judge dismissed the request, finding that s. 13 of the CCAA provides the moving party with the procedural option of bringing a leave motion to a single judge, and there was no reason to compel the moving party to adopt a different procedure.

In the context of Air Canada's CCAA restructuring, the appellant sought leave to appeal an order approving an equity investment agreement with Trinity Time Investments Limited and denying an adjournment to consider a competing proposal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding no error in the supervising judge's decision to approve the agreement, which contained a 'fiduciary out' clause allowing the board to consider superior proposals.

The court held that the test for leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings—requiring serious and arguable grounds of real and significant interest—was not met.

The appellants appealed a judgment regarding two 1973 agreements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the agreements demonstrated a sufficiently clear intention to comply with the Planning Act, falling within the exception in s. 29(2).

The Court also held that s. 4 of the Limitations Act did not apply to the transaction.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $10,000.

The appellants, minority shareholders of a Manitoba broadcasting corporation, brought an action in Ontario seeking an oppression remedy under the Canada Business Corporations Act against the majority shareholder and its affiliates.

The motions judge stayed the action, finding Ontario lacked jurisdiction and that Manitoba was the convenient forum.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motions judge erred in applying the real and substantial connection test to defendants present in Ontario, and found that Ontario did have jurisdiction over all defendants, including the extra-provincial defendant.

However, the Court upheld the stay on the basis that Manitoba was clearly the more convenient forum, as the dispute primarily concerned the internal management of a Manitoba corporation.

The client retained the solicitors on a contingency fee basis for a catastrophic personal injury action.

The action settled at mediation for $2.5 million in general damages plus costs and disbursements.

The client signed an agreement at mediation authorizing the solicitors to take their maximum contingency fee of $500,000 inclusive of GST.

The client later challenged the fees.

The assessment officer and motions judge both reduced the fees, finding the agreement unfair or unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the solicitors' appeal, holding that the fee agreement was fully understood by the client, freely entered into, and reasonable given the significant risks assumed by the solicitors and the excellent result achieved.

The appellants, who were non-parties to the bankruptcy proceedings, appealed a trial judge's order awarding costs against them.

The trial judge had dismissed the bankruptcy petitions against the respondents, finding they were brought for an improper collateral purpose and constituted an abuse of process orchestrated by the appellants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the costs order, noting that section 197(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act gives the court broad discretion regarding costs, and that special policy considerations justify harsher costs consequences against persons who misuse the bankruptcy court for improper collateral purposes.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal regarding the allocation of losses between beneficiaries after a trustee made unauthorized disbursements from a mingled bank account.

The appellants argued that the 'first-in, first-out' rule in Clayton's Case should apply to determine how the remaining insufficient funds were distributed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the rule should not apply and adopting the reasons of the lower court.

The appellant, a professional football player, was cut from the respondent's team but continued to receive his guaranteed salary.

He subsequently signed a contract to play for another team in a different league without the respondent's permission.

When the new team folded, the appellant sued the respondent for the balance of his guaranteed salary.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's signing with another team constituted a breach of his contractual arrangement with the respondent, thereby relieving the respondent of any further obligation to pay the guaranteed salary.