William S. Chalmers

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion for the preservation of $32,000 in Canadian currency, seized from Mr. Ohenhen's residence, pending a civil forfeiture application.

The motion was brought under sections 4(1) and 9(1) of the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the currency was proceeds of unlawful activity, citing Mr. Ohenhen's criminal record, pending charges, and the large, bundled cash amount.

The court also determined that preservation was in the interests of justice, as the 'clearly not in the interests of justice' exception did not apply, and the money would likely be dissipated otherwise.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion seeking to continue a Mareva injunction, obtain an Anton Piller order, and secure ancillary relief against the Defendants, who are alleged to have engaged in a significant fraud involving over US$27 million.

The Defendants had failed to comply with previous court orders for disclosure of assets and funds.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud and a real risk of evidence destruction or dissipation.

Consequently, the court granted the Anton Piller order for search and preservation of documents and electronic evidence at the Defendants' property, continued the Mareva injunction, and ordered various ancillary relief, including registering the injunction on property title, passport surrender for one defendant, and further financial disclosure.

The appellant lawyer was the subject of a Law Society discipline proceeding that was ultimately dismissed after 56 days of hearing.

He sought costs against the Law Society, which were denied by the Hearing Division and the Appeal Division.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the court found that the Law Society's investigation was one-sided and procedurally unfair, and its positions on disclosure were unreasonable.

While the court upheld the finding that the proceeding was warranted at the outset, it set aside the decisions denying costs and remitted the matter to a new panel to determine whether the appellant is entitled to costs wasted by the Law Society's undue delay, negligence, or other default.

This endorsement addresses four motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in a constitutional challenge brought by Animal Justice et al. against the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020.

The applicants in the main case allege violations of Charter rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, peaceful assembly, liberty, security of the person, arbitrary detention, and reverse onus.

The court applied the test for intervention, considering the nature of the case, the issues, and the likelihood of a useful contribution without causing injustice or expanding the record.

The motion by Justice for Migrant Workers was dismissed for lack of a substantial interest and for attempting to expand the issues.

The motion by Centre for Free Expression was allowed in part, limited to the existing issues and excluding a proposed s. 2(a) Charter argument due to lack of a developed record and expertise.

The motions by Animal Alliance of Canada and Regan Russell Foundation were fully allowed, as they met the criteria and did not seek to expand the issues.

All successful interventions were granted subject to specific conditions on written and oral submissions.

The defendants, Facebook, Inc., Facebook Canada, Ltd., and Meta Platforms, Inc., brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's 336-paragraph, 46-page Statement of Claim.

The defendants argued the claim was frivolous, vexatious, an abuse of process, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action, citing the plaintiff's history of similar lawsuits against tech companies.

The plaintiff, self-represented, denied a "litigation scheme" and argued his claims were valid.

The court, applying Rules 21.01 and 25.11, found the Statement of Claim to be overly broad, unspecific, and failing to plead material facts for various claims (e.g., facial recognition, data mining, discrimination, security breaches, private messages, data selling, scams, location data, copyright, gambling, privacy, illicit databases, trespass, conversion, competition law, consumer protection, unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment).

The court struck the entire Statement of Claim but granted the plaintiff leave to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, emphasizing the need for conciseness and material facts.

The court declined to admit evidence of other claims to prove an abuse of process, stating it would turn the motion into an evidentiary disposition.

This motion concerned an application by 2524991 Ontario Corporation (252) for an interim order to stay the enforcement of an arbitral award (the Final Award) obtained by 2650795 Ontario Inc. (265), pending the resolution of an oppression action brought by 252 against 265. 252 argued that 265 engaged in oppressive acts by refusing to cooperate in the sale of a jointly owned property, which would allow 252 to satisfy the Final Award.

The court granted judgment in the Enforcement Application by consent but then heard 252's motion to stay.

The court found that allowing enforcement would be oppressive and an abuse of process, and that 252 met the stringent test for a stay under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act and the three-part RJR-MacDonald test for interim relief under s. 248(3) of the Business Corporations Act.

The court also determined that the "clean hands" doctrine did not apply as the impugned conduct (misrepresentation) was already litigated and compensated in arbitration.

The stay was granted, without prejudice to a future application for a court-directed sale of the property.

KEB Hana Bank Canada (first mortgagee) brought a motion seeking declarations that an assessment of Power of Sale expenses, including legal costs, initiated by 2227473 Ontario Inc. o/a Huntington Cross Capital (second mortgagee) under the Mortgages Act was improper and a nullity.

KEB argued that only the mortgagor could initiate such an assessment or that legal costs should be assessed under the Solicitors Act, and that the Assessment Officer lacked jurisdiction to award interim costs.

The court dismissed KEB's motion, finding that a second mortgagee is an "interested person" entitled to requisition an assessment under s. 43(4) of the Mortgages Act, that the assessment was not a nullity despite the form, that legal costs incidental to the Power of Sale are properly assessed under the Mortgages Act, and that the Assessment Officer has jurisdiction to award interim costs.

The Plaintiffs sought an urgent interim Mareva injunction and ancillary orders against the Defendants without notice, alleging a complex fraudulent scheme involving the misappropriation of over $1.7 million.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud, inferred a serious risk of asset dissipation given the nature of the fraud and the defendants' prior conduct, and determined that irreparable harm would occur if the injunction was not granted.

The balance of convenience favored granting the injunction, and the Plaintiffs provided the necessary undertaking as to damages.

Ancillary disclosure orders and preservation orders for electronic devices were also granted.

The applicants sought directions regarding an open lift system for a minor, Kenzie Alice Bunch, whose property is under management.

Following an expert report confirming the lift's safety and suitability, and outlining future modification procedures, the court approved an amended management plan incorporating these recommendations.

The court also approved the costs associated with the expert report and the applicants' full indemnity costs for the application.

The plaintiffs brought a motion in the Superior Court for injunctive relief to restrain the defendants from dealing with a property, pending a motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The court declined jurisdiction, finding that the Court of Appeal, under section 134(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, was the proper forum to hear motions for interim relief pending an appeal or leave to appeal.

The Superior Court emphasized that the appellate court is in the best position to determine the merits of the underlying appeal, which is a key factor in granting interim relief.

The motion was therefore transferred to the Court of Appeal.

The Plaintiff, a judgment creditor, sought leave to register Certificates of Pending Litigation (CPLs) on three properties, alleging that the judgment debtor, Ms. Tong Zang, had fraudulently conveyed her interests or held beneficial interests in these properties through a resulting trust to avoid paying a $369,072.61 judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff established a triable issue regarding both resulting trust and fraudulent conveyance, citing several badges of fraud.

The balance of convenience favored granting the CPLs to prevent the properties from being sold before a judicial determination.

The plaintiff brought a motion to adjourn an 8-day trial scheduled to commence shortly, arguing that the defendant's late disclosure of 147 new documents, including bank statements and documents of disputed authenticity, and a new witness statement, necessitated additional time for review, examination of the affiant, and further inquiries.

The defendant opposed the adjournment, citing the estate trustee's lack of information regarding the new documents and alleging the plaintiff's history of delaying the action.

The court granted a three-week adjournment, finding that the late disclosure was problematic and that the plaintiff deserved the opportunity to properly prepare for trial, prioritizing a fair trial on the merits despite the case's long history.

The Crown brought an application for directions regarding the disclosure of plea correspondence between the Crown and a former co-accused who pleaded guilty and is expected to testify at the remaining accused's trial.

The former co-accused had objected to disclosure on the basis of settlement privilege.

The court held that the plea correspondence is relevant to the witness's credibility and is not protected by solicitor-client or settlement privilege, as it is not being used against the former co-accused.

The court ordered the Crown to disclose the plea correspondence to the remaining accused.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking offences after police executed a search warrant at his residence and seized approximately 1kg of cocaine from a safe.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel and s. 8 right against unreasonable search were violated due to delays in facilitating access to a lawyer, questioning before he spoke to counsel, and an unjustified level 3 (strip) search at the police station.

The court found breaches of both s. 10(b) and s. 8.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded the breaches were on the less serious end of the spectrum, had minimal impact on the accused as they did not lead to the discovery of the evidence, and society's interest favoured adjudication on the merits.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of an interim order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario suspending her certificate of registration.

The suspension followed investigations into her infection prevention and control practices, dissemination of COVID-19 misinformation, and alleged issuance of a vaccine exemption to an immunocompromised patient.

The applicant refused to cooperate with the investigations, arguing the College lacked jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the suspension order was reasonable, factually grounded, and necessary to protect the public from harm given the applicant's ungovernability.

The court also dismissed a motion to introduce fresh evidence and found no breach of procedural fairness.

The plaintiff brought a motion for judgment under Rule 49.09 after the defendant failed to comply with the terms of an accepted offer to settle.

The parties had settled the action for $90,000 payable in installments, with a term that default would result in consent to judgment for the outstanding balance plus $10,000 in costs.

The defendant defaulted on the final $30,000 and failed to respond to the motion.

The court granted judgment for the outstanding $30,000 plus $10,000 in costs.

The applicant sought a prescriptive easement in the nature of a right of way over a private, undedicated road to access her residential property.

The application was unopposed by the respondents, who included a cancelled corporation and an estate.

The court found that the applicant and her predecessors in title had continuously and openly used the road for over 20 years prior to the property's conversion to Land Titles.

The court granted the application, finding the elements of a prescriptive easement were met and ordering rectification of the register under the Land Titles Act.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to approve a settlement under s. 18.1 of the Civil Remedies Act regarding $195,110 in seized currency.

The currency was seized from a safe during a drug trafficking investigation.

The parties agreed to a settlement where $39,022 would be paid to the respondent's mother, and the remainder forfeited to the Crown.

The court found the currency was likely the proceeds of unlawful activity and approved the settlement as a reasonable compromise in the interests of justice.

The defendant brought a motion pursuant to Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to have two actions arising from the same motor vehicle accident tried together.

The parties in both actions consented to the order.

The court granted the motion, finding that the actions arose out of the same occurrence and that it was in the interests of justice for them to be tried together or one after the other.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside an order quashing nine judicial review applications on the basis that it lacked public interest standing.

The Divisional Court panel found no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's application of the test for public interest standing.

The motion judge correctly concluded that the applications did not raise a serious justiciable issue transcending specific individual interests and that judicial review was not a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

The motion was dismissed with no order as to costs.