William S. Chalmers

The defendants, a union and its representatives, brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action initiated by the plaintiffs, a hotel and its parent company.

The defamation claim arose from a press release issued by the defendants alleging the hotel required employees to remove union Pride pins, implying a lack of support for the LGBTQ+ community.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the plaintiffs' defamation claim had substantial merit and no valid defences (justification, qualified privilege, fair/reasonable comment), particularly due to evidence of malice and the untruthful implication in the press release.

The court concluded that the public interest in allowing the defamation action to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression, and awarded partial indemnity costs of $75,000 to the plaintiffs.

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) sought a permanent injunction against a former paralegal, whose licence was revoked in 2017, for allegedly continuing to provide unauthorized legal services and holding himself out as authorized to do so.

The respondent argued that the LSO's investigation was flawed and that his actions fell under the "friends and neighbour" exception.

The court found that the respondent did provide unauthorized legal services after his licence revocation and that the "friends and neighbour" exception did not apply, as it is not available to revoked licensees and the respondent failed to meet its conditions (e.g., providing services in more than three matters per year and receiving payment).

A permanent injunction was granted.

The defendants successfully brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action.

This endorsement addresses the costs of that motion.

The court found no reason to depart from the presumption of full indemnity costs under s. 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act, as the plaintiff's action was brought for an improper purpose to stifle public expression.

The plaintiff's offer to settle, which required retractions and apologies, was deemed unreasonable given the court's prior findings.

While the court found the defendants' lawyers' time excessive, it awarded costs of $132,268.17 on a full indemnity basis, a reduction from the claimed amount, deeming it fair, reasonable, and within the plaintiff's reasonable expectation given his prior involvement in similar cases.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking compensation based on an alleged oral agreement for client referrals.

The defendant argued the agreement was for profit-sharing and that the matter was unsuitable for summary judgment due to disputed facts and credibility issues, particularly given the limitations on cross-examination under simplified procedure rules.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, as the conflicting evidence regarding the oral agreement's terms and the parties' credibility could not be resolved on a summary judgment motion.

The defendant's counterclaim was dismissed by consent.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant, a former business owner, from competing with their vehicle leasing business and to compel the transfer of phone numbers and production of records, following a share purchase agreement.

The plaintiffs had ceased installment payments to the defendant, alleging misrepresentation and breach of restrictive covenants.

The court dismissed the main injunction for non-competition, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case, primarily because the restrictive covenants were not in force while the purchaser was in default of payment obligations.

The court also dismissed the requests for phone number transfer and production of records as premature or not contractually required.

A minor injunction restraining the defendant from holding himself out as a representative of the business was granted as it was unopposed.

The plaintiff, a lawyer representing advocacy groups in COVID-19 related litigation, brought an action for defamation, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and harassment against the defendants.

The defendants moved under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a SLAPP.

The court found that the impugned expressions, which criticized the plaintiff's legal approach and fees, related to matters of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to show that his claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences such as justification, fair comment, and absolute/qualified privilege.

The court concluded that the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed any unproven harm to the plaintiff and dismissed the action in its entirety.

The plaintiff, Humi Holdings Corporation, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent former employees and their new company from competing and using alleged confidential information to develop an embedded payroll software product.

The court admitted expert evidence from both sides.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the non-competition clauses were enforceable or breached, or that confidential information was misused.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favored the defendants.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendants.

The applicants sought a declaration that their insurer, CNA, had a duty to defend them in an underlying action for property damage caused by a liquid chlorine leak from their pool supply store into an adjacent unit.

CNA denied coverage, relying on the policy's pollution exclusion.

The court found that the pollution exclusion did not apply because the chlorine leaked into an adjacent indoor premises, not the natural environment, and the underlying claim was for property damage rather than environmental remediation.

The court declared that CNA has a duty to defend the applicants and awarded the applicants their defence costs incurred to date.

The applicant, a taxpayer in Toronto, sought to quash a City of Toronto by-law that provided a one-time contribution of up to $100,000 to legal challenges against Quebec's Bill 21.

The applicant argued the by-law was ultra vires as it lacked a valid municipal purpose.

The court found that the by-law, which funded litigation against a Quebec law with no extra-territorial effect on Torontonians, did not serve a valid municipal purpose related to the social or economic well-being of the City.

Citing precedents like Shell Canada and Eng v. Toronto, the court concluded that giving 'voice to values' was not a valid exercise of municipal power when the issue did not directly affect the local community.

The court granted the order, quashing the funding portion of the by-law and awarding costs to the applicant.

The Applicant brought a motion for judgment, alleging that the Respondent's principal, Paul Halyk, accessed confidential and privileged communications between the Applicant's principal and its legal counsel.

The court found that Halyk accessed privileged material and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, as he did not provide specific details about the extent of his review.

While declining to grant judgment on the Application due to insufficient evidentiary record for the underlying merits, the court ordered the Respondent's Notice of Appearance struck, allowing the Application to proceed as undefended.

The defendants, a law firm and one of its partners, brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached an ad hoc fiduciary duty and aided and abetted a breach of an undertaking and a breach of the Business Corporations Act while representing a corporation in an employment matter.

The court granted the motion to strike without leave to amend, finding no facts to support a fiduciary relationship and holding that the claims for aiding and abetting were contrary to public policy as they would interfere with the lawyer-client relationship.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for insurance coverage and bad faith.

The plaintiff had suffered a cybersecurity breach resulting in fraudulent long-distance calls, and voluntarily reimbursed its customers and paid its vendors before submitting a claim under its Tech Insure Policy.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no coverage under the policy's insuring agreements, that the contractual liability exclusion applied, and that the plaintiff breached the voluntary payments clause.

The bad faith claim was also dismissed as the insurer's denial was based on a reasonable interpretation of the policy.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction and Norwich Order against David Shpilt, who was added as a defendant in an ongoing fraud action.

The plaintiffs had invested significant funds in a cannabis business, Sustainable Growth Strategic Capital Corp., which they alleged was fraudulent.

Shpilt was found to have drafted a forged contract used to induce investment and received over $110,000 of the plaintiffs' funds.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation against Shpilt, a serious risk of asset dissipation, and that the balance of convenience favored granting the Mareva injunction.

For the Norwich Order, the court determined there was a bona fide claim, a connection between financial institutions and the fraud, and that the order was the only practical source of information to trace funds.

Both the Mareva injunction and Norwich Order were granted, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff, Janet Bowie, sought summary judgment against the defendants, Ramesh Bhandari and Sudha Dhungana, for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property.

The defendants admitted liability and damages but argued against summary judgment due to ongoing third- and fourth-party claims and sought a stay of execution.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding no genuine issue for trial in the main action and that it was severable from the third-party claims.

The court also denied the defendants' request for a stay of execution, citing lack of connection between the claims, no risk of inconsistent findings, and prejudice to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought an urgent, without-notice motion for a Mareva injunction and Norwich order against the defendants, alleging a fraudulent investment scheme.

The defendants, including Richard Nicholson and his company NWR Financial Group, allegedly induced the plaintiffs to invest USD $670,000 in a non-existent hedge fund, Legacy Investors Group Inc., promising high returns.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud, evidence of asset dissipation by Nicholson (e.g., luxury purchases, sale of home), and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction to preserve assets.

The court also granted the Norwich order, finding that the five factors for disclosure from non-party financial institutions were met, as they were the only practical source of information regarding the flow of funds.

The Applicants challenged the Toronto Transit Commission Labour Disputes Resolution Act, 2011, arguing it infringed their freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by prohibiting the right to strike and replacing it with compulsory binding interest arbitration.

The court found the Act substantially interfered with meaningful collective bargaining and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, as the TTC was not an "essential service" in the constitutional sense, and the economic and equity concerns did not justify the complete prohibition of the right to strike.

The Act was declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The defendant, Robert G. Green Equipment Sales Ltd. (Green Equipment), brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim and a co-defendant's crossclaim.

The action arose from a fire that damaged an excavator, with the plaintiff alleging negligence, breach of contract/warranty, and negligent misrepresentation against both defendants.

The court found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including whether Green Equipment was a "seller" under the Sale of Goods Act, the extent of reliance for negligent misrepresentation, and the responsibility for servicing the excavator.

Given the disputed facts and credibility issues, the court determined that summary judgment was not appropriate and dismissed the motion.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction and ancillary relief, alleging a significant fraud where over $17,000,000 in investor funds were misappropriated from a litigation financing business and diverted to companies controlled by the Defendants to purchase real estate and other assets, resembling a Ponzi scheme.

The court granted the Mareva injunction, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud, a serious risk of asset dissipation (evidenced by attempts to sell properties and the defendants' lack of forthrightness), and that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiffs.

The court also ordered the net proceeds from the sale of a specific property to be held in trust and granted substituted service for two defendants.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion seeking an order for the preservation of $41,620 in Canadian currency, pending an application for civil forfeiture under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the currency was proceeds of unlawful activity, citing its discovery with drugs, a firearm magazine, multiple phones, and identification in other names, as well as the interested party's admission of being at an "underground casino" and outstanding fraud charges.

The court also determined that preserving the currency was in the interests of justice, as it was not "manifestly harsh" or "draconian" especially given the interested party's consent.

The motion for preservation was granted.

The defendants were successful on a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim in its entirety, with leave to amend.

The defendants sought costs of $41,979.61, relying on an offer to settle that would have allowed the plaintiff to amend his claim.

The self-represented plaintiff argued he was impecunious and that success was divided.

The court found the defendants were overwhelmingly successful and that the plaintiff's impecuniosity did not shield him from a costs award, though it was a factor in reducing the quantum.

Costs were fixed at $15,000 payable by the plaintiff.