C. William Hourigan

The respondent, a paralegal with public interest standing, challenged the constitutionality of provisions of the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act that confer police powers on OSPCA inspectors and agents.

The application judge struck down sections 11, 12, and 12.1 on the ground that they violated section 7 of the Charter by depriving individuals of liberty and security of the person without accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

The application judge recognized a novel principle of fundamental justice requiring law enforcement bodies to be subject to reasonable standards of transparency and accountability.

The Attorney General appealed, and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in finding that section 7 was engaged and in recognizing the proposed novel principle of fundamental justice.

An appeal from a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum clarifying that the appellant was to be freed on November 4, 2019, and that the sentences imposed were concurrent and therefore complete as ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence.

The conviction was entered in November 2013 and the sentence of 18 months' custody (after credit of six months) followed by three years' probation was imposed in July 2014.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge reversed the onus of proof by requiring him to disprove the complainant's account; and second, that the trial judge erred in admitting his police statement.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis and dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, which had become moot as the sentence had been served.

A pedestrian struck by a vehicle in 2008 received statutory accident benefits for attendant care and housekeeping until the insurer terminated them in 2010.

In 2015, after receiving a catastrophic impairment designation, the claimant reapplied for benefits.

The Tribunal and Divisional Court found the claim was out of time based on a two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the limitation period was subject to the rule of discoverability and was not a hard limitation period.

The court held that applying a hard limitation period would be contrary to the consumer protection purposes of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and would produce an absurd result by barring claims before the claimant was eligible to make them.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal was abandoned and dismissed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellant appealed a conviction and sentence entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned after the appellant failed to attend the hearing despite being advised that the Crown would seek dismissal for non-attendance.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The parties had agreed to a joint submission intended to result in a penitentiary sentence to allow the appellant access to treatment programs.

However, the parties miscalculated, resulting in a sentence that was practically too long.

The appellant argued for 150 days while the Crown acknowledged that four to six months would have been appropriate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted a sentence of 150 days for the original 307-day sentence.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 10 years imposed for a spree of robberies committed over a two-week period.

Duty counsel argued that the sentencing judge erred by relying on an incorrect prior sentence from 2006, claiming the appellant had received six and a half years when he actually received five years and eleven months.

The court found the error immaterial as the sentencing judge had considered numerous factors and reduced a proposed 12-year sentence to 10 years based on rehabilitative efforts.

The sentence was upheld as fit and justified.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Crown acknowledged, after review of trial transcripts and an independent interpreter's assessment of audio recordings, that there were numerous and significant errors in the interpretation of the appellant's evidence during trial.

The appeal against conviction was allowed with the Crown's consent.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The respondent, as assignee of a debt owed for legal services provided in real property litigation, registered a mortgage on the property to secure the debt.

The appellants, claiming beneficial ownership interests in the property, appealed the motion judge's decision, arguing that no valid debt existed and that the respondent was not entitled to the secured funds based on unjust enrichment and misrepresentation on title.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that a debt was owed, noting the respondent's husband's testimony and the property owner's consent to the mortgage registration.

The court held that the respondent, as a bona fide purchaser for value with a registered interest, had priority over any unregistered beneficial interests of the appellants, and that there was no unjust enrichment as the assignment of the debt provided a juristic reason for the benefit received.

The appellant, principal of a hotel corporation that defaulted on mortgage financing, appealed a motion judge's decision regarding interpretation of a forbearance agreement.

The appellant argued that under the forbearance agreement with the respondent lender, the debt was limited to $8.5 million (the amount paid to discharge the original mortgage), rather than the full $17 million outstanding.

The appellant also sought relief from forfeiture under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, holding that the forbearance agreement clearly assigned the full $17 million debt and that relief from forfeiture was not warranted as the transaction was not unconscionable and the result was not disproportionate.

The appellant sought an assessment of 30 accounts totalling over $600,000 from his former counsel over approximately two and a half years of representation in a family law proceeding.

Of these accounts, 26 were paid in full and four remained unpaid.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that the appellant failed to establish special circumstances warranting assessment of the paid accounts under section 11 of the Solicitors Act, and declined to exercise inherent jurisdiction to assess the unpaid accounts.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the application judge's factual findings or legal analysis.

This appeal concerns the applicable scale of costs when a municipality unsuccessfully appeals an expropriation matter to the courts.

The Ontario Municipal Board ordered compensation to the property owner.

The municipality appealed to the Divisional Court, which dismissed the appeal but awarded only partial indemnity costs of $7,500 rather than full indemnity costs of $23,586.84.

The Divisional Court declined to apply section 32(1) of the Expropriations Act, ruling that ordinary court costs rules applied.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that the principle reflected in section 32(1) should apply to court proceedings, entitling the successful respondent to full indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder in the fatal shooting of a victim inside a bar.

The critical evidence was security camera footage showing two men in a stairwell moments before the shooting.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant was one of the men and was holding a gun.

The trial judge opined in his jury charge that the dark object appeared to be a gun, despite the Crown's earlier concession that the object was not clearly identifiable as a gun.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's opinion compromised the appellant's right to a fair trial by improperly intervening on a critical factual issue and emboldening the Crown to withdraw its concession.

The court also addressed issues regarding identification evidence and improper Crown speculation about a disabled security monitor.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding of civil contempt for breaching a parenting order.

The motion judge found that the appellant had intentionally picked up the children from school on a day when he was not entitled to do so, contrary to the court order governing transitions.

While the Court of Appeal found that the three elements of civil contempt were established beyond a reasonable doubt, it held that the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider whether to exercise her discretion to decline to make a contempt finding.

The Court emphasized that the contempt power is discretionary and should be exercised as a last resort, particularly in high-conflict matrimonial cases involving children.

The appeal was allowed and the contempt finding was set aside.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court regarding the interpretation of a "Net Developable Area" clause in two agreements for the purchase and sale of development lands.

The central issue was whether tableland used for storm water management ponds was included in the definition of Net Developable Area when such lands fell within the Protected Countryside designation of the Greenbelt Plan.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's interpretation, finding that the parenthetical exception did not apply to Greenbelt lands and that the terms "open space lands" and "Greenbelt lands" have distinct meanings subject to different planning controls.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to extend the time for service of a statement of claim.

The appellant became aware of the facts giving rise to the claim in December 2012, issued the statement of claim in March 2015, but deliberately did not serve it for three years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's refusal to extend the time, finding that the appellant's tactical decision to delay service beyond the rules' timeframe was a relevant and adverse factor.

The respondent was entitled to rely on presumptive prejudice from the expiry of the limitation period, and actual prejudice was demonstrated by the length of delay.

The Monitor of a CCAA-protected company appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its motion to disallow a creditor's claim secured by a guarantee.

The creditor, Speedy Electrical Contractors Ltd., had provided a personal loan and performed electrical work for Urbancorp entities.

When Speedy threatened legal proceedings and held a construction lien, the parties entered into a debt extension agreement whereby Speedy agreed to discharge its lien and extend the loan in exchange for a secured guarantee from King Residential Inc. (a related Urbancorp entity) over condominium units.

The Monitor argued the guarantee was a transfer at undervalue under section 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and a fraudulent conveyance under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The motion judge found Speedy and KRI were dealing at arm's length and that fraudulent intent was not established.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from a street altercation where he stabbed the complainant 13 times with a folding knife.

The trial judge granted a directed verdict of acquittal on a weapons possession charge.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing a Scopelliti application to call a witness regarding the complainant's prior violent conduct while intoxicated and in restricting cross-examination on a prior peace bond; (2) the trial judge erred in dismissing a Corbett application to exclude evidence of the appellant's prior firearm conviction; and (3) the trial judge failed to inform the jury of the acquittal on the weapons charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident following a November 2015 incident in which his vehicle struck a pedestrian.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to apply the W.(D.) test, in providing insufficient reasons, and in failing to adequately address the mens rea element of dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate and the convictions were clearly supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the trial judge committed no errors of principle.