P. Theodore Matlow

The defendant moved to stay an Ontario action pending the outcome of a related proceeding commenced in Kentucky.

The plaintiff sought declaratory relief concerning its proprietary interest in an internet domain name within Ontario.

The court found the action had a real and substantial connection to Ontario, as the plaintiff’s operations, witnesses, and relevant activities were located in Ontario and Ontario law would likely govern the dispute.

The court concluded that the defendant failed to establish that the balance of convenience favoured the Kentucky proceeding.

The motion to stay the Ontario action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Master's order transferring the defamation action and place of trial from Toronto to Hamilton.

The defamation claim arose from media reports following the withdrawal of murder charges against the appellant in Hamilton.

The appellant argued he could not get a fair jury trial in Hamilton due to extensive prejudicial publicity.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law by failing to properly address whether the appellant had a reasonable apprehension of bias in Hamilton.

The court also found the Master's inclusion of irrelevant personal views regarding the murdered parents of the responding party amounted to an effective denial of a fair hearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assessment Review Board dismissing her property assessment appeals.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, noting that judicial review is discretionary and the applicant failed to pursue the statutory right of appeal in a timely manner without explanation.

Furthermore, the application lacked merit as the Board reasonably dismissed the appeals after the applicant repeatedly failed to comply with rules regarding the Statement of Issues despite receiving proper notice.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee 17 months' reasonable notice for wrongful dismissal.

The appellant argued the notice period was too long and that the trial judge erred by not deducting all income earned by the respondent during the notice period, as she worked more hours at a lower hourly rate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the 17-month notice period based on the Bardal factors.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to only deduct mitigation income equivalent to her previous 30-hour work week, noting the new employment was at a substantially lower rate of pay and required differing hours.

A self-represented defendant brought a motion seeking payment out of approximately $30,000 held in court representing surplus proceeds from the power of sale of her condominium.

Counsel for the plaintiff argued the motion was moot because a prior trial decision had dismissed the action and ordered the funds paid to the plaintiff.

The moving party denied receiving notice of the trial and questioned the basis for the plaintiff’s entitlement to the surplus proceeds.

The court noted concerns about a potential injustice but observed that the record did not contain sufficient materials to assess the underlying claim.

The judge reserved decision and prepared an endorsement to assist the moving party in seeking legal advice and potential legal aid.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing its claim for unpaid construction work as statute-barred.

The motions judge found that the invoice rendered by the appellant was a demand obligation under s. 5(3) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and that the limitation period commenced on the date the invoice was rendered, precluding the discoverability principle.

The Divisional Court majority upheld the decision, confirming that an invoice payable on demand is a demand obligation and time starts to run when the demand is made.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an unauthorized sub-sub-contracted carrier, sought payment from the respondent consignee for transporting goods, relying on section 2 of the Bills of Lading Act.

The respondent had already paid its contracted transportation arranger, unaware of the unauthorized subcontracting chain.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant disentitled itself from relying on the Act by participating in the unauthorized subcontracting and concealing it from the respondent.

The applicant, a licensed standardbred trainer, sought judicial review of a decision by a panel of the respondent commission, which upheld findings of guilt and increased penalties related to the treatment of a horse.

The applicant was entitled to a hearing conducted as a trial de novo.

The Divisional Court found that the panel fundamentally erred by treating the hearing as a review of the initial judges' decision and applying a reasonableness standard of review, rather than determining the charges on a balance of probabilities.

The application was granted, the decision set aside, and the matter remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision granting a non-suit motion and dismissing his slander action.

The Divisional Court raised the issue of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Because the appellant failed to set out the amount of his claim in the statement of claim as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court could not determine if the claim fell within its $50,000 monetary jurisdiction.

Consequently, the court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision apportioning the proceeds of sale of a home formerly occupied by the parties.

The parties, who lived together but were not married, had an agreement to share expenses and divide the proceeds of the home's sale equally after reimbursing the appellant's down payment.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in granting the respondent an allowance akin to occupation rent, as they were not joint owners or spouses under the Family Law Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge appropriately considered all circumstances, including the appellant's sole occupation of the property and the equitable claims of unjust enrichment and constructive trust, to arrive at an equitable division of the proceeds.

The appellants were entirely successful on their appeal and sought costs.

The court awarded the appellants costs fixed at $1,000 for the motion for leave to appeal and $4,500 for the appeal, noting that the outcome was more favourable than an offer to settle made to them by the respondents.

The court found it was unreasonable for the respondents to oppose the appeal given the lack of reasonable prospect of success.

The court issued an amendment to its original judgment released on July 28, 2011, to correct an error regarding the place where the appeal was heard.

The original judgment incorrectly stated the appeal was heard in London, and was amended to reflect that it was heard in Hamilton.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application, the respondent university sought costs.

The court awarded costs to the respondent university fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court noted that the application served no public benefit, was based on voluminous materials, and was presented in a laborious manner that added significantly to the university's costs.

The Director of the Ontario Disability Support Program appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal finding the respondent to be a person with a disability.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal committed a reversible error by relying on social and external factors—such as the respondent's lack of education, her husband's unemployment, and her childcare responsibilities—rather than her medical impairments to conclude she was substantially restricted in her ability to function in a workplace.

The Court also found the Tribunal's reasons to be inadequate.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted panel for a new hearing.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order granting the respondents unfettered access to a residential property to retrieve personal belongings.

The motions judge had noted the appellants in default and refused to allow their counsel to make submissions on a motion to set aside the default or on the merits of the respondents' motion.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order, finding that the motions judge erred in law and denied procedural fairness by refusing to hear counsel, misinterpreting Rule 19.02, granting relief that far exceeded the notice of motion, and failing to provide reasons.

The Registrar appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that declined to revoke a real estate broker's registration, instead imposing conditions.

The broker had been involved in transactions where properties were flipped at inflated prices, facilitating mortgage fraud, though the Tribunal found he lacked actual knowledge of the fraud.

The Divisional Court majority dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal reasonably assessed the broker's past conduct, including mitigating factors, and appropriately applied the balance of probabilities standard.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal applied the wrong standard of proof and failed to properly apply the statutory test for registration entitlement.

The applicant, a university instructor, sought judicial review of an investigator's report and the university's subsequent determination dismissing her workplace harassment and discrimination complaint against a colleague.

The parties had previously agreed to bypass the collective agreement's formal inquiry panel process in favour of a private investigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the customized, private process lacked the requisite public character to be amenable to judicial review, and also dismissed a motion to set aside a single judge's order striking the applicant's affidavit for containing inadmissible evidence.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to order the respondent to pay a proportionate share of their daughter's tutoring expenses.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge erred in law by failing to properly apply the definition of 'extraordinary expenses' under s. 7(1.1) of the Child Support Guidelines, specifically by not considering the appellant's income and ability to cover the expense.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a rehearing.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate's decision finding that the respondent suffered a catastrophic impairment under s. 2(1.1)(g) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Divisional Court granted the application and set aside the decision, holding that the Delegate erred in law by concluding that a marked impairment in only one of four areas of functioning was sufficient for a catastrophic impairment designation.

The Court further held that the Delegate erred by failing to exclude pain associated with physical injuries when assessing impairment due to mental or behavioural disorder, as required by the AMA Guides incorporated into the legislation.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario following a guilty plea for operating in a net trust deficit position and failing to maintain proper records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was statute-barred as it was filed out of time under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court also addressed the merits, concluding the Committee's decision was reasonable, the brief written reasons were sufficient, and the requirement to file audited financial statements for three years was within the Committee's jurisdiction.