Sylvia Corthorn

The plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant in 2022 but later discovered an error in the defendant's corporate number.

After successfully amending the title of proceedings, the plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2)(a) to vary the 2022 default judgment to reflect the correct corporate number.

The court found the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence and the defendant suffered no prejudice.

The motion was granted and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendant Metrolinx brought a motion seeking an order to compel the injured plaintiff, J.E., to attend an in-person psychiatric assessment.

Metrolinx argued this was necessary to respond to evidence regarding J.E.'s psychiatric conditions, including a recent schizophrenia diagnosis.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing their pleadings did not attribute the recent psychiatric conditions to the incident and that their expert, a neuropsychologist, could address the diagnoses.

The court dismissed Metrolinx's motion, finding that Metrolinx had not established the necessity of the in-person assessment to level the playing field, especially since their own psychiatrist had already provided a paper review report addressing causation.

The court emphasized that the plaintiff's pleadings did not allege the 2017 incident caused the 2023 psychiatric conditions and that the role of treating healthcare professionals as participant experts is limited by the court's gatekeeper function.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the arresting officer's grounds for arrest and observations of the appellant's driving.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including the officer's testimony about tire tracks, the appellant's belligerent behaviour, and information from civilian callers.

The court found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and properly resolved inconsistencies in the testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for approval of a settlement of the minor plaintiffs' claims, the proposed management of the net settlement funds, and the proposed solicitor-client account.

In this third interim ruling, the court adjourned the motion to permit the plaintiffs to file additional evidence regarding the specific calculations for the minor plaintiffs' pro-rata contributions towards the solicitor-client account and the net amounts payable to each minor.

The court also directed the plaintiffs to serve the Office of the Children's Lawyer and to submit a revised draft order complying with Form 59A.

At a case conference, the plaintiff sought to prevent cross-examinations on affidavits filed for his motion to enforce a settlement, arguing the action was under the Rule 76 Simplified Procedure which prohibits such cross-examinations.

The defendant corporation opposed, arguing the motion to enforce a settlement is akin to a summary judgment motion requiring cross-examinations.

The court held that Rule 76 is not an absolute bar to cross-examinations in this context and that the two-step approach for enforcing settlements requires both parties to put their best foot forward.

The court extended the deadline for cross-examinations and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs of the case conference.

The plaintiff, Service de Pneus Lavoie Outaouais Inc., sought to amend the title of proceeding and vary a default judgment obtained against '2189224 Ontario Inc. o/a Tiremag' due to a clerical error in the defendant's corporate number, which should have been '2184224 Ontario Inc.'.

The court granted leave to amend the title of proceeding under Rule 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding no prejudice to the defendant given the history of dealings and the defendant's failure to correct the error or defend the original action.

However, the request to vary the default judgment under Rule 59.06(1) was adjourned to allow the defendant an opportunity to respond, emphasizing the principle of proportionality under Rule 1.04(1) and the potential for prejudice if the defendant had relied on the incorrect numbering.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of residency requirements for election officers under the federal Elections Act, arguing they infringed his s. 7 Charter liberty interest by impacting his choice of residence and employment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that choice of residence does not rise to the profound level of personal decisions protected by the s. 7 liberty interest, which is intended for profoundly intimate and personal choices, not economic interests.

The plaintiffs' counsel brought a motion for an order appointing a litigation guardian for the plaintiff, who was pursuing a medical negligence claim.

The plaintiff's mental health had deteriorated, and he refused to undergo a capacity assessment.

The court found the plaintiff to be a person under disability, incapable of providing instructions for the litigation.

The court appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as the plaintiff's litigation guardian, validated substituted service, dispensed with service of supporting materials on the defendant, and discontinued the co-plaintiff's claim without costs.

The plaintiff, Cary Beazley, sued 27 physicians and Queensway Carleton Hospital for medical malpractice, alleging delayed diagnosis and treatment of Lyme disease.

Three motions for summary judgment were heard: one by the defendant physicians, one by the Hospital, and a cross-motion by the plaintiff seeking a finding of liability in his favour.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against all defendants, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide admissible expert evidence to support his claims in negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court also denied the plaintiff's request to file a second expert affidavit and to be qualified as an expert.

The respondent in a vexatious litigant application brought a motion seeking various procedural and substantive relief, including an adjournment, leave to amend her pleadings in a separate action, the return of her passport, and monetary damages.

She also requested that the presiding judge recuse herself for alleged historical bias.

The court dismissed the recusal request, finding no evidence of bias.

The procedural requests regarding the timetable were adjourned to be heard by the Associate Justice managing the proceeding.

The requests for leave to amend, passport return, and monetary relief were dismissed without prejudice to the respondent pursuing them in the appropriate underlying action.

Following a successful motion for a compliance order against a unit owner and his tenant son, the applicant condominium corporation sought costs on a full indemnity scale.

The court found the applicant was presumptively entitled to costs and that the condominium's governing documents and the Condominium Act supported a full indemnity award to prevent other owners from subsidizing the enforcement.

The court reviewed the fees and disbursements, made minor reductions for duplication and unrelated work, and fixed costs at $15,916.49, to be added to the common expenses for the subject unit.

The plaintiff estate sought leave to amend its statement of claim mid-trial in a long-running family business dispute involving an oppression remedy claim.

The court granted leave for some amendments, finding they merely provided further particulars of the originally pleaded misappropriation of funds (e.g., the Stapledon loan allegations and the Stoke Lacey sale).

However, the court refused leave for other amendments (e.g., failure to pay property taxes and failure to complete audited financial statements), finding they constituted new, statute-barred causes of action that would cause actual and presumed non-compensable prejudice to the incapacitated defendant due to inordinate delay.

The court also refused amendments that amounted to a collateral attack on findings made in the first part of the bifurcated trial.

The proposed litigation administrator for the deceased plaintiff, Hanadi Mohammed, brought a motion seeking an order to continue the action, a one-year extension for service of the statement of claim, and leave to amend the statement of claim.

The action was commenced after the plaintiff's death and after the two-year anniversary of the motor vehicle collision.

The motion was brought without notice to the defendants.

The court found several deficiencies in the evidence, including a lack of explanation for commencing the action in the deceased's name, delay in bringing the motion, insufficient evidence regarding notice to defendants and potential prejudice, and the absence of a draft amended statement of claim.

Consequently, the motion was adjourned to an oral hearing and ordered to be brought on notice to the defendants, with the action remaining stayed under Rule 9.03(6).

This application concerned an oppression remedy claim brought by Rene Ziegelmaier against his former business partner, Casey Fisher, and several corporations involved in a microbrewery venture, as well as Frontenac Community Futures Development Corporation.

The applicant alleged oppressive conduct by Fisher, including being locked out of the business premises and bank accounts.

The court found numerous material factual disputes and credibility issues that could not be resolved on the application record.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application against Frontenac Community Futures Development Corporation and converted the remainder of the application into an action, directing the parties to exchange pleadings and proceed with discoveries.

This criminal trial involved charges against Zekeim Ogilvie (13 offences) and Akol Akol (15 offences, including enabling escape) stemming from a shooting incident.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance, cell phone data, and GPS data from a rented vehicle.

The court meticulously analyzed the identification evidence for Ogilvie and the elements of aiding and abetting for Akol.

The judge found that the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for either accused on any count, emphasizing the need to avoid speculation and conjecture when drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence.

Both defendants were acquitted.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action in its entirety without costs under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant, TD Canada Trust, initiated a request for dismissal.

The self-represented plaintiff, despite multiple opportunities, failed to file proper submissions in response to the court's notice regarding the potential dismissal of his action, which was found to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process with no legitimate cause of action.

The parties separated in 2011 after a 16-year marriage.

The applicant sought equalization of net family property, retroactive child support, and Section 7 expenses.

The respondent sought to set aside a term of their separation agreement regarding the matrimonial home and claimed he had overpaid child support.

The court dismissed the respondent's request to set aside the agreement and the applicant's claims for post-separation expenses.

The court imputed income to the respondent due to his intentional underemployment and failure to provide financial disclosure.

The respondent was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $77,732.51, Section 7 expenses of $45,684.63, and retroactive child support based on the imputed income.

This interim ruling addresses a motion for court approval of a minor settlement, management of net settlement funds, and solicitor-client account.

While the solicitor-client account was approved, the court adjourned decisions on the minor plaintiffs' specific contributions to the account and the detailed management of Brayden's structured settlement funds due to insufficient evidence regarding tax implications and the proposed structure.

The court also denied the plaintiffs' request to dispense with service of motion records on the defendant, emphasizing the need for proper procedural compliance and the defendant's right to review the full terms of the proposed order and release.

The defendant, TD Canada Trust, requested an administrative dismissal of the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found the plaintiff's statement of claim to have significant deficiencies and hallmarks of frivolous litigation.

However, recognizing that dismissal under Rule 2.1.01 is a "blunt instrument" and considering the plaintiff is self-represented, the court declined to dismiss the action immediately.

Instead, it directed a process for the self-represented plaintiff to file written submissions, followed by responses from the defendants, before a final determination on whether to dismiss the action in its entirety.

The action was stayed pending this process.

The defendant law firm, Addelman Baum Gilbert Robinson LLP, brought a motion to set aside a noting in default entered by the self-represented plaintiff, Deirdre Moore.

The plaintiff had sued two law firms for $1.75 million in damages.

The court found that the 20-day delay in filing a statement of defence by Addelman was not extensive and had a "real excuse" (counsel awaiting client file, Joseph Addelman on vacation).

The court criticized the plaintiff's "sharp practice" in noting default without providing the requested two weeks' notice, emphasizing that self-represented litigants are not exempt from professional courtesies.

Finding no prejudice to the plaintiff and significant prejudice to the defendant if not allowed to defend serious allegations, the court granted the motion to set aside the noting in default and allowed Addelman to deliver a statement of defence.

No costs were awarded due to the conduct of both parties.