Sylvia Corthorn

The court considered a motion by the applicant father, Kemi Andrew Emberson, for an interim order that the parties’ two children move to Ottawa to reside with him and attend school there.

The respondent mother, Trystian Elizabeth Hilton, opposed the motion.

The court reviewed the litigation history, the parties’ circumstances, and the children’s chronic school absences.

The court refused the mother’s request for leave to file late responding materials and ultimately dismissed the father’s motion, finding insufficient evidence of a material change in circumstances to justify changing the children’s primary residence on an interim basis.

The court ordered an expedited trial and increased the father’s parenting time pending trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking to remove the defendants' joint counsel of record due to conflicts of interest and seeking leave to amend their statement of claim in an ongoing estate and corporate oppression dispute.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to strike an expert affidavit relied upon by the plaintiffs.

The court found that the defendants had procedurally abandoned their motion to strike the affidavit.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remove the defendants' counsel, finding that joint representation of the various defendants created severe conflicts of interest that threatened public confidence in the administration of justice.

Finally, the court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their statement of claim and stayed the action until a litigation administrator is appointed for the deceased's estate.

The court considered a request by the Ontario Association of Police Service Boards to dismiss the action against it under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the plaintiffs' statement of claim lacked any factual basis for relief against the Association and that the pleading exhibited hallmarks of vexatious and frivolous litigation.

The court reviewed the applicable legal principles and procedures for summary dismissal under Rule 2.1.01, ultimately dismissing the claims against the Association without costs.

The court considered two motions for summary judgment in a civil action brought by William Stoddart, a former inmate, against Dr. Diana Silver Wyatt and various Crown defendants.

Stoddart alleged assault and professional negligence against Dr. Wyatt, and negligence, assault, and breach of Charter rights against the Crown defendants, arising from the discontinuation of his prescription for gabapentin following a change in the Correctional Service of Canada’s drug formulary.

The court found that the only evidence on the standard of care was from the defendants, and Stoddart failed to provide any expert evidence in support of his claims.

The court held that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment, dismissing all of Stoddart’s claims.

The accused, Jason Albert Lowe, was charged with sexual assault against M.D. following an incident on March 8-9, 2022.

The trial turned on the credibility and reliability of the complainant, who gave inconsistent statements regarding consent, the use of a condom, and other details.

The court found that the inconsistencies and lack of corroborative evidence raised a reasonable doubt and acquitted Mr. Lowe.

The court sentenced D.A.L. for procuring H.S. to offer or provide sexual services for consideration, contrary to section 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code.

The jury acquitted D.A.L. of all other charges, including human trafficking, receiving a material benefit, advertising, and violence-related offences.

The court reviewed the factual background, pre-sentence report, victim impact statement, and letters of support.

The Crown sought a two-year custodial sentence, while the defence argued for an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including the vulnerability of the complainant, the offender’s lack of criminal record, his rehabilitation, and collateral immigration consequences.

After reviewing relevant case law and the unique circumstances, the court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence (minus 31 days for pretrial custody), to be served under house arrest, followed by 12 months’ probation, with additional conditions and a DNA order.

This ruling addresses an interim motion concerning parenting time for four children following the separation of the applicant father and respondent mother.

The respondent mother sought various relief, including primary residence and a parenting schedule, while the applicant father sought full custody and decision-making authority.

The court denied the applicant's requests for leave to file additional affidavits and for an adjournment.

Focusing on the children's best interests, stability, and their expressed views and preferences, particularly those of the older children, the court ordered a temporary, without prejudice, parenting schedule.

The children are to reside primarily with the applicant father in Kemptville, with the respondent mother having alternate weekend and weekly Thursday parenting time, including time on Islamic holy days.

The court also addressed concerns about family violence and parental conduct, reserving costs and adjourning the motion for review upon the mother securing permanent housing.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of Patricia Graham's application to invalidate a will.

Katherine Blais, the successful respondent, sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court fixed Ms. Blais's costs at $22,000, reducing the requested amount of $30,700.

The decision considered Ms. Graham's conduct in unnecessarily lengthening the proceeding, the reasonableness of hourly rates for counsel of differing experience, and the exclusion of fees for inadequately explained non-lawyer timekeepers.

This motion concerned an interim parenting schedule for a 2.5-year-old child following the separation of unmarried parents.

The applicant father sought increased parenting time, which the respondent mother opposed, proposing a more gradual reintroduction.

The court applied the "best interests of the child" principle under the Children's Law Reform Act, noting that the "tender years" doctrine no longer applies and breastfeeding is one of many factors.

The court considered the geographic distance between the parents, the mother's mental health issues and associated release order, and the mother's uncooperative approach to facilitating parenting time.

While acknowledging the mother as the primary caregiver pre-separation, the court ordered a structured, gradually increasing parenting schedule for the father, including weeknight visits in the mother's area and weekend visits at a midpoint location.

The motion was adjourned for continuation in several months to assess the schedule's effectiveness and allow for further evidence.

Rachel Obita, a self-represented plaintiff, sued Algonquin College for various torts and breach of contract related to her academic experience, including a disputed grade and alleged academic bullying.

The College moved to strike her amended statement of claim for lack of jurisdiction and failure to disclose reasonable causes of action.

The court found it had jurisdiction over the general subject matter but determined that all of Ms. Obita's pleaded causes of action (intentional infliction of pain and suffering, defamation, intrusion on seclusion, breach of contract, negligence, deceit, and fraudulent misrepresentation) were fatally flawed and failed to meet pleading requirements.

Given her prior opportunity to amend and litigation conduct, the court dismissed the entire action without leave to amend.

The plaintiff, a former unionized employee, commenced a civil action against her former employer for wrongful termination and discrimination, after her grievance was withdrawn by the union and her Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) application was dismissed.

The defendant employer brought a motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction and as being frivolous or vexatious.

The court granted the motion, finding that the essential character of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator under the collective agreement and the Ontario Labour Relations Act, and that the human rights claims did not create a separate cause of action.

The court also found the action to be frivolous and vexatious.

The self-represented defendant, Lucy Shaver, brought a motion seeking release from a prior settlement agreement that required her to transfer a residential property to the plaintiff, Shaver-Kudell Manufacturing Inc. The court dismissed her motion, refusing an adjournment request and finding no legal basis for the relief sought.

The judge noted Lucy Shaver's failure to provide supporting evidence and emphasized that her motion was an improper attempt to circumvent the appeal process for a previous decision by McVey J.

The applicant sought directions for the administration of her late father's estate, specifically addressing concerns about the estate trustee's conduct and the sale of the deceased's residential property where a respondent resided.

The court provided directions for estate administration, ordered the estate trustee to produce documents and accounts, and set conditions for the sale of the property, including a deadline for the resident respondent to secure financing or vacate.

The court also addressed the applicant's access to the property and emphasized the need for respectful communication among parties.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages from the defendant for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for residential property.

The defendant failed to close the transaction due to inability to secure financing.

The defendant admitted breach but disputed the quantum of damages and alleged the plaintiffs failed to mitigate their losses.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the plaintiffs acted reasonably in mitigating damages and assessing damages based on the actual resale date.

The Ontario Federation of All Terrain Vehicle Clubs (the "Federation") brought an application seeking declarations of defamation and a permanent injunction against Paul Ireland (also known as Robert Paul Ireland) for an online campaign of defamatory posts.

Mr. Ireland failed to respond to the application.

The court applied the three-part test for defamation from Grant v. Torstar, finding that Mr. Ireland's posts, which alleged corruption, fraud, and criminal conduct, were defamatory and would lower the Federation's reputation.

As Mr. Ireland presented no evidence, the court found no valid defence (justification, fair comment, or qualified privilege).

Consequently, the court granted the Federation's requested declaratory and equitable relief, ordering Mr. Ireland to remove the defamatory posts and permanently enjoining him from publishing similar statements.

The court also awarded costs to the Federation.

The applicant, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), sought to register an Alberta judgment in Ontario without notice to the respondent.

The court found that CMHC failed to establish that the respondent was personally served with the "original action" (the Alberta application for a new judgment) and that the respondent did not appear or defend in that action.

Consequently, under s. 2(2) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (REJA), CMHC was required to give reasonable notice.

The application was adjourned, and CMHC was ordered to proceed on notice to the respondent, with the court also noting concerns regarding the quality of CMHC's affidavit evidence and the calculation of the judgment amount.

The provincial defendants requested the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action against them under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the statement of claim lacked any factual basis for relief.

The self-represented plaintiffs sought $500 million in damages for alleged police misconduct, illegal detention, and racial profiling.

The court found the pleading exhibited hallmarks of vexatious and frivolous litigation, including sweeping allegations of rights violations and repetitive claims attempting to re-litigate matters from previous proceedings.

The court dismissed the claims against the provincial defendants without costs.

The applicant sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity scale following a consent order resolving her motion for a Mareva injunction and Norwich order against the respondent, her brother and co-estate trustee.

The respondent had unilaterally transferred approximately $500,000 of estate assets to himself.

The court declined to award elevated costs, noting the applicant had also participated in impersonating the deceased to facilitate the initial transfer of funds.

The court fixed the applicant's costs on a partial indemnity scale at $45,960.00 and found the respondent's settlement offer did not entitle him to a costs set-off as it lacked the certainty achieved in the consent order.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and extortion, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

However, the court deducted 73 days of defence delay attributed to the late notice of the s. 11(b) application, bringing the net delay below the ceiling.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments that a conflict in the Crown's office and a change in the assigned trial judge constituted exceptional circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff's counsel brought a motion seeking an order to continue the action and appoint a litigation administrator for the deceased plaintiff's estate.

The court dismissed the motion without prejudice, finding insufficient evidence to establish that there was no executor or administrator for the estate.

The court also raised concerns about the appropriateness of appointing a lawyer from the plaintiff's firm as litigation administrator, particularly regarding the implications for examination for discovery in a subrogated claim and potential ethical conflicts.

The court further noted the necessity of amending the statement of claim to reflect the change in party representation.