Sylvia Corthorn

The self-represented plaintiff noted all defendants in default without providing prior notice of her intention to do so.

The defendants, comprising the Attorney General of Canada, municipal police, and other officials, moved to set aside the noting in default.

The court applied the factors from Intact Insurance Company v. Kisel and found that the defendants had always intended to defend the action, acted promptly upon learning of the default, and that the plaintiff's failure to provide notice deprived them of the opportunity to respond.

The court set aside the noting in default, allowing the claims to be determined on their merits.

The plaintiffs initiated a class action against numerous governmental and international entities, including Pope Francis and Queen Elizabeth II, alleging harms from COVID-19 protocols and constitutional infringements.

Several defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the statement of claim to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process due to its rambling nature, irrelevant historical allegations, and lack of specific legal basis for claims.

The action was dismissed in its entirety against all defendants, with no costs awarded.

The moving party father brought a motion to change a 2007 consent order, seeking a retroactive reduction in child support based on a decrease in income and an alleged verbal agreement.

The responding party mother opposed the reduction, arguing the father was intentionally under-employed and spent winters in the Caribbean.

The court found no verbal agreement existed and concluded the father engaged in a deliberate pattern of under-employment from 2016 to 2021.

Income was imputed to the father for those years, except 2020 due to the pandemic.

Arrears were fixed at $10,731.25, and the father was ordered to continue paying child support and a proportionate share of expenses if the child pursues post-secondary education, up to age 27.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for approval of a minor's settlement arising from a medical incident.

The action was commenced in Toronto, but the plaintiffs sought leave to bring the motion in Picton to avoid delays and backlog in Toronto.

The court dismissed the request for leave, holding that 'jurisdiction shopping' is not an appropriate solution to judicial backlog and directed the plaintiffs to bring the motion in Toronto.

Following a successful application to remove the respondents as trustees of a family trust, the applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis payable by the trustees personally.

The court awarded the applicant partial indemnity costs payable by the trustees personally, finding their conduct unreasonable but not reprehensible.

The balance of the applicant's full indemnity costs was ordered to be paid from the family trust.

The trustees were denied indemnification from the estate for their own costs due to their unreasonable conduct.

This is an interim ruling on the admissibility of documentary evidence for motions for summary judgment in a medical negligence action.

The self-represented plaintiff, Cary Beazley, alleged delayed diagnosis of Lyme disease against numerous physicians and a hospital.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment.

The court addressed the admissibility of 83 documents relied upon by the plaintiff, many of which were incomplete, unsworn, or linked via hyperlinks.

The court emphasized that while procedural fairness is extended to self-represented litigants, fundamental evidentiary rules, such as the requirement for hard copies, proper authentication, and logical probative value, must still be met.

Many of the plaintiff's documents were excluded for failing to meet these criteria, including a video recording of testimony due to lack of authentication and internet information for lack of reliability.

Following the dismissal of the respondent's motion to change child support, the applicant sought costs.

The court awarded the applicant costs on a full indemnity basis, finding that the respondent had engaged in unreasonable and bad faith conduct throughout the litigation, including failing to voluntarily pay child support, being repeatedly unprepared, and being deliberately deceptive with financial disclosure.

The respondent was ordered to pay $5,000 in costs, enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office.

The plaintiff, a non-profit providing farm financing to Status Indians, brought a motion for default judgment against the defendants for breach of loan agreements and conditional sales contracts.

The defendants, who reside on the Six Nations Reserve, failed to defend the action.

The court granted default judgment for monetary indebtedness totaling over $484,000.

The court also held that the Indian Act does not preclude the plaintiff from enforcing its security interests under the Personal Property Security Act to repossess farm equipment located on the reserve, as the equipment was acquired in the commercial mainstream.

Finally, the court ordered crop insurance proceeds assigned to the plaintiff to be paid into court by Agricorp pending a further motion.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion regarding the school registration of the parties' child, which was dismissed.

The respondent mother subsequently sought costs of $8,460.16 for both the urgency and substantive motions.

The court found that the applicant's initial response to the school registration decision, which included threats of litigation and allegations of fraud, constituted unreasonable behaviour.

The court awarded the respondent her costs for both motions, fixing the quantum at $7,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, after deducting clerical work and costs related to preparing the costs submissions.

The offender was sentenced for multiple counts of sexual assault, choking with intent to commit an indictable offence, and uttering threats against three vulnerable women over a twelve-year period.

The court weighed the profound physical and psychological harm to the victims, the brutal nature of the assaults, and the offender's high risk to re-offend against mitigating factors including his difficult upbringing, severe drug addiction, and pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Applying the totality principle and granting credit for pre-sentence custody, the court imposed a total sentence of 18 years imprisonment.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend the statement of claim, seeking to add a new defendant and remove an existing one.

The court identified numerous procedural deficiencies in the motion record, including an improper basis for bringing the motion in writing (expectation of unopposed vs. consent), lack of affidavit of service for the proposed new party, use of antiquated terminology ("style of cause"), and issues with the consent form and document filing.

The motion was not granted at this time and was adjourned with specific directions for the plaintiff to correct the record and ensure proper service on all parties, including the proposed new defendant.

The father brought an urgent motion seeking an order for the child to remain enrolled in a private academy, arguing that a prior consultative process had superseded the mother's sole decision-making authority regarding education.

The mother, who had sole decision-making authority, had registered the child in a public school closer to her new home in Richmond and brought a cross-motion for the child to remain there.

The court found no change to the mother's sole decision-making authority and determined that the transfer to the public school was in the child's best interests, considering practical factors such as proximity to the new home, social opportunities, and elimination of after-school care.

The father's motion was dismissed, and the mother's cross-motion was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the jury notice in her motor vehicle collision action, seeking to proceed to trial before a judge alone due to concerns about potential delays and prejudice (financial and mental health) related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted leave for the plaintiff to bring the motion but ultimately dismissed it.

The court found that the plaintiff's grounds, such as temporary jury selection bans, were no longer valid as COVID-19 restrictions had been lifted.

The court emphasized the substantive right to a jury trial and determined that the plaintiff's evidence regarding prejudice was insufficient or lacked concrete detail to justify overriding this right.

The court reserved costs to the trial judge and granted both parties leave to bring further motions if the pandemic circumstances change again.

The Superior Court of Justice granted a non-lawyer, James P. McGlone, leave to represent the plaintiff corporation, Tash Benson Group Inc., in an action for damages.

The court found that the corporation had demonstrated financial inability to retain counsel and that McGlone, its sole director, had provided sufficient evidence regarding corporate structure.

The decision also addressed costs, awarding the defendants partial indemnity costs of $4,000 for a prior related motion, payable after trial judgment, but no costs for the current motion.

This interim ruling addresses the plaintiff's request to be qualified as an expert witness in the areas of Lyme disease diagnosis and treatment, in the context of summary judgment motions.

The plaintiff, who is self-represented and a party to the action, sought to rely on his self-prepared 'Beazley Reports' as expert evidence.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's request, finding that as a party with a direct financial interest and an advocate, he was unable or unwilling to provide fair, objective, and non-partisan opinion evidence, which is a threshold requirement for expert qualification.

The court also found that the 'Beazley Reports' themselves did not constitute expert reports.

This ruling addresses two motions to strike portions of a statement of claim brought by the plaintiffs, Jayelle and Sarel Alafi, against midwives and the Children's Aid Society of Algoma (CAS).

The Alafis sued for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, negligent infliction of mental suffering, intrusion upon seclusion, misfeasance of public office, and Charter s. 7 breaches, following the apprehension of their newborn child.

The court struck Mr. Alafi's negligence claims against the midwives related to their scope of practice, finding no duty of care owed to a non-patient third party.

The court also struck the plaintiffs' negligence claims against the CAS, reaffirming that the CAS's duty is solely to the child.

However, the court dismissed the CAS's motion to strike the plaintiffs' s. 7 Charter claims, finding it not plain and obvious that these claims would fail, particularly regarding the right to security of the person in child protection contexts.

Portions of the midwives' motion were adjourned for further submissions.

The accused, charged with possession of property obtained by crime and laundering proceeds of crime, brought a pre-trial application to exclude Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) documents obtained by the investigating officer.

The officer had requested the documents under s. 241(3) of the Income Tax Act, relying on previous, unrelated charges.

The court found that for an investigation into potential new charges, the officer was required to obtain a judicial order under s. 462.48(3) of the Criminal Code.

The warrantless search of the taxpayer information violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the CRA documents from evidence and excised references to them from the Informations to Obtain (ITOs).

However, the court found that the edited ITOs still contained sufficient reliable evidence to support the General Production Orders, and declined to exclude the evidence obtained through those orders.

The applicant, who suffered a catastrophic brain injury in a motor vehicle accident, sought court approval of a $1,450,000 settlement of her Statutory Accident Benefits (SABS) claim.

The court declined to approve the settlement, finding the evidence insufficient to establish that the proposed discount from the full value of her future care needs was in her best interests.

The court also identified deficiencies in the evidence regarding the applicant's capacity to manage property and the proposed allocation of settlement funds.

The application was adjourned to a case conference to address next steps, including procedural issues regarding corporate representation and affidavit evidence.

The defendants brought a motion to adjourn a three-week trial scheduled to commence in one month, citing the plaintiffs' late production of documents and two expert reports.

The plaintiffs agreed to withdraw one expert report if the trial proceeded.

The court applied the factors from Ariston Realty and Igbinosun, finding that the defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating why they could not proceed or how their defence would be significantly compromised.

The court emphasized the prejudice of delay to the plaintiffs in an eight-year-old action and dismissed the motion, without prejudice to the defendants seeking relief at trial regarding the late productions.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the breath samples were taken 'as soon as practicable' and improperly took judicial notice of police procedures regarding meetings between arresting officers and breathalyzer technicians.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law, properly took tacit judicial notice based on common experience, and reasonably concluded the police acted with reasonable promptness.