Sylvia Corthorn

The father sought costs of $33,000 following his successful motion to change regarding primary care and child support.

The mother argued for no costs or a reduced amount based on her inability to pay.

The court found the father was successful on the most contentious issues and that the mother engaged in unreasonable litigation behaviour.

The court ordered the mother to pay the father $18,000 in costs, with $3,600 attributed to child support for enforcement through the Family Responsibility Office.

The applicants, developers in the City of Kingston, challenged the validity of the City's Impost By-law, which imposed fees for the capital costs of water and sewer infrastructure.

The applicants argued that the City was required to impose such fees under the Development Charges Act, 1997, and that the Impost By-law conflicted with that Act, was ultra vires the Municipal Act, 2001, and was discriminatory.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the legislative framework allowed the City to enact the Impost By-law under the Municipal Act, 2001, that there was no conflict with the Development Charges Act, 1997, and that the by-law was neither ultra vires nor discriminatory.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend his statement of claim to properly plead defamation against his former employer, the hospital, and to add a former colleague as a defendant.

The court found that the proposed amended pleading failed to plead the requisite elements of defamation with sufficient particularity, as it did not identify the defamatory words, when they were spoken, or to whom.

Consequently, the motion to amend was dismissed, the motion to add the new defendant was dismissed, and the action was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice due to trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiffs argued they would suffer prejudice from the delay itself, the impact on the plaintiff's mental health, and the financial erosion of her claim for economic loss.

The defendant argued the case involved chronic pain and credibility issues best suited for a jury, and that his litigation strategy relied on a jury trial.

The court found the plaintiffs established prejudice due to delay and financial erosion, which outweighed the defendant's broad assertions of prejudice.

The court conditionally struck the jury notice, ordering the trial to proceed before a judge alone on the adjourned date, but allowing for automatic reinstatement of the jury notice if the trial is further adjourned to a time when civil jury trials have resumed.

The applicant brought a motion for additional financial disclosure from the respondent in a family law proceeding.

The applicant alleged the respondent was underemployed or hiding income and sought 19 outstanding disclosure items, including unredacted account statements and tax documents.

The court ordered the respondent to provide complete, unredacted copies for 16 of the 19 items, finding that the respondent's privacy rights did not justify redacting relevant financial information.

The request for the remaining three items was dismissed without prejudice to the applicant renewing the request with additional evidence.

The defendant municipality requested the dismissal of two actions brought by the self-represented plaintiff challenging a mandatory mask by-law enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the plaintiff's pleadings, which alleged Charter violations based on the right to choose what to wear, were repetitive, rambling, and lacked a viable cause of action.

Applying Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court dismissed both actions as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Following motions by both parties regarding refusals and questions taken under advisement during questioning, the Estate Trustee was largely successful.

Both parties sought costs of the motions.

The court determined the Estate Trustee's entitlement to costs as the successful party and fixed the quantum on a partial indemnity basis at $25,200, plus $500 for a prior appointment, payable by the applicant.

The applicant father brought an application to be appointed as the guardian of property and personal care for his adult son, who has severe autism and developmental delays.

The court found the son incapable of managing property and personal care under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The court appointed the father as guardian of property and personal care, noting his long-standing devotion and appropriate management plans.

The Public Guardian and Trustee was granted oversight of the son's Registered Disability Savings Plan.

The applicant sought costs on a full indemnity basis following her largely successful motion for disclosure.

The respondent argued for no costs or a modest amount due to his limited financial means.

The court found the applicant's approach reasonable and the respondent's protracted approach to disclosure caused delay, but declined to find bad faith.

Costs were awarded to the applicant in the amount of $5,650.00, representing slightly less than full indemnity.

The applicant, a declared vexatious litigant, emailed the Divisional Court requesting permission to bring an application for judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision.

The case management judge directed that the applicant is prohibited from instituting proceedings without formal leave under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court ordered the applicant to immediately cease corresponding with the court via email and to follow the proper procedure for seeking leave.

The plaintiffs moved to strike the jury notices delivered by the defendants, seeking a judge-alone trial.

Their primary argument was the uncertainty of trial timing due to the COVID-19 pandemic's suspension of civil jury trials, and alternatively, the cumulative effect of this delay and the complexity of the issues.

The court granted leave to bring the motion, finding that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a substantial and unexpected change in circumstances, making it "manifestly unjust" to refuse leave.

Applying the principles from *Louis v. Poitras*, the court found that the indefinite suspension of civil jury trials in Ottawa caused sufficient prejudice to the plaintiffs, justifying striking the jury notices.

The court concluded that justice would be better served by proceeding with a judge-alone trial in multi-week blocks, allowing for a more timely resolution.

The Public Guardian and Trustee applied for an order appointing it as the permanent guardian of property for the respondent, Diane MacFarlane, under section 22 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The application was based on evidence that Ms. MacFarlane was incapable of managing her property, including a capacity assessment report indicating cognitive impairment and anecdotal evidence of her inability to understand financial information and the consequences of her decisions, such as attempting to give away large sums of money to an "Elvis impersonator." The court found Ms. MacFarlane incapable of managing property as defined by section 6 of the SDA and appointed the PGT as her permanent guardian of property.

The court also addressed and ordered the payment of costs for both the PGT and Section 3 Counsel from Ms. MacFarlane's property.

The respondent, Google Canada, brought a motion in writing on consent to dismiss the application against it and to dismiss the applicant's motion to add proposed respondents.

The court adjourned the motion, finding several procedural deficiencies.

Specifically, the underlying application and motion were previously stayed and the stay had not been lifted, the moving party failed to provide necessary evidence or copies of the originating processes, and there was no basis to proceed without notice to the other named respondents.

The defendant bank requested an administrative dismissal of the self-represented plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court noted deficiencies in the statement of claim but recognized a legitimate cause of action might be buried within.

The court stayed the action and directed the registrar to issue a notice allowing the plaintiff to provide written submissions before determining whether the claim should be struck.

In a bifurcated family law and estate proceeding, both the applicant and the respondent estate brought motions to compel answers to questions refused or taken under advisement during questioning.

The central issue for the first phase of the trial was the validity and enforceability of a 1986 marriage contract.

The court ordered the applicant to produce documents relating to her prior divorce and records from her physician and counsellor, finding them relevant to her understanding of domestic contracts.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to compel the estate trustee to answer questions regarding the deceased's subsequent estate planning and relationships with lawyers, finding them irrelevant to the 1986 contract or overly broad.

The applicant brought an ex parte application in writing for an order discharging a $6,600 mortgage registered in 1959, as the mortgagee was deceased.

The court found the supporting affidavit, sworn by the applicant's solicitor, to be insufficient because it relied on double hearsay and failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts as required by Rule 39.01(6).

The application was adjourned to allow the applicant to file supplementary materials addressing the evidentiary deficiencies and the procedural requirements for proceeding against a deceased person's estate.

The defendant brought a motion in writing on consent for leave to amend its statement of defence and crossclaim.

The court found multiple deficiencies in the motion record, including the failure to attach the proposed amended pleading, lack of supporting affidavit evidence, and an improperly drafted consent and draft order.

Despite the motion being on consent, the court adjourned the motion and ordered the moving party to deliver a fresh, corrected motion record.

The applicant, a declared vexatious litigant, sought leave under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to bring an application for judicial review against the Health Services Appeal Review Board.

The Board had previously informed the applicant that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his appeal regarding OHIP's refusal to pre-approve funding for a psychiatric assessment.

The court, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.01(1), dismissed the application for leave as an abuse of process, finding that the Board had made no statutory decision subject to judicial review.

The respondent father brought a motion to increase his access time with his two children, remove the supervision requirement, and secure holiday access.

The applicant mother opposed the holiday access due to COVID-19 concerns related to a visiting family member, and opposed unsupervised access citing the father's lifestyle and past behaviour.

The court held that the mother could not unilaterally cancel scheduled access due to family plans and ordered the holiday visit to proceed.

The court also found insufficient evidence to justify long-term supervised access, ordering a gradual phase-out of supervision over several weeks.

The defendant hospital brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff former employee's action for damages arising from alleged workplace harassment, defamation, and other torts.

The court found that the majority of the claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator under the collective agreement and dismissed them.

The remaining claims for threats and poisoning were struck for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, while the plaintiff was granted leave to amend the pleadings regarding the defamation claims.