Stephen T. Bale

The Toronto Police Service sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission that varied the penalty imposed on a police officer who pled guilty to deceit and insubordination.

The Hearing Officer had ordered dismissal, but the Commission substituted a penalty of forfeiture of pay, suspension, and demotion, finding the Hearing Officer made several errors in principle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, holding that the Commission reasonably concluded the Hearing Officer erred by mischaracterizing the officer's admission of a mistake, making unsupported findings about risks to an investigation, and improperly relying on the fact of the officer's suspension.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for directions regarding the assessment of damages following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal had remitted the case for assessment of damages for deceit/fraudulent misrepresentation, setting a base amount and requiring deduction of profits from collateral exploitation.

The moving parties argued for a broader basis of damages (contractual) and a higher initial amount, which the court rejected, affirming the Court of Appeal's specific instructions.

The court provided directions on further examinations for discovery, restricting the examination of one defendant and limiting the plaintiffs' examination, and on the admissibility of evidence regarding profits.

Hazelton Homes Corporation, a non-party, brought a motion for leave to intervene and to set aside orders granting the plaintiffs leave to issue writs of possession for two properties.

Hazelton alleged the defendant held the properties in trust for it, while the defendant claimed the trust agreements were forged.

The plaintiffs and the first mortgagee held mortgages in default.

The court found Hazelton was not a mortgagor under section 23 of the Mortgages Act but granted an interim order allowing Hazelton to intervene and stayed the enforcement of the writs of possession, conditional upon Hazelton paying all mortgage arrears, ongoing interest, and costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff moved for an order authorizing a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) for Phase 1B lots.

A previous motion by de Sa J. had refused a CPL for these lots due to their resale to Cleary Homes and potential prejudice.

The plaintiff presented new evidence that the contract with Cleary Homes was no longer in effect, and Cleary Homes had abandoned plans for the lots.

The court found the plaintiff had a reasonable claim to an equitable interest in the land and was entitled to the CPL on an ex parte basis.

The court deferred the consideration of factors under s. 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act to a potential future contested motion to discharge the certificate.

The Superior Court of Justice considered a constitutional challenge to mandatory minimum sentences under ss. 286.2(2) (receiving material benefit from sexual services provided by a person under 18), 286.3(2) (procuring a person under 18), and 163.1(3) (distributing child pornography) of the Criminal Code.

The applicants, who were found guilty by a jury, argued these mandatory minimums violated s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court, applying the "grossly disproportionate" standard and considering reasonable hypotheticals, found the mandatory minimums for ss. 286.2(2) and 163.1(3) to be unconstitutional and declared them of no force or effect.

The mandatory minimum for s. 286.3(2) had already been declared unconstitutional in a prior decision.

The appellant general contractor appealed from summary judgments granted to two sub-subcontractors in a consolidated construction lien action.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by granting judgment without evidence of the value of the work done by the subcontractor, misinterpreting the holdback provisions of the Construction Lien Act, and improperly placing the evidentiary burden on the appellant to establish the quantum of its liability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the liens were not restricted to the basic holdback and that the appellant failed to provide evidence of the amount it owed to the subcontractor, which was a fact within its knowledge.

Following their convictions for various prostitution-related offences involving minors, the applicants sought a declaration that sections 286.2(2), 286.3(2), and 286.4 of the Criminal Code were unconstitutional, arguing they violated sections 7 and 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding the impugned sections constitutional.

It held that the sections were not arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate under s. 7, and that while s. 286.4 infringed s. 2(b) freedom of expression, it was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The appellant municipality appealed a summary judgment order that quashed a by-law directing the deduction of $5,434.21 from the respondent former councillor's severance pay.

The municipality argued the motion judge failed to consider its limitation period defence and erred in finding bad faith.

The Divisional Court held that the amended statement of claim did not raise a new cause of action, meaning the claim was not statute-barred.

The court upheld the finding of bad faith, noting the by-law was a 'one-shot reimbursement device' enacted without notice.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to quash only the specific section of the by-law directed at the respondent, rather than the entire by-law.

This sentencing decision followed jury convictions arising from the sexual exploitation of a 16-year-old through online advertisements, hotel-based sex work, and related financial benefit offences.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the primary sentencing objectives under the Criminal Code where the offences involved abuse of a person under 18, while still recognizing rehabilitation as relevant given the offenders' youth.

Applying the sentencing fact-finding principles governing mixed jury verdicts, the court concluded that some violence described by the victim could be accepted despite acquittals on trafficking and certain other counts, but not conduct underlying specific acquittals.

The court also addressed the constitutionality of mandatory minimum penalties and imposed individualized custodial sentences, pre-sentence custody credits, probation for one offender, and ancillary DNA, firearms prohibition, no-contact, SOIRA, and victim fine surcharge orders.

Hasibullah Sakhiyar, charged with firearm offences, applied for a review of a bail decision that detained him in custody.

The application was a reverse onus bail hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the bail justice did not err in law by failing to apply the "ladder principle" (which is inapplicable to reverse onus hearings), that the original decision was not clearly inappropriate in its weighting of detention grounds, and that the proposed new release plan did not constitute a material and relevant change in circumstances.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding they illegally locked out the tenant by failing to provide replacement keys after the rental unit was repaired following a fire.

The landlord argued the tenancy was frustrated, the remedy was miscalculated, and the Board denied procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the frustration and remedy issues were questions of mixed fact and law not subject to appeal, and the Board properly exercised its discretion regarding procedural fairness and bias allegations.

The appellant wife appealed an order directing the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home prior to trial.

The respondent husband had brought a motion for the sale to access his equity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the law that a joint tenant has a prima facie right to partition and sale.

The wife failed to provide sufficient evidence that her potential equalization claims would be prejudiced by the sale, given the significant equity in the home.

The appellant father appealed a trial judge's decision on a motion to change a final custody order.

The trial judge had found a material change in circumstances but ordered that the parties continue to have joint custody of the child with a parallel parenting regime, and that the child's primary residence remain with the respondent mother.

The father argued he should have been granted sole custody.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors of law, her findings of fact were supported by the evidence, and she made no palpable and overriding error in determining that joint custody remained in the child's best interests.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of two Grievance Settlement Board (GSB) decisions reinstating two Transit Safety Officers who were discharged for misconduct.

The GSB had found that the employer breached a sunset clause by considering expired disciplinary records when deciding to terminate the employees.

Relying on the Molson's case, the GSB concluded it was bound to void the discipline entirely and reinstate the employees with full compensation.

The Divisional Court granted the applications for judicial review, holding that the GSB erred by failing to consider all relevant circumstances before applying Molson's and by failing to consider its statutory discretion to substitute a penalty under s. 48(17) of the Labour Relations Act.

The decisions were quashed and remitted to the GSB.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Environmental Review Tribunal's decisions dismissing her application for leave to appeal an Environmental Compliance Approval granted to an adjacent asphalt plant, and refusing to reconsider that dismissal.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Tribunal had carefully considered the applicant's submissions regarding zoning, noise, and past environmental breaches.

The Court concluded that the Tribunal's decisions were within the range of reasonable outcomes and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The Law Society sought judicial review of a disclosure order made by the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division during an interlocutory suspension proceeding.

By the time the judicial review was heard, the Law Society had complied with the disclosure order and the interlocutory suspension had been imposed, rendering the disclosure issue moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue, finding that the matter should have proceeded through the Tribunal's internal appeal process and that the Tribunal should be allowed time for its jurisprudence to evolve.

The accused applied under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of search warrants at two apartment units.

The warrants were based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) relying heavily on confidential informants, resulting in significant redactions in the disclosure provided to the accused.

Following a Garofoli step six procedure, the court reviewed the unredacted ITO, ordered certain excisions, and determined that the judicial summary provided to the accused was sufficient.

The court found the confidential informants' information compelling and credible, compensating for weaknesses in corroboration.

The court also dismissed allegations of impermissible judge-shopping by the police.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused was tried on a historic sexual assault allegation involving repeated touching of the complainant at a family cottage when she was a child.

The court rejected defence arguments based on delay in disclosure, asserted inconsistencies, alleged physical implausibility, and an alleged motive to fabricate connected to a family property dispute.

Applying established principles governing delayed disclosure and childhood memory, the court accepted the complainant's evidence and found corroborative surrounding circumstances.

The accused's police statement and trial testimony were found untruthful on his prior knowledge of the allegations.

The Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender was convicted of possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

He absconded prior to sentencing.

The court sentenced him in absentia to a global term of 7 years imprisonment.

The court awarded 23 months of pre-sentence custody credit, including time spent in custody on subsequent charges, finding that custody was attributable to the initial charges.

A request for credit for strict bail conditions was denied due to a lack of evidence and the offender's absconding.

The court determined the costs of a motion for judgment and the costs of the action in a shareholder dispute.

The defendants were wholly successful on their motion for judgment, which dismissed the plaintiff's oppression and legal fees claims, and were awarded $15,000 in costs.

The plaintiff had made an offer to settle that triggered Rule 49.10(1) consequences, entitling her to partial indemnity costs of the action up to the date of the offer, fixed at $7,500.

The court set off the amounts, ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants a net amount of $7,500 in costs.