Stephen T. Bale

The defendants, a children's aid society and its employee, brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiff mother's personal claims arising from a child protection investigation that led to criminal charges against her husband.

The court declined to strike the negligent investigation claim, finding that the law regarding a society's duty of care to parents at the investigative stage remains unsettled.

However, the court struck the plaintiff's claims for bad faith, misfeasance, abuse of process, defamation, and Charter breaches due to insufficient pleading, while granting leave to amend.

The offender, Lawrence Watts, was found guilty of fraud exceeding $5,000 for preparing fraudulent income tax returns for 241 taxpayers, reporting non-existent business losses.

The intended loss to federal tax revenue was over $10 million, with an actual payout of $2.75 million.

Watts personally benefited by $149,128.11.

The court considered sentencing objectives, principles, and aggravating/mitigating factors, including the magnitude of the fraud, degree of planning, and breach of public trust.

Watts was sentenced to six years in federal penitentiary and ordered to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $149,129.11, with a default imprisonment term of two years consecutive.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a personal injury action following an eleven-week jury trial.

The jury awarded Zacharia Lane $20,000 in general damages and $8,160 for past loss of income, and Alexis Koch $30,000 in general damages.

The court considered the application of Rule 76.13(3) regarding simplified procedure costs, finding it reasonable for plaintiffs to have pursued the ordinary procedure.

The court also applied Rule 49.10 and Rule 49.13 concerning offers to settle.

It found the defendants' May 16, 2014, offer to Alexis Koch more favourable than her jury verdict, impacting her costs entitlement.

However, the offer to Zacharia Lane was not found to be more favourable.

The court ultimately made specific costs awards, balancing the parties' success, offers to settle, and the excessive length of the trial.

Gregory McClurg was charged with making and possessing child pornography, sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The complainant, a 15-year-old runaway, testified that the accused showed her pornography, sexually touched her, and took photographs of her.

The accused denied the allegations, presenting an alibi and suggesting his son's involvement, and also claimed erectile dysfunction.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible regarding sexual touching and the creation of child pornography, but had lingering doubt about the accused's direct involvement and the reliability of his alibi.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted of all charges.

The plaintiff, Gauvreau & Associates Professional Corporation, sought an interlocutory injunction against the defendants, Pelton & Co. Professional Corporation and Laurie Pelton, to enforce a non-competition agreement.

The agreement stemmed from the sale of Pelton's accounting practice to Gauvreau, which included goodwill and a client list, alongside an independent contractor agreement.

The defendants, after Pelton left Gauvreau, began servicing clients from the sold list.

The court, treating the agreement primarily as a business sale contract but also considering employment interests, found the seven-year, Ontario-wide non-competition clause unduly restrictive.

While acknowledging a serious issue to be tried regarding the enforceability and potential "reading down" of the clause, and finding irreparable harm in the loss of goodwill, the court granted a limited injunction.

This injunction prohibited the defendants from *further* soliciting clients on the sold list until trial, but did not prevent them from accepting business from clients who had already switched or those who had not yet retained them.

Costs were reserved to the trial judge.

The Crown brought a motion during a voir dire to admit a video statement given by the accused to the police following his arrest for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The court found that the police officer conducting the interview lied to the accused about the nature of the allegations and provided false legal advice, suggesting that consensual sex with the complainant would not be a criminal offence.

The officer also attempted to undermine the advice given to the accused by duty counsel.

The court held that the accused was deprived of the ability to make a meaningful choice about whether to confess due to police trickery and misinformation.

The statement was ruled inadmissible.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence charges arising from sexual activity with a teenage complainant who viewed him as a long-standing trusted adult and father figure.

The Crown withdrew the sexual interference charge and did not seek a finding of guilt on the sexual exploitation charge, leaving only sexual assault.

The court held that although the complainant agreed to the sexual activity, there was no consent in law under s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code because the accused induced the activity by abusing a position of trust.

The complainant's difficulty recalling dates did not undermine the overall credibility and reliability of her evidence.

A finding of guilt for sexual assault was entered.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for an unpaid concrete supply invoice of $6,698.64.

The defendants counterclaimed against the plaintiff and the concrete installer for breach of contract and negligence due to a defective concrete floor installation.

The court found that the installer failed to properly install the concrete topper and that the plaintiff had represented it would ensure the desired result.

The court held the installer and the plaintiff jointly and severally liable for $27,007 in repair costs, apportioned 75% to the installer and 25% to the plaintiff, subject to a set-off for the unpaid invoice.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking leave to introduce summary evidence in the form of spreadsheets summarizing voluminous documentary evidence in a complex fraud prosecution.

The evidence related to hundreds of tax returns allegedly containing false business loss claims prepared for numerous clients.

The spreadsheets categorized documentary evidence, linked electronically to supporting records, and illustrated the alleged pattern of conduct and amount of tax evaded.

The court held that demonstrative summary evidence was permissible and necessary to assist the jury in understanding complex and voluminous records, provided its accuracy was established.

The motion was granted and the Crown was permitted to introduce the summary evidence at trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking to consolidate, or alternatively to have heard sequentially, their appeal of a property standards order under the Building Code Act, 1992 and a separate civil action against the municipality, neighbours, a supplier, and an engineering firm.

The plaintiffs argued that both proceedings arose from the same factual circumstances regarding retaining walls and responsibility for remediation work.

The court held that the appeal was narrowly limited to determining whether the property complied with applicable standards and whether the ordered repairs were required, while the civil action involved broader questions of liability and damages.

Consolidation or a stay would undermine the purpose of the property standards regime by delaying enforcement.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant municipality sought a determination regarding the nature of an appeal under s. 15.3(4) of the Building Code Act, 1992 from a property standards committee decision, specifically whether the appeal proceeds as a hearing de novo or as an appeal limited to the record.

The court considered conflicting authorities of the Superior Court addressing the issue.

Preferring earlier precedent, the court held that such appeals are hearings de novo, permitting the parties to introduce new and oral evidence, including evidence arising after the committee hearing.

The court emphasized that under s. 15.3(6) the court possesses the same powers and functions as the committee, including receiving evidence and determining issues on the merits.

A lender brought a motion for summary judgment against personal guarantors after the principal debtor repaid the loan but the lender later returned the funds following a bankruptcy preference claim under s. 95 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The guarantors argued that the debt had been extinguished by payment, that the payment had not been set aside by a bankruptcy court, and that no proper demand had been made.

The court held that preferential payments are void as against the trustee under s. 95 and that the debt and related guarantees were revived when the lender repaid the funds to another secured creditor.

The court also found the debtor was insolvent at the time of payment and that the presumption of intention to prefer applied.

Summary judgment was granted against the guarantors.

The applicant, a federal inmate serving a six-year sentence, applied for habeas corpus challenging a transfer from minimum to medium security.

He alleged the transfer decision was procedurally unfair under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act because confidential source information was withheld and insufficient particulars were disclosed.

The court held that correctional authorities may withhold information where disclosure would jeopardize safety, security, or investigations, provided a sealed affidavit explaining the withheld material is supplied to the reviewing court.

The court was satisfied that the sealed affidavit justified nondisclosure and that the applicant had received an adequate summary of the information against him.

The court also found the transfer decision reasonable and declined to interfere with institutional placement decisions.

Two co-owners sought relief under the Partition Act regarding two severed parcels of land originally purchased jointly.

The parties disputed their respective beneficial interests arising from alleged unequal financial contributions decades earlier.

The court held that the respondent failed to prove unequal ownership and therefore the parties were presumed to hold equal interests as tenants‑in‑common.

Given the separate nature of the parcels and the long-standing use arrangements, the court vested one parcel entirely in each party rather than ordering a sale or unequal division.

The accused applied for particulars under s. 587(1) of the Criminal Code in relation to a fraud charge alleging he participated in preparing false T1 income tax returns defrauding the Government of Canada of more than $5,000.

The accused argued the indictment was vague and failed to specify whether the alleged victim was the public or a person, identify co-participants, and identify the individuals referenced in the indictment.

The court held that a fraud against the Government of Canada clearly constitutes a fraud against the public and rejected the accused’s reliance on contrary appellate authority.

The court further found that the accused had already received extensive disclosure, including the identities of the 241 individuals whose tax returns were involved.

The indictment contained sufficient detail to comply with s. 581 of the Criminal Code, and the request for further particulars was dismissed.

The accused applied to quash production orders and search warrants obtained during a CRA criminal investigation into alleged tax-related fraud.

He argued that the Income Tax Act had not been proven to have received Royal Assent, that Ontario Court of Justice judges lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrants, and that requests for his tax returns violated his Charter rights under ss. 7 and 8.

The court rejected these arguments, holding that consolidated statutes published by the Minister constitute evidence of the statute’s existence, that Criminal Code investigative powers permit warrants issued by a justice, and that the requests to file overdue tax returns did not violate the Charter.

After excising references to the accused’s later tax returns from the information to obtain, the court found that reasonable grounds for the search warrants remained.

At a status hearing under Rule 48.14, the defendants sought dismissal of a personal injury action for delay following prolonged inactivity and incomplete document production.

The court reviewed the transition from the former Rule 48.14 to the revised rule effective January 1, 2015 and considered whether the plaintiff had shown cause why the action should not be dismissed.

Although the plaintiff’s delay in delivering an affidavit of documents was inexcusable, the court found no demonstrated prejudice to the defendants and noted that procedural remedies such as motions for further and better disclosure had been available.

Considering the relatively modest delay and the policy reflected in the amended rule extending the time to set an action down for trial, the court permitted the action to proceed.

The court ordered sworn affidavits of documents and additional productions within 45 days and directed that a pre‑trial conference be scheduled.

The applicant, who was pregnant with the deceased's child at the time of his death, brought a motion for interim support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The deceased's ex-wife opposed the motion, arguing the applicant was not a dependant and that the deceased's life insurance policy was not available for support due to an irrevocable beneficiary designation in her favour.

The court held that the applicant was a dependant and that the life insurance proceeds were available to satisfy the support claim under s. 72 of the Act.

The court ordered $20,000 in interim support to be paid from the insurance proceeds.

The applicant father brought a motion for judgment seeking sole custody and limited supervised access, arguing the respondent mother had delayed a previously ordered custody and access assessment.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion to dismiss the motion for judgment, reinstate her supervised access, and order the completion of the assessment.

The court dismissed the motion for judgment, finding that completing the assessment was in the child's best interests given the mother's treatable mental health issues.

The court ordered the assessment to be completed, reinstated supervised access, and ordered the applicant to pay the assessment fees in lieu of costs.

The plaintiff, a 56-year-old Director of Business Development with 22.5 years of service, was terminated without cause by the defendant pharmaceutical company.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court determined the reasonable notice period to be 24 months, considering the plaintiff's senior role and the specialized nature of his employment.

The court also awarded damages including a 2% salary increase and a bonus based on the average of the two years prior to termination.

The court ordered that any income earned by the plaintiff during the post-judgment notice period be held in trust and paid to the defendant upon the expiry of the notice period.