Stephen T. Bale

The plaintiff, a municipal councillor, brought two defamation actions against several defendants regarding statements made on social media and at a town council meeting.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act (s. 137.1).

The court found that the expressions related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to satisfy the merits-based hurdle, as the defendants had valid defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed the public interest hurdle, as she could not demonstrate that the harm she suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions.

Both actions were dismissed.

The plaintiff foundation, established by a deceased donor, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction or an order under Rule 45.02 to prevent the defendant charitable foundation from making distributions from a donor-advised fund.

The plaintiff sought to compel the defendant to make distributions according to the plaintiff's instructions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried because a valid charitable gift requires the donor to divest all power and control over the property to the donee.

The plaintiff conceded it could not compel specific donations, and failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured an injunction.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing his application for lack of jurisdiction.

The Board found that the tenancy was exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act under s. 5(i) because the tenant was required to share a kitchen and bathroom with the landlord's daughter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's interpretation of the exemption or its factual findings regarding the daughter's residency and use of the shared facilities.

Hiawatha First Nation applied for a permanent injunction to restrain three of its members from constructing a gas station on the reserve.

The band argued the construction violated the Indian Act, a band by-law requiring building permits, a band resolution imposing a moratorium on new businesses, and environmental legislation.

The court found that the building permit by-law and environmental legislation did not apply, and that the proposed business structure did not violate the Indian Act.

However, the court held that the band resolution imposing a moratorium was an enforceable by-law.

The court granted an injunction restraining construction while the moratorium remains in effect and until the proponents comply with all applicable laws.

The tenants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing their applications for bad faith eviction and tenant rights violations.

The landlords had served an N12 notice for purchaser's own use, but title was ultimately taken by a corporation.

The Divisional Court upheld the LTB's finding that the landlords did not act in bad faith at the time the notice was served.

The Court also upheld the dismissal of the tenant rights application on the basis of res judicata, as the issues could have been raised in a prior proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, LawPro, appealed a motion judge's order limiting its recovery of judgment enforcement costs to the steps explicitly listed in Rule 60.19(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act provides broad jurisdiction to award costs of enforcement, and is not restricted by Rule 60.19(1).

The court awarded LawPro its costs for a related fraudulent conveyances action, finding it was incidental to enforcing the judgment, but declined to award costs for responding to the respondents' consumer proposals.

The court fixed the enforcement costs at $30,000 for reasons of proportionality.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment holding him liable for rent arrears and property damage.

The appellant had signed a residential lease for a friend but never occupied the unit.

He argued he was not a tenant, the lease was assigned, and the Small Claims Court lacked jurisdiction because the Landlord and Tenant Board has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was a tenant who failed to terminate the lease, and confirmed that the Small Claims Court has jurisdiction over claims for arrears and damages when the tenant is no longer in possession of the rental unit.

The appellants, a religious organization, appealed a decision denying property tax exemptions for certain properties under the Assessment Act.

The properties included portions of a temple site and several satellite sites used for Tai Chi classes.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the primary purpose of the satellite sites was not worship, but rather evangelization or physical health, and that the specific temple areas (sales area, campground, contemplative garden) did not qualify as places of worship.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase a newly built home from the defendant.

After discovering the home would not have a garage door access as expected, the plaintiff sent an angry email threatening litigation.

The defendant treated this as an anticipatory breach, refused to close the transaction, and sold the property to a related charity.

The court found that the plaintiff's email was an idle threat and did not amount to repudiation or a breach of the duty of good faith.

The defendant's refusal to close constituted a repudiation of the contract.

The plaintiff was awarded damages assessed as of the date of breach.

The appellants (purchasers) appealed a summary judgment order forfeiting their deposit after a failed residential real estate transaction.

They argued they were entitled to rescind the agreement because the MLS listing misrepresented the home's square footage.

The motion judge found that the purchasers, one of whom was an experienced real estate agent, relied on their personal inspection of the property rather than the MLS listing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's factual inferences were reasonable and supported by the evidence, including the purchasers' repeated affirmations of their intent to close after discovering the actual square footage.

At the outset of a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant moved to exclude expert evidence based on a brain SPECT scan used to diagnose a traumatic brain injury (TBI).

The court held that using a SPECT scan to diagnose TBI and distinguish it from anxiety or depression constitutes novel science.

Applying the reliable foundation test from R. v. J.-L.J., the court found the methodology had not been tested, lacked peer review, had no known error rate, and was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The appellant appealed a costs decision arising from a summary judgment motion.

The motion judge had awarded substantial indemnity costs against the appellant personally, based on a finding that the appellant's counsel breached his duty to the court by failing to bring a relevant, determinative case to the court's attention.

Although the underlying action settled and the appeal became moot, the lawyer was granted intervenor status to appeal the findings of professional misconduct.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge breached procedural fairness by making findings of professional misconduct based on his own research without giving the lawyer notice and an opportunity to be heard.

The applicant condominium corporation sought judicial review of a Condominium Authority Tribunal (CAT) decision regarding an accessible parking dispute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to exhaust its statutory right of appeal under the Condominium Act.

The court held that absent exceptional circumstances, judicial review is not available where an adequate alternative remedy, such as a statutory appeal on questions of law, exists.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Small Claims Court deputy judge's interlocutory order setting aside a default judgment and awarding $400 in costs to the respondent.

The applicant argued the costs award exceeded the $100 limit under Rule 15.07 absent special circumstances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the deputy judge had jurisdiction under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and provided adequate reasons for the higher award.

Furthermore, the Court exercised its discretion to decline relief, emphasizing that judicial review of Small Claims Court interlocutory orders should only be granted in exceptional circumstances to preserve the informal and cost-effective nature of the process.

The defendants moved for security for costs, substitute security, set-off of interlocutory costs, and withdrawal of writs of execution pending an assessment of damages for deceit.

The plaintiffs brought cross-motions including a request to add a vesting order issue to the assessment.

The court dismissed all motions, primarily citing the defendants' significant delay in bringing their motions and the potential prejudice to the plaintiffs, who had been exploiting the intellectual property collateral for years.

The court also found that considering a vesting order was beyond the scope of the assessment ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The third party moved to strike several paragraphs of the defendant's affidavit filed for a simplified procedure trial.

The moving party argued the paragraphs introduced evidence refused on discovery and relied on inadmissible hearsay.

The court struck two paragraphs: one that improperly adopted another witness's affidavit and one containing inadmissible hearsay.

The court dismissed the remainder of the motion, finding the moving party was not prejudiced by the discovery refusal and that the other hearsay statements fell under the admissions exception.

The applicant, an immigration lawyer, sought judicial review of Legal Aid Ontario's decision to remove him from its immigration and refugee panel due to billing irregularities.

The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable and procedurally unfair because he was denied an oral hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the decision maker's reliance on admitted billing errors to establish a pattern of violations was reasonable.

The court also held that the administrative nature of the decision and the statutory scheme did not require an oral hearing, as the decision was based on admitted facts rather than credibility findings.

The applicant union sought judicial review of two decisions by the Agricultural, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal.

The Tribunal had dismissed an unfair labour practice complaint against the employer and rejected a constitutional challenge alleging that the Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002 violates the freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by failing to provide a right to strike.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision on the unfair labour practice was reasonable and its conclusion on the constitutional issue was correct, as it was bound by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Fraser.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding party in the fixed amount of $25,000.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision barring him from proceeding with an appeal for catastrophic injury benefits due to his failure to attend an insurer's medical examination and provide documents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had an adequate alternative remedy through a statutory right of appeal under the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act.

The court held that no exceptional circumstances existed to justify bypassing the statutory appeal process in favour of judicial review.