Shawn D. Porter

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his sentence for participating in an unprovoked assault on a civilian and attempting to fabricate evidence.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider the impact of imprisonment on his career.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and agreeing with the trial judge that the grave nature of the offence and the appalling breach of trust required a sentence of imprisonment to address denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed a finding by the trial judge that he was unfit to stand trial.

The trial judge's finding was based on the appellant's delusional thinking, which caused him to disavow his legal name and believe he had no role in the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant understood the nature of court proceedings and indicated he would defend the case if the Information were amended to his preferred name.

However, the Court concluded that amending the Information was a matter for the authorities and found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's finding of unfitness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the admissibility of evidence obtained during two police entries into his apartment and alleging errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the first entry was justified by exigent circumstances.

While questioning the second entry, the Court concluded the evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to police good faith, inevitable discovery, and the appellant's consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from an order of the Superior Court of Justice upholding a committal order made by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reviewing judge that the preliminary inquiry judge provided a careful analysis of the evidence which warranted the committal for trial.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's excellent oral reasons.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving causing death.

The trial judge found that the appellant engaged in an unplanned street race at an excessive rate of speed, resulting in a collision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, save for a minor adjustment to the start date of the ten-year driving prohibition, as the custodial term and prohibition were deemed fit given the appellant's poor driving record.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his common law partner.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding a lay witness's testimony, gave an inadequate limiting instruction regarding a forensic pathologist's testimony, and that the verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding there was a substantial body of circumstantial evidence to support the jury's verdict.

The respondent was convicted of manslaughter after stabbing his landlady 107 times while intoxicated.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 11 years, deducting pre-trial custody for a net sentence of 4.5 years.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentence was manifestly unfit and that the trial judge erred by treating the 8 to 12 year range for 'aggravated manslaughter' established in R. v. Clarke as an immutable cap.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while subcategorizing manslaughter is not a useful sentencing approach, the trial judge did not fetter his discretion and imposed a fit sentence based on all relevant circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 12-month custodial sentence for an offence involving dangerous driving.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended witness testimony regarding the victim's position and erred in rejecting the defence of necessity.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, holding that the appellant's decision to back up his vehicle at speed with the victim in harm's way amounted to wanton and reckless disregard.

The court also upheld the sentence, noting the combination of alcohol consumption and dangerous driving.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's findings constituted a finding that the appellant posed a significant risk to the public, primarily through violent suicidal conduct that could cause significant harm to others.

The appellant appealed from a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's interjection during argument resulted in unfairness and challenged the trial judge's findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the unfairness argument and held that the factual challenges revealed no error in law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the police officer failed to comply with the immediacy requirement for a breath demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence clearly showed the officer formed a reasonable suspicion and made the demand immediately.

The appellant appealed from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision upholding his conviction for criminal harassment.

He argued that the trial judge's refusal to grant adjournments to allow him to retain counsel resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and that the trial judge failed to adequately assist him as a self-represented accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had ample opportunity to retain counsel during a four-month adjournment and that the refusal of further adjournments was justified to prevent extending the complainant's ordeal.

The court also found no error in the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and sexual interference, as well as his 12-year net sentence and increased parole ineligibility.

The convictions arose from the death of a 13-year-old girl who overdosed on drugs supplied by the appellant at his home, where he also sexually assaulted her while she was comatose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant's actions in supplying and encouraging the use of lethal drugs substantially contributed to the death, and that his conduct constituted criminal negligence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 15-year sentence for manslaughter and the order for increased parole ineligibility due to the egregious circumstances and the appellant's diagnosis of psychopathy.

The appellant appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that set aside her acquittal.

The appellant argued her s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached because she misunderstood her right to contact her own lawyer rather than duty counsel at the roadside.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an unexpressed desire to speak to one's own lawyer, which is not conveyed to the investigating officer, cannot result in a s. 10(b) breach.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

The appellant conceded there was evidence for second-degree murder but argued there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence, including animus, threats, and luring the victim to an ambush, capable of supporting the inference of planning and deliberation.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal on a charge of first-degree murder.

He conceded there was evidence for second-degree murder but argued there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some circumstantial evidence—including animus, threats, preparation, luring to an ambush, and obtaining a gun—capable of supporting the preliminary justice's conclusion that the murder was planned and deliberate.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for theft involving a breach of trust while employed by a trustee-in-bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the circumstantial evidence supported the trial judge's finding of culpability and that the W. (D.) framework was properly applied.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, setting aside the six-month custodial sentence and substituting a six-month conditional sentence, noting the appellant was a first offender, the primary caregiver for two disabled children, and that the employer had made the affected clients whole.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 16 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued that his statements to police, which led to the discovery of his wife's cremated remains and forensic evidence in his home, were obtained in violation of his Charter rights under s. 10(b) and s. 7.

He also challenged the trial judge's use of his after-the-fact conduct to infer murderous intent and the assessment of expert bloodstain evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breaches and no errors in the trial judge's reasoning.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the parole ineligibility period was reduced to 13 years to accord with the parity principle for domestic murders.

The appellant sought to vary the remaining 3.5 months of his conditional sentence to allow him to leave house arrest two days a week for business purposes.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and allowed the appeal, varying the sentence to permit the appellant to leave his residence on Mondays and Thursdays in the company of his spouse to examine job sites.