Shawn D. Porter

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his detention order at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant argued the Board erred by failing to meaningfully consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded that a detention order was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition given the appellant's need for close medical supervision, history of substance abuse, lack of insight into his mental illness, and the risk of rapid decompensation without medication.

This was a summary conviction appeal in which the appellant sought appellate relief from sentence.

In an addendum to reasons released the same day, the court clarified that the sentence appeal was allowed.

The disposition was varied to a suspended sentence with one year probation.

The Crown applied to revoke the respondent's release pending his conviction appeal for second-degree murder.

The respondent, while bound by a recognizance prohibiting communication with trial witnesses, approached the forensic pathologist who testified at his trial at a gas station and discussed the case.

The respondent was subsequently charged with breaching his recognizance.

The Court of Appeal found reasonable grounds to believe the respondent breached his release conditions and committed an indictable offence.

The respondent failed to show cause why his detention was not justified.

The release order was revoked and the recognizance cancelled.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board refusing an absolute discharge and continuing a conditional discharge.

The Board concluded the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety due to a high likelihood of non-compliance with anti-psychotic medication if discharged absolutely.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by the evidence, particularly the expert opinion of a consulting forensic psychiatrist regarding the appellant's fluctuating insight into his condition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to sufficiently scrutinize a key witness's evidence for reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was aware of the weaknesses in the witness's evidence but explained why he accepted it.

The court held that the trial judge's credibility determination was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for discharging a firearm, possession of a firearm while prohibited, and breach of probation, as well as his 10-year global sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to put self-defence to the jury, admitting evidence of prior disreputable conduct, and finding his police statement voluntary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the self-defence claim and no errors in the evidentiary rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year sentence fell within the established range for serious firearm offences.

The appellant appealed convictions for discharging a firearm with intent to wound and aggravated assault following a jury trial.

He argued that the trial judge impermissibly bolstered the complainant’s evidence in the jury charge by referring to a prior consistent statement after admitted perjury, and that the acquittals on attempted murder and robbery rendered the verdicts inconsistent.

The court rejected both grounds, holding that the impugned instruction was merely an example of inconsistent statements and would not have bolstered the complainant’s testimony.

The court also held that the different mens rea requirements and factual findings available to the jury made the verdicts logically reconcilable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari, which sought to quash his committal for trial on four firearms offences.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence at the preliminary inquiry to support the conclusion that the appellant had possession of a shotgun found in his bedroom shortly after it was fired outside his residence.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error, as there was circumstantial evidence—including the size of the gun, the apartment's configuration, and the appellant's control over his bedroom—from which a jury could reasonably infer his knowledge, consent, and control over the firearm.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a criminal appeal arising from a brutal home invasion assault on an elderly victim, one appellant challenged his convictions on the basis of deficient jury instructions on party liability under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, while the other pursued only a sentence appeal.

The court held that the charge on common unlawful purpose was incomplete and misleading because it failed to explain the required elements of agreement, offence, and knowledge, and failed to instruct that the incidental offence had to be different from the original unlawful purpose.

The repeated deficiency in the recharge to the jury compounded the error.

The curative proviso did not apply because the evidence was not so overwhelming that a properly instructed jury would necessarily have convicted.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered for one appellant; leave to appeal sentence was granted to the other appellant, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempt murder and firearms offences, as well as his sentence of 15 years and 3 months.

He argued that his statement to the police should not have been ruled voluntary and that the sentence was crushing for a 24-year-old.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the statement was voluntary.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge appropriately weighed the gravity of the ambush-style shooting and the appellant's youth.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after engaging in sexual activity with the complainant, who mistakenly believed he was her boyfriend.

The trial judge rejected the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the appellant's knowledge of the complainant's intoxication, the visibility in the tent, the timeline of events, and physical differences between the appellant and the boyfriend.

These errors undermined the trial judge's credibility assessment and reasonable steps analysis, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his firearm convictions, arguing that his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated.

Police officers in an unmarked van called out to the appellant on the street; he initially paused but then fled.

He was pursued, arrested, and searched, revealing a loaded handgun.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no psychological detention prior to his flight, as he did not submit to police authority.

The court further held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain him based on the totality of the circumstances, and the subsequent pat-down search was justified for officer safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his designation as a long-term offender.

At trial, the complainant's mother testified about a phone call during which the complainant stated the appellant was touching her.

The trial judge found it would be dangerous to convict on the complainant's evidence alone but used the mother's hearsay evidence as confirmatory.

The Court of Appeal held that while the prior consistent statement was admissible to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, the trial judge erred by using it for the truth of its contents to confirm the complainant's allegations.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his summary conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in law by failing to explicitly address evidence of his return to the building as indicative of consciousness of innocence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave application, finding that since the trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence for unassailable reasons, the bare fact of his return did not rise to a level of importance requiring explicit dismissal.

The appellant pled guilty to possession of stolen property after purchasing six tractor trailer loads of stolen commercial goods worth $500,000.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment and three years' probation.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by overemphasizing general deterrence and failing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the sentence was within the appropriate range given the magnitude of the crime and the motivation of greed.

The appellant, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after a traffic altercation where he arrested a dangerous driver and applied excessive force, breaking the driver's jaw.

He appealed his conviction and 90-day intermittent jail sentence.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, proper application of the burden of proof, and proper admission of lay opinion evidence.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the case exceptional due to the appellant's extraordinary community service and the significant provocation involved.

The custodial sentence was set aside and replaced with one year of probation and 100 hours of community service.

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision granting certiorari to quash a committal for trial for manslaughter and committing him for second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing evidence and preferring inferences favourable to the accused.

However, the Court found the application judge erred by directly committing the appellant for trial on second degree murder.

The appeal was allowed in part, and a mandamus order was issued remitting the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge to commit the appellant for trial on second degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and arson after his wife died in a deliberately set house fire.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on after-the-fact conduct regarding his fabricated statements to an insurance adjuster, and on the burden of proof concerning his defence that the deceased committed suicide.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstances of the fabricated statements could constitute independent evidence of concoction, and that the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof and reasonable doubt.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to commit murder, sought a review of a detention order under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the application judge erred in dismissing his second bail application, which was based on an alleged material change in circumstances, including new evidence from the preliminary inquiry and a new release plan.

The reviewing judge found no error in the application judge's assessment that the Crown's case remained strong and the new release plan was inadequate.

The court also held that while Gladue principles apply to bail, the applicant failed to adduce evidence to support such an analysis.

The application for review was dismissed.

The self-represented accused appealed a Superior Court order requiring him to provide an undertaking as a condition precedent to receiving Crown disclosure.

The Crown moved to quash the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that its statutory jurisdiction under s. 784 of the Criminal Code is limited to decisions granting or refusing relief in proceedings by way of mandamus, certiorari, or prohibition, and a motion for directions regarding disclosure undertakings does not fall within these categories.