Shawn D. Porter

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, following a traffic stop.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons, improperly rejected allegations of racial profiling, and erred in evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate and no evidence of racial profiling.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the two-year sentence to two years less 20 days to preserve the appellant's right to appeal his deportation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon against her child and was sentenced to nine months in prison and three years' probation.

The trial judge declined to impose a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

On appeal, the appellant introduced fresh evidence demonstrating significant progress in family reunification and support from the Children's Aid Society for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the custodial sentence, and substituted a nine-month conditional sentence to be served in the community, finding it appropriate in the changed circumstances.

The appellant appealed convictions for indecent assault arising from a jury trial on multiple sexual offence counts involving family members.

The appeal turned on whether the trial judge properly admitted similar fact evidence from an additional witness and whether the evidence on each count was admissible across all other counts.

Applying the post-trial framework in the Supreme Court authorities on similar fact evidence, the court held that the issue had been defined too broadly as credibility and that the alleged acts lacked the necessary persuasive degree of connection across all counts.

The prejudicial effect of the impugned evidence outweighed its probative value on several counts.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual touching, and indecent assault involving multiple complainants.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, reversed the burden of proof, and erred in admitting similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for all counts except count 14, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and the burden of proof was not reversed.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence for count 14 due to a lack of persuasive similarity, and entered an acquittal on that count.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that grounds existed.

The Court further noted that even if grounds were lacking, the evidence obtained from the search would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant's sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by a Justice of the Peace, which was previously dismissed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law, necessitating a new trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial but expressed hope that the Crown would not proceed given the nature of the charge and the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including possession of stolen property and break and enter, based solely on his thumbprint found on a pop can inside a stolen vehicle two weeks after its theft.

The trial judge relied on the doctrine of recent possession to convict.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the prerequisites for the doctrine were not met, as there was no evidence the appellant possessed the stolen goods or when the pop can was placed in the vehicle.

The convictions for the property offences were quashed and acquittals substituted.

The sentence for a breach of undertaking conviction was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, alleging no error in principle but arguing the sentence was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that given the many aggravating factors, the sentence was not manifestly unreasonable.

Fresh evidence provided no basis to interfere.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to time served.

The appellant, a general contractor, was convicted of six counts of fraud relating to home renovation contracts and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment and restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence from each count as similar fact evidence on the other counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the temporal connection and interconnectedness of the events made the evidence highly probative of fraudulent intent.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and a 12-month conditional sentence was substituted, as the court found the trial judge erred in characterizing the commercial relationship as a breach of trust and overemphasizing general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, gang sexual assault, and forcible confinement.

He argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding DNA evidence, in refusing to declare a mistrial after the Crown mentioned the complainant's virginity, and that the Crown's closing address was inflammatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, noting the relevance of the virginity evidence to the aggravated sexual assault charge, and concluding the Crown's closing address was not inflammatory.

The young person appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was not obliged to articulate a Vetrovec warning and adequately cautioned himself regarding a witness's evidence.

However, the Crown conceded the sentence was illegal.

The Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, reducing the probation period from two years to one year and varying the assault sentence to one year concurrent to correct the illegality.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in drawing an inference of consciousness of guilt from his suicide attempt, in assessing the complainant's cross-examination, and in using prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge and rejecting the proposed fresh evidence under the Palmer test.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge focused almost exclusively on the offence itself.

In light of fresh evidence regarding the appellant's medical condition, the sentence was varied to three years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, uttering a death threat, attempting to choke, and extortion.

The trial judge's reasons were very brief and simply adopted the Crown's submissions in their entirety.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence in a case turning on credibility, and improperly treated the case as a credibility contest.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, dangerous driving, and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the driving offences, finding no error by the summary conviction appeal judge.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the assault charge, holding that the appellant's act of pulling his arm away to disengage from police officers did not constitute an assault in law, though it likely amounted to an offence under s. 129 of the Criminal Code.

The conviction for assault resisting arrest was set aside.

The accused appealed his assault conviction to the summary conviction appeal court, which dismissed the appeal with brief, conclusory reasons.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing the appeal judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to give adequate reasons constituted an error of law that deprived the accused of meaningful appellate review.

Upon reviewing the trial record, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence and subjected the accused's testimony to stricter scrutiny than the complainant's.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping, extortion, assault, and uttering a death threat.

The charges arose from an incident where the appellant and co-accused kidnapped the victim, forced him into a car, and assaulted him.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting a 911 call under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, in his jury instructions regarding conceded facts and identity, and in allowing prior consistent statements to enhance a witness's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and noting the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, breach of probation, and breach of recognizance.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable because his DNA on a Coke bottle found at the scene did not prove he was present, and that the trial judge improperly used his failure to testify to convict him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences from the DNA evidence were logical and not speculative, and that the trial judge only noted the appellant's silence after already concluding the Crown had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, which was based solely on the eyewitness identification of the complainant, a taxi driver.

The Court of Appeal found the identification evidence to be unreliable due to discrepancies in the complainant's descriptions, the brief and stressful nature of the encounter, and flaws in the photo line-up.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after the deceased was found strangled in his apartment building.

At trial, the Crown introduced similar fact evidence of a prior sexual assault committed by the appellant against a prostitute four years earlier to prove identity.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing the similar fact evidence was improperly admitted and challenging the jury instructions on reasonable doubt and DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the similar fact evidence lacked the high degree of similarity required to prove identity and was highly prejudicial.