Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The accused, Jovane Watson, was charged with accessory after the fact to murder.

The key issue was whether the Crown could disprove the defence of duress beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court analyzed the six elements of duress, including implicit threat, reasonable belief, absence of safe escape, temporal connection, proportionality, and lack of conspiracy.

The court found that the Crown failed to disprove any of the elements, particularly that the accused acted under a reasonable fear of death or bodily harm from the principal offender, who had just committed a murder.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty.

The accused, Matthew McQuarrie, was sentenced for second-degree murder following a guilty plea and a joint submission on sentence.

The court accepted the joint submission, imposing a sentence of life imprisonment with parole ineligibility fixed at 15 years.

The decision balanced the aggravating facts of the vicious killing with the highly mitigating effect of the guilty plea, which saved significant judicial resources and provided closure to the victim's family.

The court also imposed a lifetime firearms prohibition, a DNA order, a forfeiture order, and a no-contact order.

The accused, Shane Codrington, was charged with multiple offences including robbery, sexual assault with an imitation firearm, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault with a weapon, stemming from an incident on July 10, 2019.

The Crown presented evidence including the complainant's testimony, video surveillance, and forensic DNA evidence linking a co-accused.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming an alibi and that evidence was planted.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and corroborated by video and medical evidence.

The court rejected the accused's alibi and claims of planted evidence, finding his testimony untruthful.

The accused was found guilty on all counts except one related to the co-accused's participation in the elevator assault.

The defendant, charged with assault, sexual assault, and voyeurism, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the date of charge to the anticipated end of trial exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

After deducting delay solely attributable to the defence and discrete events, the net delay still exceeded the ceiling.

The court found the delay unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for criminal harassment.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based on two text messages sent consecutively to the complainant, finding they constituted 'repeated communication'.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that two text messages sent at the same time constitute a single communication, not repeated communication.

The court also found the trial judge's conclusions that the complainant was harassed and that her fear was objectively reasonable were unreasonable, given the lack of threats and the context of the messages.

The conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered.

The accused, a practitioner of Traditional Chinese Medicine, was charged with sexually assaulting a patient during an internal examination in 2004 or 2005.

The Crown alleged the examination was not a legitimate medical practice and that the complainant's consent was vitiated by fraud.

The court admitted expert evidence on Traditional Chinese Medicine but found it insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's actions fell outside the unregulated practices of the time or that he knowingly breached provincial regulations.

The accused was acquitted.

L'accusé, M. Zelman, faisait face à des accusations de harcèlement criminel, extorsion et fraude de plus de 5 000 $.

La Cour a accordé une motion pour verdict dirigé sur l'accusation d'extorsion, la Couronne n'ayant pas prouvé l'élément de menaces.

Concernant l'accusation de fraude, la Cour a permis une modification des dates de l'acte d'accusation, jugeant que le temps n'était pas un élément essentiel de l'infraction et qu'aucune injustice n'en résulterait.

Après avoir évalué la crédibilité des témoins, la Cour a déclaré M. Zelman coupable de harcèlement criminel, s'appuyant sur le témoignage de la victime et des preuves documentaires corroborantes.

Cependant, la Cour a déclaré M. Zelman non coupable de fraude de plus de 5 000 $, estimant que la Couronne n'avait pas prouvé hors de tout doute raisonnable la valeur exacte de la privation ni l'intention frauduleuse.

The accused was convicted by a jury of importing between 6.5 and 8.5 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The Crown sought a sentence of 7 years' incarceration, while the defence argued for 6.5 years, citing time spent on bail as a mitigating factor.

The court found that the accused's bail conditions were not sufficiently stringent to warrant a reduction in sentence.

Applying the established sentencing range for first-time offenders importing large quantities of cocaine, the court sentenced the accused to 7 years' incarceration, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The Crown brought a motion for a finding that the accused's video statement to police was voluntary and admissible.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a lack of operating mind, inducements/trickery related to his parents, and the cumulative effect of these factors.

The court found the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that police conduct did not amount to trickery or inducement, and the accused possessed an operating mind, demonstrating nuanced decision-making despite his Asperger's condition and recent psychiatric care.

The statement was deemed admissible for the upcoming trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, and breach of probation.

At trial, the sole issue was the identity of the driver, with the defence arguing that a passenger was driving.

The trial judge rejected the defence evidence and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the third prong of the W.(D.) framework regarding credibility and reliability.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's detailed credibility analysis and factual findings.

The accused was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executing a search warrant discovered over 1.3 kilograms of cocaine, cash, and trafficking paraphernalia in his apartment.

The court considered the seriousness of trafficking large quantities of cocaine and the accused’s lengthy criminal record, including prior drug and firearms offences.

Mitigating factors included efforts at rehabilitation while in custody and an early resolution following pre-trial litigation.

Applying the principles of denunciation and deterrence under the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court determined that a penitentiary sentence was required.

A total effective sentence of five and a half years’ imprisonment was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant sought a Rowbotham order directing the Attorney General or Legal Aid Ontario to fund counsel for pending criminal prosecutions involving multiple marijuana production and trafficking charges, or alternatively a stay of proceedings until funding was provided.

Legal Aid had refused coverage on financial grounds.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he lacked the means to retain private counsel, noting inconsistencies in his financial disclosure, undisclosed joint bank accounts, and evidence suggesting a potential interest in property owned by a person with whom he maintained a close relationship.

The court further held that the applicant had not demonstrated that representation by counsel was essential to a fair trial.

The Rowbotham application was therefore dismissed.

The accused in a terrorism prosecution brought motions challenging the constitutionality of s. 577 of the Criminal Code, which permits the Attorney General to prefer a direct indictment, and alleging abuse of process arising from the loss of a preliminary inquiry.

The accused argued that bypassing the preliminary inquiry deprived him of judicial screening and the opportunity to cross-examine a key undercover officer.

The court held that longstanding appellate authority confirms the constitutionality of s. 577 and that there is no constitutional right to a preliminary inquiry or to discovery through that process.

The preferment of a direct indictment is an exercise of core prosecutorial discretion reviewable only for abuse of process or Charter violations.

Given the extensive disclosure provided and the absence of evidence of misconduct, the accused failed to demonstrate any infringement of Charter rights.

The accused applied to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant executed at his residence in a child pornography investigation.

He argued the Information to Obtain contained stale information, lacked full, frank and fair disclosure, and failed to provide sufficient technical evidence supporting reasonable grounds.

The court reviewed the authorization under the Garofoli framework and concluded the issuing justice had sufficient grounds to issue the warrant, relying on the officer’s observations of child pornography files associated with the IP address and explanatory evidence regarding file sharing networks and forensic recovery.

The court held the information was adequate and not misleading, and that reasonable grounds existed to believe evidence would be found.

In the alternative, the court found the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the police acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable and crucial to the prosecution.

The accused brought a constitutional motion challenging the validity of several anti‑terrorism provisions of the Criminal Code, including the definitions of “terrorist group” and “terrorist activity” in s. 83.01 and the participation offence in s. 83.18.

The accused argued the provisions were overbroad, vague, and violated the presumption of innocence and Charter freedoms by criminalizing attempts and counselling related to participation in terrorist groups.

The court held that s. 83.18 creates a substantive offence requiring proof of both participation and a specific intent to enhance a terrorist group’s ability to carry out terrorist activity.

Relying on appellate authority including Khawaja and Nadarajah, the court found the provisions neither vague nor overbroad and concluded that the mens rea requirements significantly limit the reach of the offence.

The constitutional application was dismissed in its entirety.

During a jury trial for homicide, the defence brought a motion for a mistrial after the Crown’s opening address referenced conduct allegedly prohibited by a prior ruling on discreditable conduct evidence.

The defence argued that references to the disposal and sale of the deceased’s clothing improperly introduced prejudicial material.

The court held that the earlier ruling primarily addressed illicit drug use and trafficking evidence, and that the Crown’s reference to the clothing described post‑disappearance conduct that could reasonably be interpreted in different ways by the jury.

The court found the opening address was not inflammatory and did not breach the prior evidentiary ruling.

The defence motion for a mistrial was dismissed.

The accused was charged with theft over $5,000 arising from a series of cheques written to herself from a corporate account while employed as a manager and later shareholder.

The Crown alleged the accused lacked authority and concealed the payments.

The defence maintained the cheques were authorized and properly recorded as shareholder loans in the company’s books.

After applying the W.(D.) credibility framework, the court accepted the accused’s evidence, supported by a forensic accounting report showing the payments were transparently recorded and not concealed.

The court held the dispute was essentially civil in nature between shareholders and that the Crown failed to prove theft beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to admit videotaped police interviews of three witnesses under ss. 715.1 and 715.2 of the Criminal Code.

The defence opposed admission, arguing the statements did not describe the “acts complained of” and that their admission would prejudice the accused.

The court reviewed jurisprudence interpreting the phrase “acts complained of” and concluded that the videotaped statements primarily concerned events preceding the alleged killing and therefore did not fall within the statutory requirement.

As the statements did not describe the acts forming the basis of the indictment, the statutory prerequisites were not met.

The Crown’s applications to admit the video statements were dismissed.

The accused was convicted after trial of multiple child pornography offences including possession, making child pornography available, and accessing child pornography through a peer‑to‑peer file‑sharing network.

Police investigators directly connected to the accused’s computer through the LimeWire/Gnutella network and downloaded files while the accused’s system was actively downloading and sharing illicit material.

A search of the accused’s residence revealed thousands of images and videos stored on a computer tower, laptop, and disks accumulated over several years.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as the dominant sentencing objectives for internet‑based child pornography offences, particularly where the offender disseminates material to others online.

Considering the scale of the collection, the dissemination of files, and the lack of remorse or evidence of treatment prospects, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence with concurrent terms and ancillary orders.

In a pre‑trial evidentiary application during a jury trial for sexual assault with a weapon and uttering a death threat, the accused sought to exclude alleged post‑offence conduct.

The Crown proposed to introduce evidence that the accused failed to attend a preliminary hearing and was later re‑arrested when returning to Canada.

The court held that the proposed evidence was not relevant to the issues at trial because there was no evidence establishing when or why the accused left the country or failed to attend court.

The judge further concluded that the evidence carried a high risk of prejudicial reasoning by inviting speculation that the accused fled due to guilt.

Even if minimally relevant, the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value and the evidence was excluded.