Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-22-00000014-0000 Superior Court of Justice

His Majesty The King v. Justice Snache

Reasons for Judgment

Before: The Honourable Justice C. Boswell On: April 26, 2023, at Barrie, Ontario

Appearances: M. Levasseur, Counsel for the Crown M. Villamil-Pallister, Counsel for the Crown J. Herbert, Counsel for Justice Snache

Table of Contents

Legend [sic] – indicates preceding word has been reproduced verbatim and is not a transcription error. (ph) – indicates preceding word has been spelled phonetically.

Transcript Ordered: April 26, 2023 Transcript Sent to Reviewing Judge: April 29, 2023 Transcript Completed: May 1, 2023 Ordering Party Notified: May 1, 2023

Reasons for Judgment

Boswell, J. (Orally):

Derek Simmerson was stabbed to death on November 19, 2020, as he walked westbound on Coldwater Road in Orillia. His killing was random and senseless. Today I render judgment on the person accused of committing the attack. I expect that nothing I say today will make any sense of Mr. Simmerson’s death, nor bring much comfort to those impacted by it. At best, it will bring an end to two and a half years of Court proceedings that have followed the offence.

Justice Snache is charged with one count of second-degree murder in connection with Mr. Simmerson’s death. His trial was scheduled to commence on April 17, 2023. Following a number of rulings I made on a series of pre-trial motions, Mr. Snache signalled, through counsel, that he intended to admit that he was the person who stabbed Mr. Simmerson and to otherwise advance a defence that he is not criminally responsible for the killing on account of a mental disorder.

The trial was adjourned for one week to accommodate the scheduling of a psychiatrist, Dr. Naidoo, who was expected to give evidence in support of the NCR defence.

Mr. Snache was arraigned on the murder charge on April 24, 2023. He entered a plea of not guilty. Notwithstanding the not guilty plea, the parties entered an Agreed Statement of Facts that formed the entire case of the Crown against Mr. Snache. The joint expectation, I was advised, was that the Agreed Statement of Facts would be sufficient to satisfy the Court that the charged offence had been made out to the reasonable doubt standard. In other words, counsel expressed that their joint expectation was that the Agreed Statement of Facts would lead to a finding of guilt.

To be fair, there was a small hiccup along the way.

An NCR defence may be advanced either in the course of a one-stage trial or as a two-stage trial. In a one-stage trial, the trier of fact is called upon to determine whether the accused committed the actus reus of the charged offence. If the Crown establishes the actus reus to the reasonable doubt standard, then the trier of fact proceeds to determine if the NCR defence is established on a balance of probabilities. If not, then the trier of fact moves on to determine what, if any, crime has been committed.

In a two-stage trial, the trier of fact is called upon to determine what, if any crime, the accused person is guilty of. If, and only if, there is a finding of guilt, is the trier of fact then called upon to determine if the accused person is criminally responsible for the offence that he or she has been found guilty of. In other words, only if the accused is found guilty, does the trier of fact proceed to consider the NCR defence.

The parties did not appear initially to be ad idem with respect to whether the NCR defence would be advanced as part of a one-stage proceeding or a two-stage proceeding. After some consultation with one another, they agreed that the trial would proceed as a two-stage proceeding. In the result, the Court was called upon to determine whether, on the basis of the Agreed Statement of Facts, the Crown had made out the charge of murder to the reasonable doubt standard.

To establish Mr. Snache’s guilt on a charge of murder, the Crown must prove, to the reasonable doubt standard, that:

i) Mr. Snache caused Mr. Simmerson’s death by an unlawful act; and,

ii) Mr. Snache had one of the requisite states of mind for murder. In other words, that he either:

a) Intended to kill Mr. Simmerson; or,

b) Intended to cause Mr. Simmerson bodily harm that he knew was likely to kill Mr. Simmerson and he was reckless as to whether death ensued.

To be clear, the cause of Mr. Simmerson’s death has never been contentious. He died of multiple stab wounds, in particular one wound that penetrated his left lung and heart. Moreover, it is not contentious that stabbing someone is an illegal act. It is an assault with a weapon.

The live issues have always been whether Mr. Snache was the person who stabbed Mr. Simmerson and, if so, whether he had one of the requisite states of mind for murder at the time of the attack.

Mr. Snache did not formally admit, in the Agreed Statement of Facts, that he is the person who stabbed Mr. Simmerson. He did, however, make that admission in open Court. His admission is amply supported by the agreed upon facts, which include:

1. GPS location data from Mr. Snache’s cell phone places him in the general vicinity of the offence at the time it occurred. That location data is not precise, nor is the precise location of the stabbing known. But based on the GPS evidence, I am satisfied that Mr. Snache was generally in the right place at the right time and had the opportunity to commit the offence.

2. A person matching Mr. Snache’s appearance was dropped off by a taxicab driver at Mr. Snache’s residence in Cumberland Beach at about 10:45 p.m. on November 19, 2020. That person left a bloodied knife behind in the back seat of the cab. There was blood on the blade of the knife. A DNA analysis of the blood could not exclude Mr. Simmerson as the source of the blood. A further analysis of a swab taken from the handle of the knife could not exclude Mr. Snache as the source of one part of a mixture of DNA found on that handle.

3. A receipt from the Common Stove Restaurant was left in the taxicab along with the bloody knife. A security camera at the Common Stove recorded a male matching Mr. Snache’s description attending there at roughly 8:30 p.m. on November 19, 2020; perhaps 10 minutes or so after Mr. Simmerson was stabbed. The Common Stove is a short walk from the area where the stabbing likely occurred.

4. The police executed a search warrant at Mr. Snache’s residence. They seized a hooded sweatshirt that was determined to have a blood stain on it. A DNA analysis performed on the blood determined that Mr. Simmerson could not be excluded as the source of the blood. And, finally,

5. On November 22, 2020, Mr. Snache turned himself into the police and confessed to having stabbed Mr. Simmerson.

On the basis of the evidence contained in the Agreed Statement of Facts and of Mr. Snache’s admission that he stabbed Mr. Simmerson, I am satisfied, to the reasonable doubt standard, that Mr. Snache killed Mr. Simmerson by an unlawful act.

The next question is whether Mr. Snache had one of the necessary states of mind for murder when he stabbed Mr. Simmerson. He did not expressly admit, in the Agreed Statement of Facts, that he did. Nor did he make that admission in Court. That said, he did agree, in the Agreed Statement of Facts, that the facts support that he committed the act of second-degree murder.

It can be difficult to determine a person’s state of mind, what he intended, because we do not have the ability to look into another person’s mind. Typically, determining a person’s state of mind is a matter of inference drawing, based on all of the surrounding circumstances.

The circumstances available to the Court for consideration are limited to the ones contained in the Agreed Statement of Facts. No further evidence was tendered at stage one of the trial. Notably, no evidence was tendered by the defence, at stage one, in relation to Mr. Snache’s mental health. None of the evidence tendered at stage two of the trial is available for me to consider at stage one.

Counsel agreed that, on the basis of the limited evidence before the Court, it was open to the Court to conclude that, as a matter of common sense, a person usually knows what the predictable consequences of his or her actions are and the means to bring them about.

At stage one of the trial, I had no evidence that Mr. Snache was intoxicated or suffering from a mental disorder at the time he stabbed Mr. Simmerson. On the basis of the limited evidence contained in the Agreed Statement of Facts, there were no grounds to conclude that it would not be appropriate to apply the common sense inference I have just described.

On the basis of the common sense inference, I find that Mr. Snache knew what the predictable consequences are when a person is stabbed in the chest and torso with a knife and that he intended to bring those consequences about. To be clear, the predictable consequence is death, given the presence of vital organs in the chest and torso.

The common sense inference is bolstered by the nature of the attack itself, the deadly weapon used, the amount of force involved and the particular circumstances of the attack. Mr. Snache stabbed Mr. Simmerson multiple times. Indeed, after he had stabbed Mr. Simmerson at least once, Mr. Simmerson began to run. Mr. Snache pursued him and stabbed him again.

In the circumstances, I am satisfied, to the reasonable doubt standard, that Mr. Snache intended to kill Mr. Simmerson. In the alternative, and at the very least, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Snache intended to cause Mr. Simmerson bodily harm that he knew was likely to kill him, and he, nevertheless, persisted, being reckless as to whether death ensued.

In the result, I am satisfied that Mr. Snache had one of the states of mind for murder and that the Crown has established his guilt for the charged offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

I turn now to whether Mr. Snache is criminally responsible for what he did.

Section 16 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:

1. No person is criminally responsible for an act committed or an omission made while suffering from a mental disorder that rendered the person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong.

2. Every person is presumed not to suffer from a mental disorder so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility by virtue of subsection (1), until the contrary is proved on the balance of probabilities.

3. The burden of proof that an accused was suffering from a mental disorder so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility is on the party that raises the issue.

Section 16 reflects certain fundamental principles and policies of the criminal law.

First, our law presumes that individuals are autonomous and rational beings whose acts are capable of attracting criminal liability. In other words, our law presumes that accused persons are mentally sound.

Second, our law recognizes that it would be unfair to impose criminal consequences on accused persons who were not acting autonomously or rationally at the time an offence was committed. Hence, the presumption of mental soundness is a rebuttable one.

Third, the availability of a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder “gives effect to society’s interest in ensuring that morally innocent offenders are treated rather than punished, while protecting the public as fully as possible.” See R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, 2011 SCC 58, at paragraph 52.

To be exempt from criminal responsibility due to a mental illness, an accused person must satisfy two factors on a balance of probabilities. These factors were described by Justice Watt in R. v. Dobson, 2015 ONSC 2865, at paragraph 66, affirmed, 2018 ONCA 589, as follows:

“The exemption has two components: the first is a condition, a mental disorder. The second is an incapacity associated with that condition. On its own, a mental disorder does not exempt anyone from criminal responsibility. A mental disorder only exempts from criminal responsibility if it renders a person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of an act or omission, or incapable of knowing that the act or omission was wrong.”

See also R. v. Bharwani, 2023 ONCA 2023 at paragraph 233, and R. v. Worrie, 2022 ONCA 471 at paragraph 95.

In the result, the issue of criminal responsibility requires the Court to consider the following two questions:

1. Was Mr. Snache suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the offence? And,

2. Did that mental disorder render him incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his actions, or incapable of knowing they were wrong?

I will address these issues in turn, beginning with the issue of a mental disorder.

Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines a mental disorder as a “disease of the mind”. The phrase, “disease of the mind” is a “legal concept with a medical dimension”: See Bouchard-Lebrun, at paragraph 61. This means that although medical expertise plays an important role in the characterization of any particular condition as a mental disorder, it remains a question of law to be decided by the trial judge.

The legal concept of “disease of the mind” was defined by Justice Dickson in Cooper v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1149, where he said as follows:

“One might say that in a legal sense ‘disease of the mind’ embraces any illness, disorder or abnormal condition which impairs the human mind and its functioning, excluding however, self-induced states caused by alcohol or drugs, as well as transitory mental states such as hysteria or concussion.”

Counsel are agreed that Mr. Snache had a disease of the mind at the time of the offence. In particular, that he suffered from schizophrenia.

Dr. Naidoo testified at the NCR hearing. He is a forensic psychiatrist. He is a staff psychiatrist at St. Joseph’s Healthcare Hamilton, an assistant clinical professor of psychiatry at McMaster University and a correctional psychologist at the Niagara Detention Centre. He has extensive experience in assessing accused persons’ mental health for the purposes of NCR defences.

I qualified Dr. Naidoo, on consent, as an expert in forensic psychiatry, able to provide opinion evidence about whether Mr. Snache had a disease of the mind and whether he had the ability to appreciate the nature and consequences of his actions with respect to the index offence and whether he knew his actions were wrong.

Dr. Naidoo conducted two face-to-face interviews with Mr. Snache, interviewed his mother, and reviewed a substantial amount of collateral material, including, but not limited to, character reference letters from a number of individuals who know Mr. Snache, medical records from a number of health care facilities, occurrence reports from interactions Mr. Snache has had with police officers and Mr. Snache’s videorecorded confession.

Mr. Snache was 19 years old at the time of the offence. He reported symptoms of his mental illness first appearing when he was 18. According to Dr. Naidoo, 18 is a common age of diagnosis or emergence of symptoms with schizophrenia, which he described as a developmental disease. Mr. Snache’s experience is consistent with what psychiatrists know about the development of the disease.

Dr. Naidoo walked the Court through a number of interactions Mr. Snache had with health care facilities in the two years prior to the index offence.

Mr. Snache was apprehended under the Mental Health Act on February 22, 2019. He had been travelling by train between Montreal and Toronto. He was expressing suicidal ideation and the police were called. He was apprehended at the Ottawa station and taken to the hospital where he stayed overnight. The next day he asked to be discharged. The attending psychiatrist did not diagnose any psychosis nor assess that Mr. Snache presented a risk to himself or others. He appeared cognitively intact. He was accordingly discharged.

Roughly a year later, on February 26, 2020, Mr. Snache attended at the Toronto Western Hospital and complained of the experiencing auditory hallucinations. He was admitted and spent two days in hospital. A differential diagnosis was made which included schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder and substance-induced psychosis. He was prescribed a month’s supply of Aripiprazole and released. Aripiprazole, often sold under the brand name Abilify, is an anti-psychotic medication prescribed to treat schizophrenia.

On March 10, 2020, Mr. Snache was taken by ambulance to the Brampton Civic Hospital. He was picked up at the Days Hotel. He had called an ambulance because he was hearing voices. He was diagnosed with an unspecified psychosis. His prescription for Abilify was continued and he was released, given the absence of concern that he was a risk to himself or others.

On May 14, 2020, Mr. Snache attended the emergency room of St. Mary’s General hospital in Kitchener. He was vague about what brought him to the hospital. He mentioned seeing things. No further diagnosis was made. His prescription for Abilify was extended and he was released.

On May 29, 2020, Mr. Snache attended the emergency department of Bluewater Health, which is a hospital in Sarnia. He was homeless at the time and had no supports in Sarnia. He was vague about his health situation. He spoke about having some paranoia and homicidal ideation. He said he thought people were watching him and out to harm him. He requested a refill of his Abilify and also asked that something else be prescribed. He was given a CT scan because of complaints about headaches. He was given a referral to CAMH and released.

It is clear to me, from Mr. Snache’s medical history throughout 2020, that he was suffering significantly with mental illness. He appears to have been homeless and transitory through much of that time and lacking in supports, partly, I would think, due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Mr. Snache needed help. He knew it. He sought it. But he did not get it, at least not the help he needed.

Dr. Naidoo diagnosed Mr. Snache with schizophrenia, which he described as a severe mental disorder. There is no doubt that schizophrenia is a “disease of the mind” within the meaning of Section 16 of the Criminal Code.

In all the circumstances, there is ample evidence to support that diagnosis. Its manifestations, in Mr. Snache’s case, included auditory hallucinations and distortions in his thought content.

Sometimes the voices heard by Mr. Snache narrated his circumstances. Other times they were threatening. Still other times they told him to do things, like walk. On July 28, 2020, for instance, Mr. Snache was apprehended by the OPP walking on the shoulder of a highway near Puslinch. He reported that voices had told him to walk there.

Mr. Snache reported to Dr. Naidoo that for some time prior to the offence he had heard voices that threatened his life at times. He believed a group of individuals wanted to kill him and had the ability to control his emotions. He had a fixed and false belief that there were individuals in the community who wanted to kill him and could do so.

Mr. Snache further reported to Dr. Naidoo that he believed Mr. Simmerson wanted to kill him and was going to kill him. He considered the fact that Mr. Simmerson made eye contact with him and appeared to be reaching into his pocket to be threatening. While he considered turning around and going the other way, or walking around Mr. Simmerson to avoid him, he did not think those actions would be enough to save his life. He thought he had to stab Mr. Simmerson to survive.

Following the attack on Mr. Simmerson, Mr. Snache made his way to the Common Stove Restaurant. He can be observed on a security camera recording engaging in arguably bizarre behaviour. He can, for instance, be seen to be making what Dr. Naidoo described as nonsensical, purposeful movements. Mr. Snache told Dr. Naidoo that he was having auditory hallucinations at the time. He said he was directed by the voices to repeatedly attend in the washroom, which he can be seen doing.

The waitress who served Mr. Snache at the Common Stove gave a statement to the police in which she described Mr. Snache’s demeanour as “off”. She said she felt very uncomfortable serving him. So much so, in fact, that she implored the manager to cash him out.

Subsequently, on the videorecording of his statement to the police on November 22, 2020, Mr. Snache can be observed talking to himself and laughing.

Dr. Naidoo’s opinion was that Mr. Snache was experiencing acute symptoms of schizophrenia at the time of the offence. The Crown does not take issue with that opinion. Neither do I.

Mr. Snache’s medical history throughout 2020 supports the conclusion that his mental health was significantly deteriorating, though it clearly fluctuated, as Dr. Naidoo pointed out.

His auditory hallucinations and distorted cognition support Dr. Naidoo’s diagnosis. Frankly, I have no reason to reject that diagnosis.

The next question is whether Mr. Snache’s schizophrenia rendered him incapable of appreciation the nature and quality of his actions on November 19, 2020, or of knowing those actions were wrong.

As I described earlier, one of the two components of an NCR defence requires Mr. Snache to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that he was incapable of either appreciating the nature and quality of his actions, or of knowing that they were wrong.

The defence did not argue that Mr. Snache was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his actions. To be capable of appreciating the nature and quality of his actions, Mr. Snache needed to have the capacity to know what he was doing (in this case, stabbing Mr. Simmerson), and to estimate and understand the physical consequences that would flow from his actions (in this case, physical injury that could result in death). See Dobson, at paragraph 103. The evidence, including the opinion of Dr. Naidoo, supports the conclusion that Mr. Snache did know that he was stabbing Mr. Simmerson and that he had the capacity to understand that the stabbing would severely injure Mr. Simmerson.

I will, in the circumstances, focus on the second prong of the capacity test: did Mr. Snache have the capacity to know that his actions were wrong?

To be capable of knowing his actions were wrong, Mr. Snache needed to have the capacity to be aware that his actions would be considered wrong according to the ordinary moral standards of reasonable members of society. See Dobson, at paragraph 121.

There is conflicting evidence regarding Mr. Snache’s capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his actions.

For instance, in this statement to the police on November 22, 2020, Mr. Snache left a strong impression that, at least on that day, he knew that what he had done was both legally and morally wrong. DC Rempel asked him what he thought the consequences of his actions would be. He answered, “Jail time, I think. Actually, I heard one time that it was 25 years.” DC Rempel went on to ask him why he decided to make a confession. Mr. Snache answered, “Just felt guilty and it’s murder, like, that’s wrong, right?”

Mr. Snache underwent an assessment regarding his criminal responsibility at the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health in August 2021. The assessment was ordered by Justice Nichols of the Ontario Court of Justice. The assessment was completed by a forensic psychiatrist named Dr. Andrew Wang.

Dr. Wang’s report provides a history not unlike that of Dr. Naidoo. He noted, however, that Mr. Snache’s self-reporting was often vague and inconsistent. Nevertheless, he diagnosed Mr. Snache with schizophrenia and alcohol use disorder, partially in remission. He described Mr. Snache as continuing to experience auditory hallucinations while in custody, along with disorganized thinking.

Dr. Wang opined that it is likely that Mr. Snache was experiencing symptoms of schizophrenia at the time of the index offence, but the burden of those symptoms was difficult to assess because it relied almost entirely on Mr. Snache’s self-reporting, which Dr. Wang noted as vague and inconsistent.

He concluded that there is some evidence that Mr. Snache was not able to know the moral wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the offence and that he was unable to engage in rational decision-making, but he expressed a concern about inconsistencies in Mr. Snache’s reporting. He thought there was insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of criminal responsibility on a balance of probabilities.

Dr. Naidoo testified that, in his view, the inconsistent evidence of Mr. Snache’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions is not problematic when considered in context.

More particularly:

a) Mr. Snache’s symptoms tended to fluctuate in intensity. The intensity experienced on November 19, 2020, had subsided by November 22nd. Though still present, those symptoms no longer prevented Mr. Snache from applying his intellectual understanding of moral and legal wrongfulness; and,

b) Mr. Snache’s mental health was significantly improved at the time of Dr. Naidoo’s assessment, as compared to the time of Dr. Wang’s assessment. His thinking was more linear and organized. He was able to provide a more detailed and consistent history of his experiences.

I will take a moment to explore Dr. Naidoo’s evidence in a little more detail.

There is little doubt that Mr. Snache had an intellectual understanding of moral wrongfulness. That much is evident by his statements to DC Rempel on November 22nd. In Dr. Naidoo’s opinion, however, Mr. Snache was unable, at the time of the index offence, to rationally apply his understanding of wrongfulness to his actions on the day.

Mr. Snache was, he said, experiencing strong auditory hallucinations. Voices were telling him that he was in danger and would be killed. He tried to reduce their intensity by consuming alcohol and by listening to music. He was, at the time of the attack on Mr. Simmerson, labouring under the fixed, false belief that his life was in peril.

Mr. Snache’s perception of events as they unfolded, tended to support his delusional belief: the eye contact made by Mr. Simmerson; and the perception that Mr. Simmerson was reaching into his pocket. Dr. Naidoo explained that persons with schizophrenia often take benign signals in the environment and incorporate them as supportive of their delusions. Mr. Snache appears to have done so on the occasion in question. In Dr. Naidoo’s opinion, he would likely have felt morally justified in his actions in the circumstances.

Mr. Snache, he said, would unlikely have been able to make an assessment of his actions against societal norms. His ability to consider other people’s viewpoints and perspectives, his general understanding of wrongfulness was impaired. He was acting on his impaired subjective state. That impaired state is in evidence in the moments after the attack. Mr. Snache stood and watched as Mr. Simmerson collapsed in the intersection, and while a truck driver stopped to call an ambulance. Then he simply walked to a restaurant and ordered a drink and food. Later he went home and had a good night’s sleep. He did not appear to be affected by what had occurred.

Mr. Snache reported that he had not been sleeping well in the week prior to the offence. Dr. Naidoo testified that a lack of proper sleep can reduce a schizophrenia sufferer’s ability to cope with and manage symptoms. By November 22nd, Mr. Snache was more well-rested, which may go part of the way to explaining his reduced symptomatology at that time.

Having said that, Dr. Naidoo recognized that there are still compelling indicators that Mr. Snache was continuing to experience symptoms of schizophrenia during his interactions with police on November 22nd. His account of events, for instance, was vague and he had an unusually flat affect during the retelling of events. Dr. Naidoo testified that his lack of detail is likely reflective of impairment in his episodic memory. Such impairment is well-established in persons experiencing the throes of a psychotic episode.

Dr. Naidoo recognized that Dr. Wang came to a different conclusion on the issue of whether an NCR defence had been made out on a balance of probabilities. He had little difficulty, however, reconciling their different views. He described Dr. Wang’s position as more or less provisional and subject to further consideration on better evidence.

Dr. Naidoo was clear in this testimony that further and better evidence is now available.

Since going into custody, Mr. Snache has been under continuous psychiatric care and treatment. A somewhat lengthy and sustained period of treatment has, Dr. Naidoo suggested, led to an improvement in Mr. Snache’s condition. It has enabled Mr. Snache to provide a more coherent account of events of the day. It has reduced somewhat the vagueness and inconstancy in the history provided by Mr. Snache, identified as a concern by Dr. Wang. His thinking has become more organized. This type of improvement is, Dr. Naidoo said, commonly seen in those suffering from schizophrenia after they have been treated for a lengthy period of time. Mr. Snache had roughly a year’s worth of treatment between the assessments conducted by Drs. Wang and Naidoo. That length of treatment is quite significant in Dr. Naidoo’s opinion.

There is always a risk that an accused facing a sentence of life imprisonment may fake or exaggerate symptoms of a mental illness in support of an NCR defence. In my view, that is not this case.

I accept Dr. Naidoo’s opinion that Mr. Snache is not malingering. Indeed, his months long effort to obtain help at a number of hospital emergency rooms suggests to me that Mr. Snache was suffering significantly with his disease in 2020.

There was a long gap between his last hospital attendance in May 2020 and the date of the offence. I accept that on November 19, 2020, Mr. Snache’s symptoms were quite florid. They significantly impaired his cognitive functioning and left him in with a distorted reality. More specifically, I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that they impaired his capacity to appreciate the legal and moral wrongfulness of his actions.

The intensity of his symptoms abated somewhat by November 22nd, but it is obvious, upon observing his interactions with the police, that while he met the “operating mind” threshold, he was continuing to experience a genuine level of cognitive impairment.

In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that Mr. Snache is not criminally responsible for the offence of murder. This finding does not mean that Mr. Snache will immediately return to the community.

I am remanding Mr. Snache to the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board for the purpose of a disposition hearing. Mr. Snache will remain under the care and supervision of a psychiatric facility until a hearing is held before the Ontario Review Board to determine what order should be made about his supervision and treatment. That Board, which includes one or more psychiatrists and other mental health care professionals amongst its members, must hold a hearing within forty-five days of any finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

At the hearing, the Review Board must consider,

• The safety of the public, which is the paramount consideration,
• The mental condition of Mr. Snache,
• The re-integration of Mr. Snache into society; and
• The other needs of Mr. Snache,

and decide whether Mr. Snache is a significant threat to the safety of the public. Mr. Snache will only be released when the Review Board decides that he is not a significant threat to public safety. The Board’s decisions are subject to the review by our appeal Courts.

...WHEREUPON REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED

Electronic Certificate of Transcript

FORM 3 Electronic Certificate of Transcript (Subsection 5(2)) Evidence Act

I, Rebecca Liberman, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the recording of R. v. Snache in the Superior Court of Justice held at 75 Mulcaster Street, Barrie, Ontario, taken from Recording No. 3811_03_20230426_094512__30_BOSWELC.dcr, which has been certified in Form 1.

May 1, 2023

(Signature of Authorized Person) Rebecca Liberman Authorized Court Transcriptionist ACT Number: 2531785837 Ontario, Canada 1-855-443-2748 rliberman@actiontario.ca

A certificate in Form 3 is admissible in evidence and is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the transcript is a transcript of the certified recording of evidence and proceedings in the proceeding that is identified in the certificate.