SCJ 2016

The applicant brought a successful motion for a temporary order to enroll the parties' child in a new school.

Both parties subsequently sought costs for the motion.

The court found the applicant to be the successful party, despite her unilateral action in changing the child's school prior to obtaining a court order.

Applying the factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court awarded the applicant costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amount at $4,673.76 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The offender was convicted of possessing 486 grams of heroin for the purpose of trafficking after accepting a controlled delivery package.

The offender acted as a low-level conduit or 'mule' for financial gain while also participating in fraudulent schemes.

The court weighed the highly addictive nature of heroin and the profit motive as aggravating factors against the offender's lack of a prior criminal record.

A global sentence of four years was imposed, reduced to 22 months of further custody after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

During a jury trial for a slip and fall in a commercial parking lot, the defendants tendered an expert to give opinion evidence on winter maintenance standards.

The plaintiff opposed the qualification.

Following a Mohan voir dire, the court found that the proposed expert had acquired special knowledge in winter maintenance through his post-graduate training and extensive work experience.

The court qualified the witness as an expert, noting that any deficiencies in his training compared to the plaintiff's expert went to weight rather than admissibility.

Prior to the testimony of the complainant in a trial for conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder, the parties sought a ruling on the permissible scope of cross-examination regarding the complainant's prior acts of misconduct.

The court ruled that defence counsel could cross-examine the complainant on the factual details underlying his prior convictions, withdrawn charges, and uncharged misconduct detailed in police occurrence reports, provided there was a good faith basis.

However, defence counsel could not cross-examine the complainant on the factual allegations underlying charges for which he was acquitted, as an acquittal represents a verdict of legal innocence, though they could question him on accompanying uncharged fraudulent activities.

Sentencing decision following a jury conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm arising from a violent assault at a house party against a highly intoxicated complainant.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence predominated over rehabilitation for this serious sexual violence, while still considering the offender's youth, lack of record, employment history, family support, and low-to-moderate risk assessment.

The assault involved force, repeated penetration, anal intercourse, degrading comments, and lasting physical and psychological harm.

A penitentiary sentence at the high end of the range was imposed, together with DNA, SOIRA, weapons prohibition, and victim fine surcharge orders.

The defendant Crown brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for failing to comply with the 60-day notice requirement under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The plaintiff, an inmate who was assaulted by another inmate, argued that incident reports and statements given at the time of the assault constituted sufficient notice.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the initial reports contained no element of complaint against the Crown.

The action was commenced less than 60 days after formal written notice was provided by the plaintiff's counsel, rendering the action a nullity.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's statement of defence and counterclaim, which contained allegations of deceit, intimidation, and bad faith bargaining.

The defendant subsequently brought a motion to amend the pleadings.

The substantive issues were resolved on consent, leaving only the issue of costs.

The court found that the defendant's original pleading was flawed and that the plaintiff was justified in challenging it, but criticized both counsel for failing to resolve the matter without court intervention.

Applying principles of proportionality, the court awarded the plaintiff fixed costs of $6,000, significantly reducing the amount claimed.

During a jury trial for a slip and fall in a parking lot, the defendants (the property owner and the winter maintenance contractor) conditionally settled their crossclaims.

The plaintiff sought disclosure of the settlement agreement.

The court ordered the agreement disclosed to the court and then to the plaintiff, finding that it altered the adversarial landscape.

Consequently, the court ruled that the defendants were no longer adverse in interest and prohibited defence counsel from asking leading questions during the cross-examination of each other's witnesses, except on narrow issues where adversity remained.

The applicant, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to a search warrant.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds and relied on an uncorroborated confidential informant tip.

He also argued the indictment violated the single transaction rule under s. 581 of the Criminal Code by combining drugs seized from his person upon arrest with drugs later seized from his vehicle.

The court dismissed the application, finding the ITO contained sufficient corroborated grounds to justify the warrant.

The court also held that the single transaction rule was not violated, as the seizures occurred on the same day and formed part of a continuous series of acts.

The applicants, comprising 100% of the members of Branch 1-7 of the Polish Alliance of Canada, sought a declaration that they were entitled to leave the organization and take with them the property held in trust for them by the Polish Association of Toronto Limited.

The respondent argued that the property belonged to the central organization and raised issues regarding the rule against perpetuities.

The court applied the common law 'clubman's veto', finding that the unanimous members of an unincorporated association could disaffiliate and take their property.

The application was granted, and the applicants were awarded costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion for various orders, including production of documents and answers to refusals, after the action had been set down for trial and the trial had commenced and been adjourned.

The court held that the plaintiff required leave under Rule 48.04(1) to bring the motion.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a substantial or unexpected change in circumstances to justify granting leave, noting that an amendment to the statement of claim did not entitle her to obtain new evidence she could have obtained earlier.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The applicant commenced an application against the Government of Canada and various officials, seeking $510 billion USD based on nonsensical documents he claimed were historic financial bonds.

The Department of Justice requested the application be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim completely devoid of merit and dismissed the proceeding as frivolous and vexatious.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial subject to a publication ban, the court convicted the accused of threatening death and sexual assault arising from sexual activity at a cottage on an island.

The central issue was whether the complainant's apparent participation was negated because she submitted after the accused threatened to kill her.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court rejected the accused's account, found corroborative support for the complainant's evidence in surrounding witnesses and physical circumstances, and held that consent was vitiated under s. 265(3)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court also ruled that the 911 recording was not admissible for the truth of its contents under the principled hearsay exception, but was admissible as evidence of post-offence demeanour.

The plaintiff sued the police and Crown Attorneys for negligent investigation, unlawful arrest, and intentional infliction of mental suffering following an acquittal on a murder charge that involved a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Crown Attorneys moved to strike the plaintiff's claim and a crossclaim brought by the police for negligent legal advice.

The court struck the plaintiff's claim against the Crown Attorneys, finding it barred by absolute common law immunity, which only allows claims for malicious prosecution.

However, the court refused to strike the police crossclaim for negligent legal advice, finding it was not plain and obvious that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police when providing legal advice during an investigation.

The court also held that statutory immunity under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act applied to the plaintiff's claim but not the crossclaim.

The applicant sought recognition of a $22 million arbitral award against the respondent.

The respondent opposed recognition, arguing it would be contrary to Ontario public policy because its counsel in the arbitration had a conflict of interest by providing expert evidence in a separate case that the applicant could indirectly benefit from.

The court rejected this defence, finding that the alleged conflict did not fundamentally offend basic principles of justice and fairness, and granted the order recognizing the award.

The Liquidator of Maple Bank GmbH brought a motion seeking approval of a Settlement Agreement and a Sale Transaction with the Bank of Montreal, as well as an order sealing a Confidential Supplement containing unredacted transaction details.

The court applied the Soundair principles and the Sierra Club test, finding the settlement and sale to be fair, reasonable, and beneficial to the estate.

The court also granted the sealing order to protect commercially sensitive information that could prejudice ongoing negotiations with other parties.

The motion was granted on consent.

The self-represented defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the Minister of National Revenue regarding her student loan debt.

The defendant had entered into a payment arrangement with the Minister and was advised by the Canada Revenue Agency that she could ignore the statement of claim.

Despite this, the Minister obtained default judgment and garnished her wages.

The court found the Minister's conduct to be exploitative, abusive, and an abuse of process.

The court set aside the default judgment, notice of garnishment, and writs of seizure and sale, and awarded costs to the defendant to sanction the Minister's behavior.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting of default and default judgment obtained by the plaintiffs for unpaid accounting fees.

The court found the defendants did not provide a plausible explanation for the default and did not bring the motion promptly.

However, the court found the defendants had an arguable defence regarding joint and several liability and a potential limitation period defence for some invoices.

The court varied the default judgment to reflect the defendants' limited personal liability and set aside the noting in default to allow them to defend the remaining claims.

The accused brought a Charter motion seeking a stay for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b).

Applying Jordan, the court held that delay arising from a defence adjournment to contest additional committal submissions under s. 548 of the Criminal Code was defence delay because the position lacked arguable merit, and that delay caused by the accuseds' non-attendance at the preliminary inquiry was also defence delay.

After deducting that time, the net delay fell below the 30-month ceiling.

In the alternative, the court held that the matter also complied with Morin as a transitional case.

Both applications were dismissed.

The mother brought motions for contempt against the father for failing to facilitate supervised access as ordered, and for joint custody with increased access.

The father cross-moved to vary the access order, citing concerns over the mother's past drug addiction and the child's anxiety.

The court found the father in contempt for deliberately disobeying the clear terms of the access order, but suspended any penalty to allow him to purge the contempt by complying with a new schedule.

The court deferred the issue of custody to trial but ordered a gradually increasing access schedule for the mother, transitioning to unsupervised and overnight access, conditional on her providing random negative drug tests.