Sara J. Erskine

This trial concerned a long-standing dispute over an easement (right-of-way) through a tunnel between adjacent commercial properties at 247, 253, and 255 Main Street South, Newmarket.

The plaintiffs, owners of 255 Main Street, alleged that the defendants, owners of 247 and 253 Main Street, substantially interfered with their easement rights through increased use, physical alterations, and parking.

The plaintiffs also sued the Town of Newmarket for enabling the interference.

The defendants counterclaimed, asserting the plaintiffs illegally parked on their property.

The court found that while increased use and minor alterations did not constitute substantial interference, the defendants' parking in the tunnel did.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for damages and against the Town of Newmarket, but granted an injunction preventing parking in the tunnel.

The court also granted the defendants' counterclaim, enjoining the plaintiffs from parking on the 253 Main Street parking pad, finding no ancillary right or prescriptive easement for parking.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Merritt J. dated June 15, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the fixed amount of $5,000, all inclusive.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) over a commercial development property, claiming a 10% beneficial interest based on alleged oral agreements and financial contributions.

The defendants opposed, disputing the existence of a binding agreement or trust.

The court found a triable issue regarding the plaintiffs' claim to an interest in the property, satisfying the initial low evidentiary threshold for a CPL.

However, after balancing the equities, the court exercised its discretion to deny the CPL.

The court reasoned that the property was acquired for profit, making damages a satisfactory and calculable remedy, and that the property was not unique.

Furthermore, the CPL would act as an injunction, causing greater harm and inconvenience to the defendants by delaying development and sale while they remained responsible for carrying costs.

The applicant, EDE Capital Inc., sought to set aside two arbitral awards: a Partial Award on Damages and a Partial Award on Costs.

The applicant argued that the arbitrator breached procedural fairness by reopening issues and making inconsistent findings, exceeded jurisdiction by affecting non-parties, and mischaracterized claims under the Securities Act.

The court determined that the International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICAA) and the Model Law applied due to one respondent's habitual residence in China.

The court dismissed the application, finding no serious procedural unfairness or excess of jurisdiction, and affirmed the arbitrator's decision, including the costs award.

The appellants, pre-construction purchasers of townhouses and condominiums, appealed the dismissal of their motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL).

The original developer transferred the lands to a lender, Grand Grace, after defaulting on loans.

Grand Grace took title free of the unregistered agreements of purchase and sale and resold the properties.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Justice's conclusion that the properties were not unique, damages were an adequate remedy, and the non-registration clauses in the agreements weighed against granting a CPL.

The appellant, a cryptocurrency mining company, appealed a motion judge's dismissal of its motion for the interim preservation of specific funds or assets purchased with those funds under Rules 45.01 and 45.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant had made upfront payments to the respondents for power supply, which the respondents co-mingled with general funds to build power generation infrastructure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the correct legal tests and made no palpable and overriding errors in concluding that the appellant failed to establish a right to a specific fund or identify specific assets to be preserved.

The appellants brought a motion to set aside, amend, or vary the Court of Appeal's previous order regarding trial costs, arguing procedural unfairness, inconsistency with costs principles, and insufficient reasons.

The motion was brought under rules 59.06(1) and (2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the relief sought was not available under rule 59.06, as it was an attempt to reargue issues already adjudicated.

The court clarified that challenges to discretionary orders, procedural fairness, or adequacy of reasons are typically grounds for seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court also addressed and dismissed belated arguments regarding the order settlement procedure under rule 59.04 and the inapplicability of rule 37.14.

The appellant obtained a judgment for unpaid commissions against Stonebrook Properties Inc. and registered a writ of seizure and sale against a condominium development property registered in Stonebrook's name.

The respondents, who were the beneficial owners of the property, successfully applied to have the writ lifted on the basis that Stonebrook held the property as a bare trustee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that Stonebrook was a bare trustee with no independent discretion, meaning the property was not available to satisfy a judgment against it.

The plaintiff brought a motion to transfer the action from Ottawa to Toronto.

The court dismissed the motion without costs, noting that a prior order had already transferred the action to Toronto and there was no evidence the order had been set aside or varied.

This costs endorsement followed a successful appeal by the appellant, Dong Jin Qiu, regarding the quantum of damages.

The appeal resulted in the respondent, Biao Liu, owing the appellant $10,496.68.

The court determined that the appellant was the successful party at both trial and appeal, contrary to the respondent's argument for partial indemnity costs based on a forfeited deposit.

As the appellant did not request costs, no order for trial costs was made.

The plaintiffs, purchasers of pre-construction condominium and freehold units, brought motions for certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) against the development property after the original developer became insolvent and transferred the property to a new developer.

The purchase agreements contained non-registration clauses prohibiting the registration of CPLs.

The court found that while there was a triable issue regarding an interest in land based on constructive trust, the non-registration clauses and the equitable factors from Dhunna—including the lack of uniqueness of the property, the adequacy of damages, and the prejudice to new innocent purchasers—weighed heavily against granting the CPLs.

The motions were dismissed.

The appellants, former portfolio managers, appealed a trial decision dismissing their claim for over $1.3 million in performance fees and a discretionary bonus from their former employer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellants were not contractually entitled to performance fees directly from the respondent, as their entitlement was structured through a side agreement with a lead portfolio manager.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred in precluding the appellants from arguing their entitlement to a discretionary bonus, as this claim was sufficiently pleaded.

The Court awarded each appellant $115,000 for the discretionary bonus, determining that the employer's discretion in awarding bonuses was not exercised fairly and reasonably given the fund's exceptional performance and bonuses paid to similarly situated employees.

The moving party, who was the respondent on a previous appeal, brought a motion under Rules 37.14 and 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary the Court of Appeal's decision and dismiss the appeal.

The moving party argued the court erred by misreading the record regarding the interpretation of a partnership agreement.

The court found Rule 37.14 inapplicable as it pertains to specific procedural errors, and Rule 59.06 (accidental slip or omission) also inapplicable, as the submission was a re-argument of a point already considered and not supported by the trial judge's findings or the agreement's wording.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The applicants sought the release of funds held in trust, arguing that a writ of execution obtained by the respondent against a bare trustee did not attach to the property.

The respondent argued that the bare trustee was also acting as an agent for the applicants, making them liable as principals for her unpaid commissions.

The court found that while an agency relationship did exist, the respondent was precluded from recovering against the principals because she had already obtained judgment against the agent, and the limitation period to sue the principals had expired.

The funds were ordered released to the applicants.

The appellant, a subtenant, appealed a lower court decision that found no rent reduction agreement existed and dismissed its claim for damages after being locked out for non-payment of rent.

The appellant argued the lockout was unlawful and sought damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's factual finding that no rent reduction agreement was made, noting deference is owed to such findings in the absence of palpable and overriding error.

The court also found the landlord was not liable for damages under the Helping Tenants and Small Businesses Act, 2020, as the lockout occurred before the Act's non-enforcement period began, and the tenant regained possession shortly after the Act came into force.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also dismissed.

The plaintiff, CryptoStar Corp., sought an interim order for the preservation of specific funds (Upfront Payments) or assets purchased with them, and a declaration of interest in property to facilitate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) in Alberta.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Upfront Payments did not constitute a "specific fund" under Rule 45.02 as they were co-mingled and not contractually segregated.

The court also found no serious issue to be tried regarding the refund claim under the Agreement's terms and no basis for a CPL as the plaintiff failed to establish an interest in land.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the measure of damages for breach of a joint venture partnership agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of a binding partnership agreement and its breach but found an error in the quantification of damages.

The trial judge had incorrectly awarded the respondent the extra capital he invested as damages.

The Court of Appeal clarified that damages should be limited to the cost of borrowing the additional capital incurred due to the breach, up to the date of trial, less a retained deposit.

The appeal was allowed with costs to the appellant.

The applicants sought an order declaring that a writ of execution obtained by the respondent against Stonebrook Inc. did not attach to real property registered in Stonebrook Inc.'s name.

The respondent had obtained the writ to enforce a judgment for unpaid commissions.

The court found that Stonebrook Inc. held the property merely as a bare trustee for the applicants (the beneficial owners) and had no independent discretion or beneficial interest in the property.

Consequently, under section 9(1) of the Execution Act, the writ could not attach to the property.

However, the court deferred releasing funds held in trust to allow the respondent an opportunity to argue that the bare trustee acted as an agent for the beneficial owners.

The appellant, Country Garden Academy Inc., appealed a Superior Court judgment that determined the minimum rent for a lease renewal.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in interpreting "comparable premises" failing to consider zoning limitations, and overlooking alleged bad faith by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's holistic consideration of factors, including property use and zoning, and no evidence to support the bad faith claim.

The respondent's cross-appeal for leave to appeal costs was also denied.

The moving party, UAP Inc., brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of E. M. Morgan J. released July 19, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $7,500 to the responding parties Robert Dinino and Lawrence Tyler Bacchus, and $7,500 to the responding parties Yako Hirmiz (Jacob) Yako, Sabah (Sam) Yako, and Sako Auto Parts Inc.