Sara J. Erskine

In an insider trading proceeding, the respondents brought a motion for unrestricted disclosure of forensic images of a third party's computer hard drives.

Staff had withheld two images citing the third party's privacy and sensitive commercial information.

The Commission held that while respondents are entitled to a high standard of disclosure akin to Stinchcombe to make full answer and defence, this right must be balanced against the legitimate privacy interests of third parties.

The Commission ordered disclosure of the disputed images but imposed strict conditions, including that the images remain in the custody of counsel or their expert, not be electronically copied, and be used solely for the purpose of the proceeding.

Four of the fourth parties brought a motion to intervene on an appeal of a summary judgment granted in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants.

The moving parties argued that the motion judge made unanticipated and impermissible findings of credibility and fact against them, which could prejudice their position in the forthcoming trial.

The court granted the motion to intervene on conditions, finding that the moving parties had a similar interest to the appellants on some issues and that their intervention could be structured so as not to unfairly prejudice the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the employer's Fairness Appeal Program did not apply to his termination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the program expressly excludes terminations without cause.

The court held that an employer's underlying concerns regarding performance do not convert a termination without cause into a termination for cause when the employer elects to provide notice or payment in lieu thereof.

No evidence of employer bad faith was found.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission alleged that Universal Settlements International Inc. (USI) traded in securities without registration or a prospectus by offering viatical products to investors.

The central issue was whether these viatical products—fractional interests in the death benefits of life insurance policies—constituted 'investment contracts' under s. 1(1) of the Securities Act.

Applying the Howey and Pacific Coast tests, the Commission found that the products involved an investment of funds with a view to profit in a common enterprise, where profits were derived from the undeniably significant efforts of USI and its agents.

Consequently, the viatical products were deemed securities, requiring USI to comply with the Act's registration and prospectus requirements.

The appellant appealed an order granting a request for international judicial assistance (letters rogatory) from a United States District Court.

The respondents sought to examine the appellant, a former manager of a Canadian oil company's subsidiary, regarding the company's alleged complicity in human rights violations in Sudan.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the request did not violate Canadian public policy, it was framed in terms so broad and general that the record could not sustain a finding that the evidence sought was relevant, necessary, or not otherwise obtainable.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission alleged that the respondent violated a Cease Trade Order by giving instructions to sell shares in a corporate account over which he had sole trading authority.

The respondent argued that the order's exception permitting trading 'for his own account(s)' allowed trading through a corporate entity.

The Commission rejected this interpretation, finding that the exception did not allow trading through corporate vehicles, even if the respondent was the beneficial owner.

The Commission concluded that the respondent breached the Cease Trade Order and ordered a three-year trading ban, removal of exemptions, and $15,000 in costs.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario revoking his certificate of registration for sexual abuse.

During the hearing, the College called an expert witness who was subsequently appointed to the Discipline Committee before the panel released its reasons.

The Divisional Court found that a reasonably informed bystander would conclude there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the panel members had to weigh the expert's evidence while she was their colleague on the Committee.

The decision of the panel was quashed as void ab initio.

The appellant physician was convicted of sexually abusing a patient by the Discipline Committee.

At the hearing, the appellant sought production of the treating psychologist's notes, which were illegible.

The Panel dismissed the motion, stating it lacked jurisdiction and that the first stage of the O'Connor test was not met, but provided no further reasons.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Panel breached the duty of fairness by failing to provide adequate reasons for its decision, which was both incorrect on jurisdiction and inexplicable on the O'Connor test.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing ordered.