Roy Wing Yeung Lee

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of three Criminal Code provisions relating to prostitution: operating a common bawdy-house, living on the avails of prostitution, and communicating for the purpose of prostitution.

The application judge struck down all three provisions as violating section 7 of the Charter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking down of the bawdy-house provision (suspended for 12 months) and read in an exploitation requirement to the living on the avails provision.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the application judge's decision on the communicating provision, finding it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice and was a justified limit on freedom of expression, binding the lower court to the Supreme Court's previous decision in the Prostitution Reference.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Surrender Order made by the Minister of Justice, arguing that outstanding charges in Macedonia affected the reasonableness of the decision to extradite him to the United States.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that the outstanding charges in Macedonia were for entirely different offences and did not affect the reasonableness of the decision to extradite.

The Republic of Poland sought the extradition of the applicant for fraud-related offences.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings, alleging abuse of process on the basis that Canada had previously attempted a 'disguised extradition' through deportation proceedings at Poland's behest, and that the Attorney General of Canada had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by improperly withholding relevant documents.

The court found that the deportation proceedings were indeed a disguised extradition initiated solely to appease Poland, and that the Attorney General's defiance of a production order constituted an abuse of process.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The applicant sought to set aside a motion judge's decision quashing his application for judicial review of a sports arbitration award.

The applicant argued that the arbitration panel exercised public powers and a statutory power of decision, making it subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the arbitration was a private contractual matter and did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision, meaning declaratory relief under the Judicial Review Procedure Act was unavailable.

The applicant, an elite wheelchair athlete, sought judicial review of an arbitral decision by the Court of Arbitration for Sport regarding an anti-doping violation.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, holding that the arbitrator derived authority from a private contract rather than a statutory power, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The court also found the application to be an abuse of process due to a parallel civil action seeking the same relief.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to stay the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, which struck down several prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional, pending appeal.

The moving party argued that the judgment created a legislative void with profound implications for the public interest.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that there was a serious issue to be tried, the government would suffer irreparable harm to the public interest without a stay, and the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The motion was granted and the judgment was stayed for a limited period to permit appellate review.

The appellants, organizations promoting traditional conceptions of morality, sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application challenging the constitutionality of prostitution provisions in the Criminal Code.

The motion judge dismissed their motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred, noting the appellants had a real, substantial, and identifiable interest and an important perspective distinct from the parties.

The appeal was allowed and the motion to intervene was granted.

The Crown appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding it liable in nuisance for damage to the respondent's dock caused by the release of water from the Trent-Severn Waterway during a heavy rainstorm.

The respondent cross-appealed the dismissal of his claims in negligence, Rylands v. Fletcher, and riparian rights, as well as the trial judge's costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the finding that the release of water caused the damage and constituted a nuisance.

The cross-appeal on liability was dismissed, but the cross-appeal on costs was allowed, increasing the respondent's trial costs to $645.50.