Robert Sheppard

The appellant appealed the six-year global sentence imposed for historical sexual offences against multiple child victims.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly considered the appellant's prior sentences and lack of insight.

The court upheld the global sentence as fit for a sexual predator abusing young victims, but adjusted the allocation for specific offences to respect statutory maximums and credited 42 days for pre-trial custody.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the accused on charges of sexual assault.

The trial judge found that the accused's actions were involuntary and occurred while in an automatistic state caused by a series of small strokes, characterizing it as non-mental disorder automatism.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to presume the automatism was caused by a mental disorder, by treating the medical classification of a brain disease as determinative of the legal classification of a mind disease, and by improperly assessing the continuing danger factor.

A new trial was ordered to determine whether the automatism should result in a verdict of not guilty or not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury charge by using the word 'some' regarding s. 21(2) and the phrase 'ought to have known' regarding possession under s. 4(3).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first phrase would not have misled the jury given the instructions on reasonable doubt.

While acknowledging the second phrase was an error, the Court applied the curative proviso because the photographic evidence against the appellant was overwhelming.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his effective three-year sentence for a lengthy spree of offences committed in an organized and professional manner across southwest Ontario.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by imposing a sentence exceeding the Crown's position of two years less a day without allowing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the judge should have afforded counsel the chance to make submissions, the sentence imposed was fit.

The appellant sought leave to appeal her sentence of six years for criminal negligence causing death and impaired driving causing death, plus one year consecutive for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The offences resulted in the death of a five-month-old baby and serious injuries to the mother.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's decision, noting the appellant's prior record for impaired driving and the severity of the consequences.

The appeal was dismissed, and the seven-year total sentence was upheld as fit and not offending the totality principle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery while armed with an offensive weapon and carrying a concealed weapon.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of identification evidence from two witnesses due to pre-suggestion, and erred by not expressing his own opinion on the identification after viewing the surveillance video.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly treated the witnesses' testimony as recognition evidence and was not required to supplement it with his own observations.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to three counts of break and enter with intent, misleading police, and failing to attend court.

The sentencing judge imposed consecutive four‑month sentences on the break and enter counts, resulting in a global custodial sentence of 13½ months.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was excessive and offended the principles of parity and totality, particularly compared to a co‑accused who received a significantly shorter sentence.

The appeal court held that while the use of consecutive sentences did not amount to an error in principle or a demonstrably unfit sentence, the sentencing judge relied on incorrect information about the co‑accused’s sentence.

To correct the resulting disparity, the court allowed the appeal and reduced the total sentence.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple assaults and uttering threats arising from a domestic relationship.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly assessed credibility, and relied on impermissible propensity reasoning.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no reversible error in the credibility analysis and upheld the convictions on the later counts.

However, the court held that several counts were statute‑barred because the Crown elected to proceed summarily more than six months after the alleged offences without clear, informed, and unequivocal consent from the accused under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code.

Those convictions were quashed as a nullity, and the matter of sentence on the remaining counts was remitted to the trial judge for reconsideration.

The appellant appealed his conviction for internet luring, arguing the trial judge failed to consider whether he had a last-minute change of heart about a planned sexual encounter, which might negate the mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the offence had crystallized well before the meeting date and any last-minute change of heart was irrelevant.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on firearms charges, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding a statement the respondent made to another prisoner while in police cells.

The trial judge found a breach of the respondent's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel because the police officer delayed contacting counsel to interview another person and eavesdrop on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that no s. 10(b) breach had occurred at the exact moment the statement was overheard, as the officer had not yet had any opportunity to comply with the request for counsel.

The acquittals were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for an armed robbery of a restaurant.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellants' proximity to the getaway van shortly after the robbery.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge could infer the appellants were in the van, concluding they were the robbers was not the only rational inference.

Evidence showed at least three people were in the van, and DNA from other individuals was found inside.

The trial judge erred by failing to consider other possible combinations of perpetrators.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving, fleeing police, and assaulting a police officer, arguing that the trial judge's finding on identity was unreasonable.

The sole issue at trial was whether the appellant was the driver of the ATV involved in the incident.

The trial judge relied on the eyewitness identification by a police officer who had prior familiarity with the appellant and observed him face-to-face during the altercation.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the evidence and the trial judge's application of the principles regarding eyewitness identification.

The court found that the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of the identification evidence and that the verdict was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, two youthful first-time offenders, pleaded guilty to a variety store robbery involving planning and violence but no weapon.

They appealed their sentences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by dismissing the sentencing principles of specific deterrence and rehabilitation.

The Court allowed the appeal, substituting a global sentence of two years less a day for each appellant, which, after accounting for pre-trial custody, resulted in a sentence of 357 days.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

The sole issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding that the police officer had objectively reasonable grounds to support a breath demand under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge's findings of fact, which included erratic driving, a strong smell of alcohol, glassy eyes, and an admission of drinking.

The court held that these facts were sufficient to objectively support the officer's subjective belief of impairment, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, arguing the trial judge failed to consider the impact of his despondent mental state on the proof of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the issue was not raised at trial and was negated by the appellant's own testimony.

The trial judge properly found all essential elements, including mens rea, established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing bodily harm, arguing the jury's guilty verdict was inconsistent with his acquittals on two 'over 80' charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that impaired driving and driving 'over 80' are separate offences.

The court found there was abundant evidence of impairment, including prior drinking, erratic driving, and unusual behaviour, to support the conviction despite the acquittals on the blood alcohol charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for threatening to cause the death of a fellow inmate and his parents if the inmate testified against him in an unrelated prosecution.

The appellant argued the trial judge shifted the burden of proof, improperly used the absence of motive to lie to bolster the Crown witness's credibility, and unfairly intervened during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) framework, correctly considered motive in assessing credibility, and intervened within permissible limits to control the proceedings.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered after a finding of guilt for child luring, where the trial judge held the accused had been entrapped by an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old girl on MSN Messenger.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by failing to determine whether the officer's initial contact actually provided an opportunity to commit the offence.

The initial request to be added as a friend, the neutral photograph, and innocuous conversation were investigative steps only, not an inducement or opportunity to commit child luring.

The accused initiated and led the sexually explicit communications after learning the purported age of the child.

The stay was set aside, a conviction was substituted, and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

The appellant appealed a 12-month sentence imposed by the trial judge, which was twelve times the joint submission at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge overemphasized the dangerousness of the drug and gave too little weight to the lack of severity of the crime, its low level of sophistication, and the offender's unfortunate circumstances.

On appeal, both the appellant and the Crown submitted that the appropriate sentence was six months plus probation.

The Court of Appeal agreed, granted leave, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to six months.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal held that it was open to the trial judge to infer that the jacket containing drugs belonged to the appellant, given the documents found in the wallet inside the jacket.

The appeal was dismissed.