Robert Sheppard

Appeal from convictions for possession of a firearm while prohibited and possession of a firearm without a licence.

The appellant was prohibited from possessing firearms under a lifetime order.

While on parole, he told his girlfriend his gun was at a firearms dealer in a nearby town.

Police discovered a high-powered rifle for sale under his name at the store.

The appellant testified he had no control over the firearm and that it was being sold on behalf of his brother-in-law to secure a loan.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his approach to the failure of the defence to call certain witnesses, including reversing the burden of proof by requiring corroborating evidence and making improper inferences about witnesses refusing to lie for the appellant.

The offender was convicted of entering into an arrangement with an undercover police officer to commit sexual interference with a person under 16 years of age.

He challenged the constitutionality of the one-year mandatory minimum sentence under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it was grossly disproportionate.

The court reviewed the gravity of the offence, the offender's high moral blameworthiness, and mitigating factors including his lack of a prior record and genuine remorse.

The court determined that a fit and proper sentence range was 9 to 12 months, concluding that the one-year mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate and therefore constitutional.

Candice McFadden appealed her conviction for assaulting her common law spouse with a weapon.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's account of the incident, failed to conduct a full R. v. W.(D.) analysis by focusing too narrowly on the final moments of the confrontation, and applied a different standard of review to the evidence of the victim and the accused.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 9 years less 18 months pre-sentence custody for aggravated assault with a weapon.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in failing to consider whether intent to kill was the only available inference and that the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of proportionality given the mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge carefully balanced the mitigating and aggravating factors and was entitled to consider the appellant's intent to kill as a seriously aggravating factor.

The sentence was found to be fit in the circumstances.

The appellant, Ahmed Saghier, appealed his convictions and sentence on four counts of assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, the timing of reporting, the admission of hospital records, and the sufficiency of reasons.

The appellant also argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider a conditional sentence.

The Superior Court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or her decision to admit hospital records.

The court affirmed that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and that her sentencing discretion was properly exercised, as the imposed sentence was within the acceptable range for domestic violence cases involving multiple injuries.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash his committal for trial on charges of discharging a firearm and aggravated assault.

The accused argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence because the complainant recanted his identification of the accused during cross-examination.

The reviewing court dismissed the application, finding the preliminary inquiry judge properly considered all the evidence, including the complainant's adoption of his prior statement during examination in chief, and did not exceed his jurisdiction.

The defendant, M.P., was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown alleged non-consensual sexual intercourse, while the defendant claimed consent.

The court considered the conflicting testimonies of the complainant, Ms. H., and the defendant, M.P., as well as a third witness, Ms. D.S. The judge noted numerous significant inconsistencies in the Crown witnesses' accounts across multiple interviews and hearings, and found the defendant's testimony problematic due to admitted lies and internal inconsistencies.

Ultimately, the court found that the totality of the conflicting evidence left a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainant consented to sexual intercourse, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

The accused was sentenced on two charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking in methamphetamine and one charge of fraud.

The accused had a lengthy criminal record spanning 26 years and had participated in the London Drug Treatment Court, where he made significant progress before relapsing and committing the offences while on bail.

The court imposed a sentence of 4 years in federal penitentiary on the drug trafficking charges and 2 months consecutive on the fraud charge, with credit for pre-trial custody and bail conditions.

The court emphasized the serious harm caused by crystal methamphetamine and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and gross indecency involving an underage neighbour, arguing that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of four other sexual offences, including rape.

He contended that the jury must have reached an impermissible credibility compromise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were not inconsistent.

The jury was entitled to accept some of the complainant's evidence while rejecting other parts, and it was open to them to distinguish between the offences involving intercourse and those that did not.

The appellant was discharged at a preliminary inquiry for offences against his domestic partner because the preliminary inquiry judge found no evidence of identity.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to quash the discharge.

The appellant appealed, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge's error was not jurisdictional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to consider the identity of names and biographical details as some evidence of identity amounted to a failure to consider the whole of the evidence under s. 548(1) of the Criminal Code, constituting a jurisdictional error.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of stolen property.

The trial judge entered the stay on his own initiative when the trial Crown was 22 minutes late due to a conflicting sentencing matter in Superior Court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge was right to be displeased, a stay of proceedings was not warranted as there was no prejudice to the respondent's right to a fair trial and the integrity of the justice system was not diminished.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court, arguing that the judge erred in inferring an agreement under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code to regularize proceedings instituted beyond the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the judge had an adequate evidentiary foundation to infer the agreement.

The court held that the correctness of this conclusion raised a question of mixed fact and law, which cannot be appealed under s. 839(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed following conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the sentencing judge erred by refusing to grant a conditional discharge and instead imposing a 30‑day conditional sentence.

The appellant contended that the sentencing judge used conclusory reasoning and failed to properly weigh mitigating factors including exemplary character, loss of employment, and significant collateral consequences.

The court held that the sentencing judge properly considered all mitigating and aggravating factors and appropriately emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the abuse of authority and breach of trust by a custodial officer against a prisoner.

Applying the deferential standard for appellate review of sentence, the court found no error in principle and no basis to conclude the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed a conviction on one count of gross indecency following a jury trial involving historic sexual abuse allegations, arguing the verdicts on two counts were inconsistent and that the jury charge inadequately addressed credibility and an asserted motive to fabricate.

The court held the jury instructions were proper, the verdicts were logically reconcilable because the counts related to distinct incidents with differing evidentiary features, and the motive-to-fabricate instruction already captured the possibility of honest mistake.

On sentence, the court found one aspect of the conditional sentence unduly restrictive and varied the house arrest term to permit limited absence from the residence with prior written supervisory consent.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and the sentence appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to consider Gladue principles and the jump principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record, breach of probation, and the risk posed to a police officer.

The Court also held that the sentence increase was measured and did not violate the jump principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting his step-daughter while she was sleeping.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his testimony due to its lack of clarity and in drawing an unreasonable inference that his admitted 'thoughts' about the complainant were sexual in nature.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment and inferences were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for using an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence and breach of a recognizance.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the principal Crown witness and that the imitation firearm conviction was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the credibility assessment and concluding there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the object used was an imitation firearm.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a home invasion robbery in which the sole live issue at trial was identity.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury charge on identification evidence was materially deficient because it failed to caution adequately about the limited value of in-dock identification, the risk of contamination of the photo-lineup identification, the weak connection between witness confidence and accuracy, and the exculpatory significance of a discrepancy about eye colour.

Given that the Crown’s case rested entirely on eyewitness identification that was far from overwhelming, the cumulative effect of the charge errors undermined trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, uttering threats, and assault.

He argued that as a front-seat passenger he did not operate the vehicle and that the trial judge misapprehended evidence affecting credibility findings.

The court held that the trial judge made no reversible error in assessing credibility and was entitled to accept the taxi driver’s evidence that the appellant grabbed and turned the steering wheel, causing the vehicle to veer into oncoming traffic.

The court found the conduct analogous to circumstances where a passenger assumes control of a vehicle and thereby operates it.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, although the sentence appeal was allowed on joint submission to vary probation to reflect community service already completed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to break, enter and theft of a dwelling house and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, less 1:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by declining to grant enhanced credit at a rate of 1.5:1.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to discharge the onus of demonstrating that enhanced credit was warranted.