Robert Sheppard

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence of the complainant and the appellant.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge's credibility assessments and found no error, noting the trial judge carefully and scrupulously reviewed the evidence of all witnesses in a fair and even-handed manner.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, G.S., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation, and his sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's decision to allow the Crown to re-examine the complainant on prior consistent statements and the sufficiency of jury instructions regarding these statements.

The appellant also argued the five-and-a-half-year custodial sentence was unfit and that the trial judge failed to consider the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the admission or instruction on prior consistent statements, as the defence had implicitly alleged recent fabrication.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but only varied the lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order to 20 years, upholding the custodial sentence.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for a third child pornography conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the two-stage Proulx framework, specifically by not determining an appropriate sentence of less than two years and by not assessing the danger to the community or consistency with sentencing principles (denunciation and deterrence).

Given the respondent's repetitive conduct and lack of genuine rehabilitation, the conditional sentence was deemed manifestly unfit.

The appeal was allowed, and a three-year penitentiary sentence was substituted, with credit for pre-sentence custody, time on house arrest bail, and time served on the conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assaulting his former wife, arguing the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) test for credibility and created a reasonable apprehension of bias through an off-hand comment to defence counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly resolved the conflicting evidence and did not unevenly scrutinize the testimony.

The court also held that the single off-hand comment did not meet the threshold for establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Appeal from a conviction for possession of child pornography.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in reviewing the Information to Obtain (ITO) that formed the basis for the search warrant used to seize the DVD containing child pornography.

The appellant argued that information excised from the ITO had the potential to taint the issuing justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the excisions were made consistently with established principles and that sufficient reasonable grounds remained to support the issuance of the warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her convictions for counselling murder, criminal harassment, and breaching court orders arising from a prolonged campaign of harassment against her former domestic partner and his new wife.

The trial judge found that the appellant had sought to incite her brother and ex-husband to murder her former partner by falsely claiming he had sexually assaulted her daughter.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and the sentence of 10 years effective on the counselling murder charge, finding no legal error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, evidentiary rulings, or sentencing analysis.

The Appellant, S.V., appealed his conviction for sexual touching, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately consider inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and applied an uneven standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no significant error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or the application of scrutiny, and affirmed the deference owed to the trial judge's findings.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a motion for leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order dismissing his appeal from a Landlord and Tenant Board decision.

The Board had ordered the moving party to pay the respondent $4,885.19 for damages arising from a bed bug infestation.

The issue before the Board was whether the rental accommodation fell within the exemption under section 5(i) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 for shared accommodation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as it did not raise a question of law but rather challenged factual findings.

The motion judge dismissed the extension request, finding little merit to the proposed appeal given the limited right of appeal available under the RTA.

The Appellant, Young Min Shon, appealed a 10-month jail sentence for assaulting his 12-year-old son, arguing the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the punitive effect of his impending deportation and that a shorter custodial sentence would suffice.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence was not demonstrably unfit and fell within the acceptable range for the offence.

The court held that the sentencing judge's silence on immigration consequences did not constitute an error impacting the sentence, as deportation was a direct result of the conviction itself, not the length of the custodial term, and the trial judge was fully aware of these consequences.

The appellants appealed their convictions for human trafficking and procurement into prostitution.

The trial judge found that while the complainant voluntarily entered the sex trade, the appellants subsequently exercised control over her, withheld her earnings, and forced her to work against her wishes.

The appellants challenged the verdicts as unreasonable, alleging the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to reconcile inconsistencies, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding ample evidence supported the verdicts and the trial judge properly addressed credibility issues and deficiencies in the complainant's evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence of 26 months imprisonment, less four months credit for pre-trial custody, plus two years' probation for possession of hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant argued the sentence was excessive given the small quantity of drugs, his addiction status, and rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant factors, including the appellant's addiction and rehabilitation attempts, but reasonably concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist.

The court noted the appellant had failed to complete a residential treatment program, continued using opiates, committed further offences while on bail, and failed to appear for sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft over $5,000 and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in failing to caution the jury against speculating on the reason for his administrative leave, which he contended raised an inference of bad character.

The Court of Appeal rejected this ground, finding that the trial judge had adequately instructed the jury not to speculate about missing evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant challenged a $75,000 restitution order to St. Anne's Church, arguing that compensation should have been pursued through civil proceedings and that there was insufficient factual basis for the restitution.

The Court of Appeal upheld the restitution order, finding it was properly supported by evidence and reflected the need for denunciation and deterrence in a case involving breach of trust by a priest who misappropriated church donations.

The Crown appealed an acquittal of sexual assault charges.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his sister-in-law on two occasions without her consent.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding his testimony that the sexual activity was consensual to be credible.

The trial judge negatively assessed the complainant's credibility based on her post-assault behaviour, which included continued association with the accused and failure to flee or call for help.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by relying on stereotypical views about how sexual assault victims should behave.

The court determined that this legal error was material to the verdict because the trial judge's belief in the accused's credibility was inextricably linked to her flawed assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

Appeal from a conviction entered by a Superior Court judge sitting with a jury on charges of sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on two grounds: first, that the jury should have been specifically cautioned that the appellant's failure to return to Canada immediately upon learning of the charges could not be used as evidence of guilt; and second, that the jury should have been instructed that if they found the complainant deliberately lied about a specific incident (the "2008 event"), they could use that lie to reject all of her evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the appellant's delay in returning could be relevant to credibility, the trial judge's instructions adequately conveyed to the jury that they must assess the complainant's entire testimony in context and that deliberate lies are relevant to credibility.

Three appellants appealed their convictions for drug trafficking offences arising from Project O'Bunker, a large joint forces investigation in London, Ontario.

The appellants challenged the dismissal of their s. 11(b) Charter applications alleging unreasonable delay, and one appellant also challenged his conviction on the merits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding that while the total delay of 39-40 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 30 months established in R. v. Jordan, the delay was justified by the exceptional complexity of the prosecution and the transitional exceptional circumstance based on reasonable reliance on the previous Morin framework.

The appellant, H.A.E., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the corresponding sentence, which included a six-month conditional sentence, one year of probation, and a 10-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment, alleging different scrutiny levels for the complainant and appellant, undue reliance on demeanour, and an error in rejecting the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The sentencing appeal argued inadequate consideration of collateral impacts, failure to apply the principle of restraint, and an unreasonable sentence compared to similar cases.

The Superior Court dismissed both the conviction and sentencing appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility findings or application of the law regarding consent, particularly s. 273.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court also determined that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, distinguishing the aggravating factors present in this case from those in cited precedents.

The appellant pleaded guilty to mischief and uttering threats.

The Crown and defence made a joint submission for a conditional discharge with 18 months' probation.

The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and entered convictions without notifying counsel of his concerns or allowing the appellant to withdraw his plea.

On appeal, the Superior Court found this violated the procedure set out in R. v. Anthony-Cook.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions and sentence were vacated, and the joint submission for a conditional discharge was imposed.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction, making the mandatory minimum sentence six months imprisonment.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that while the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate for this particular offender, it would be grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonable hypotheticals involving minimal culpability.

The court declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional and imposed an intermittent sentence of 111 days (90 days to serve after pre-trial custody credit) with probation and ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 12 years imprisonment (less 5 years for time served) imposed on December 21, 2016 for multiple drug trafficking and firearm offences.

The sentencing judge had determined an appropriate aggregate sentence of 17 years before applying mitigating factors and the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence unfit, holding that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's guilty pleas, his relative youth and status as a first offender at the time of the initial offences, and the principle that an offender should not be crushed by the sentence.

The court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 9 years imprisonment (less 5 years for pre-sentence custody).

Appeal from convictions for possession of a firearm while prohibited and possession of a firearm without a licence.

The appellant was prohibited from possessing firearms under a lifetime order.

While on parole, he told his girlfriend his gun was at a firearms dealer in a nearby town.

Police discovered a high-powered rifle for sale under his name at the store.

The appellant testified he had no control over the firearm and that it was being sold on behalf of his brother-in-law to secure a loan.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his approach to the failure of the defence to call certain witnesses, including reversing the burden of proof by requiring corroborating evidence and making improper inferences about witnesses refusing to lie for the appellant.