Robert Pelletier

The respondent father brought a motion for temporary orders including child support, spousal support, and permission to communicate with the applicant mother.

The mother brought an informal cross-motion for child support.

The court found that the father met the 40% threshold for shared custody and imputed his income at $40,000 due to insufficient financial disclosure.

The mother was ordered to pay $900 per month in child support, subject to a 30% reduction for extraordinary expenses she paid.

The father's requests for temporary spousal support and direct communication with the mother were dismissed due to the high-conflict nature of the separation.

The defendant brought a motion to strike out the plaintiff's jury notice, arguing it was served after the close of pleadings.

The plaintiff had amended her statement of claim multiple times, adding claims for defamation, breach of contract, and bad faith, and significantly increasing the damages sought.

The court found that the substantial amendments fundamentally altered the nature of the claim, meaning the pleadings were not closed when the jury notice was served.

The motion to strike the jury notice was dismissed.

The appellant brought a motion seeking a stay of a 12-month driving prohibition pending the appeal of her conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The court previously found that the prohibition caused hardship.

However, after reviewing the trial record, the court concluded that the appeal lacked merit, as the trial judge's findings regarding impairment were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The responding father brought a motion seeking multiple interim parenting-related orders, including a prohibition on the mother relocating more than five kilometres, orders concerning parenting structure and school attendance, restoration of a specific physician for the children, supervised access, and expanded disclosure from a child protection agency as well as medical and school records.

The court found no evidence that the mother intended to relocate or that the children lacked appropriate care, and held that the mother was presently meeting the children’s health and safety needs.

Given pending criminal charges prohibiting the father from contacting the children, the court determined it was premature to order supervised access.

The court also declined to revisit prior disclosure orders or compel disclosure from third-party institutions.

The motion was dismissed, with the exception of an order requiring the mother to provide 60 days’ notice of any relocation or school change.

La requérante a présenté une motion pour jugement sommaire dans une instance de protection de l’enfance visant une ordonnance de pupille de la Couronne sans accès aux parents.

Elle soutenait qu’il n’existait aucune question en litige véritable concernant les capacités parentales, les limites intellectuelles des parents, leur logement, leur réseau de soutien et les besoins particuliers de l’enfant.

Le tribunal a examiné la preuve par affidavit et a conclu que plusieurs questions factuelles demeuraient sérieusement contestées et dépendaient d’évaluations de crédibilité et d’appréciations subjectives.

Les questions relatives aux capacités parentales, aux limites cognitives, au logement et au soutien familial nécessitaient un examen complet par témoignage et contre‑interrogatoire.

La motion pour jugement sommaire a donc été rejetée et l’affaire renvoyée pour procès.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, arguing that the trial judge misapplied the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.) and improperly restricted cross‑examination concerning alleged exculpatory statements made during the incident.

The appeal court held that although the trial judge’s articulation of the second branch of the W.(D.) test differed slightly from the classic formulation, the reasons as a whole demonstrated that the correct burden of proof was applied and the accused’s evidence was rejected in its entirety on credibility grounds.

The court also found no miscarriage of justice arising from the trial judge’s intervention regarding prior exculpatory statements and the requirement for assurance that the accused would testify.

Any potential confusion was addressed during the trial and did not prejudice the defence.

The convictions were therefore upheld.

The defendants brought a Rule 21 motion seeking determination of questions of law in a defamation action arising from a television broadcast and newspaper article alleging the plaintiff union supported a terrorist organization.

The defendants argued the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient notice under s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act and also challenged the legal capacity of an unincorporated trade union to sue in defamation.

The court held that the written notices provided by the plaintiff did not sufficiently specify the matter complained of as required by the statute, despite the plaintiff later identifying specific impugned words in the statement of claim.

Because proper notice is a mandatory precondition to bringing a libel action, the failure constituted a complete bar to the proceeding.

The court further commented that the legal capacity of trade unions to sue in defamation remains unsettled but declined to determine that issue on a Rule 21 motion.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge found that the investigating officer lacked the required reasonable suspicion to make an approved screening device demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code, rendering the demand an unreasonable search contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

The breathalyzer results were excluded under s. 24(2), leading to an acquittal.

On appeal, the court held that the officer’s testimony demonstrated a misunderstanding of the legal threshold for making a screening demand and supported the trial judge’s finding that the officer did not possess the necessary subjective belief.

The exclusion of the evidence and resulting acquittal were upheld.

The respondent father brought a motion for equal shared parenting and an order that the child's residence remain in Ottawa.

The applicant mother brought a cross-motion seeking sole custody and permission to relocate with the child to Cornwall to live with her fiancé.

The court applied the framework from Gordon v. Goertz and determined that it was in the child's best interests to remain in Ottawa on an interim basis, noting the child's established routine, extended family, and the lack of detailed evidence regarding the proposed move.

The court ordered that the child's primary residence remain in Ottawa, maintained the existing parenting schedule, and ordered the father to pay interim child support.

Following a conviction for criminal harassment based on repeated sexualized letters sent from jail to an unwilling complainant, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate detention under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code.

The court found the predicate offence was a serious personal injury offence and that the offender had established a pattern of repetitive behaviour creating a high risk of future psychological, and possibly physical, harm to elderly women.

However, applying the governing framework, the court concluded there remained a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community through a fixed penitentiary sentence, strict geographic and behavioural restrictions, treatment, and a long-term supervision order.

The dangerous offender application was denied and a long-term offender designation was made.

Sentencing decision for robbery and multiple breaches of recognizance arising from a late-night convenience store robbery in which the offender threatened to shoot the clerk with a purported firearm.

The offender pleaded guilty and had served approximately 16 months of pre‑trial custody, credited as two years.

The court considered the offender’s extensive criminal record alongside Gladue factors, including a traumatic upbringing, substance abuse, and systemic issues affecting Indigenous offenders.

Applying the principles from Gladue, Wells, and Ipeelee, the court found the punitive objectives of sentencing had been satisfied by pre‑trial detention.

A suspended sentence with three years’ probation was imposed, with rehabilitative and community‑based conditions.

The parties separated after a 19-year marriage.

The respondent claimed compensatory spousal support, arguing he suffered economic disadvantage while the applicant pursued her master's degree, which led to a significant increase in her income.

The court dismissed the spousal support claim, finding no economic disadvantage to the respondent.

The court also resolved disputes over the children's primary residence for child support purposes, ordered pro-rata sharing of section 7 extraordinary expenses, and determined the equalization of net family property, noting the respondent's failure to disclose certain assets.

The accused pleaded guilty to 28 fraud and related charges after operating a Ponzi-style scheme under the guise of film production investments, defrauding 26 victims of $296,250.

The funds were largely used to support the accused's lavish lifestyle.

The court weighed the significant breach of trust, the number of victims, and the global amount against the accused's guilty plea and lack of prior record.

The accused was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment, 3 years' probation, ordered to pay full restitution, and subjected to a 5-year prohibition under s. 380.2 of the Criminal Code.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs of both the trial ($348,135.96) and the pending appeal ($68,417.45) under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs' defamation action had been dismissed at trial.

The court found that the corporate plaintiffs were not impecunious and had sufficient assets to satisfy a cost order.

The court also noted that ordering security for the full amount would unjustly prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing a meritorious appeal.

The court dismissed the motion for security for trial costs but ordered the plaintiffs to post $40,000 as security for the costs of the appeal.

The Crown brought an application in a criminal harassment prosecution to admit evidence of the accused’s prior convictions as evidence of other discreditable conduct.

The prior incidents included a sexual assault conviction from 2001, a conviction for unlawfully being in a dwelling house in 2008, and convictions for break and enter, threats, and unlawful presence in a dwelling in 2011.

The court applied the governing principles for similar fact and other discreditable conduct evidence, including the requirement that probative value outweigh prejudicial effect.

The court held that the 2001 and 2011 events were relevant to the complainant’s reasonable fear and to the accused’s state of mind when sending numerous letters alleged to constitute criminal harassment.

Evidence relating to the 2008 events was excluded as insufficiently relevant.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change existing custody and access orders to permit her to relocate with the parties' 7-year-old child from Ottawa to Gander, Newfoundland.

The move was prompted by the unexpected military posting of the mother's new partner.

The court found that the new committed relationship and the unexpected posting constituted a material change in circumstances.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz framework, the court determined that it was in the child's best interests to remain in the primary care of the mother and relocate to Newfoundland, subject to a modified access schedule that provided the father with extended blocks of parenting time.

The accused pleaded guilty to failing to provide the necessaries of life and criminal negligence causing bodily harm in relation to her young child.

The child was discovered severely malnourished, developmentally delayed, and confined to a room covered in feces.

The court considered the accused's mental health issues, including depression and drug dependency, as well as the abusive control exerted by her partner.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for the prolonged and severe neglect, the court sentenced the accused to 12 months of incarceration followed by 24 months of probation.

Following a successful appeal where a new trial was ordered, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The court noted that while the appellants were successful, they could have achieved the same result with more judicious effort.

Costs were fixed at $5,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements, payable following the new trial or settlement.

The plaintiff masonry company brought an action for unpaid services under a verbal, cash-based contract for the installation of stone veneer and chimneys on the defendants' new home.

The defendants counterclaimed for the cost of remedial work, alleging the masonry was defective and not compliant with the building code.

The court found that both parties entered into an imprecise, 'under the table' arrangement and shared responsibility for the project's shortcomings.

Concluding that the plaintiff received less than expected but was entitled to less due to the final result, and that the defendants as builder/contractors bore responsibility for the conditions, the court dismissed both the main action and the counterclaim.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing their action regarding a defective well in a real estate transaction.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge made two palpable and overriding errors.

First, the trial judge misinterpreted testimony regarding when modifications were made to the Seller Property Information Statement.

Second, the trial judge failed to consider and evaluate the evidence of several witnesses, including an expert hydrogeologist, who testified that the well was defective prior to the sale.