ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: 11-SA5112

DATE: 2015/10/8

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent

– and –

L.P.
Appellant

Moiz M. Karimjee, Assistant Crown Attorney

Dominique D. Smith for the Appellant

HEARD: September 16, 2015

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ON A SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL

PELLETIER, J.

Introduction

[1] L.P. appeals against his conviction entered June 4, 2014 on one charge of sexual assault and one charge of sexual exploitation. In the Appellant’s view, the learned trial judge, the Honourable Madam Justice C. Kehoe, committed two reviewable errors in law; that the learned trial judge misapplied the assessment of evidence standard of R. v. W.(D.) (1991) 1991 93 (SCC), S.C.J. No. 26, and that the learned trial judge erred in law by ruling that statements purportedly made by the Appellant could not be tendered in evidence unless the Appellant provided an assurance that he would testify.

[2] For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal on both grounds.

The trial proceedings

[3] The Appellant was charged in relation to the alleged sexual abuse of his daughter in the Summer and Fall of 2011. Two specific incidents were alleged to have occurred. The Crown presented the complainant’s video-taped interview, as adopted by the complainant, pursuant to s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code. The complainant provided further context and detail at trial and was cross-examined. The Crown further called the complainant’s older brother.

[4] The Appellant chose to testify and was cross-examined in relation to the events giving rise to the charges as well as his contacts with the complainant following the laying of the charges and the imposition of non-communication bail conditions.

[5] At trial, the complainant was cross-examined in relation to a statement purportedly made by the Appellant, during the second incident. As the statement was exculpatory in nature and tended to suggest that the complainant’s younger brother was actually making inappropriate gestures, the learned trial judge intervened, inquiring as to whether the Appellant intended to testify in order to deal with the admissibility of prior exculpatory statements. Eventually, the Appellant did testify as to the statements he purportedly made at the time of the events.

The issues

[6] The Appellant contends that the learned trial judge misstated and failed to properly apply the R .v. W. (D.) test in relation to competing versions of the two principal witnesses. The Appellant further contends that the learned trial judge’s intervention concerning questions relating to the Appellant’s purported statements at the time of the second incident created a significant prejudice to the Appellant.

Analysis

[7] The first issue revolves around the learned trial judge’s identification and application of the R. v. W. (D) formulation. Following a very extensive and detailed review of the evidence, the learned trial judge stated the R. v. W.(D) test as follows:

i. If I believe the accused’s evidence I must acquit;

ii. If I disbelieve the accused’s evidence has a reasonable doubt been raised on the evidence I do accept;

iii. If I reject the accused’s evidence has the Crown proved all of the elements of each offence on the evidence I do accept.

(Reasons for judgment, June 4, 2013, para. 68)

[8] The learned trial judge went on to conduct the following analysis of the Appellant’s evidence:

I do reject the accused’s evidence. L.P.’s evidence was full of internal inconsistencies, that he only understood English if you spoke slowly, yet he often answered in English before the question was translated and had to be reminded several times to wait for the translation; that he brought L.P. Jr. with him when he met S.P. but that he did not involve L.P. Jr. to make sure he had a witness, that he met S.P. because she was so sad but that S.P. was happy all the time. He was confrontational at times during cross-examination, asking questions instead of answering the question. He attempted to anticipate the questions and changed his evidence several times: i.e. concerning the reason he slept with a pillow, why he had L.P. Jr. come when he would meet with S.P.; how many times and on what occasions he would have massaged S.P., i.e. once then twice. He tried to implicate and blame all of the children. He blamed S.P. for the communication and breaches. He blamed Y.P. as the perpetrator of the touching of S.P.’s breasts. He maligned his ex-wife, the mother of S.P. at every opportunity. His evidence that he was taking sleeping pills for shingles was not believable. His evidence concerning the November 18, 2011 incident is not believable. He testified that S.P. went to her bunk bed and came back to sleep beside him but that he had been asleep since 7:00 p.m. because he had taken the sleeping pill. He was awake at 10:30 when Y.P. came to bed but asleep the next second. He testified that he did not hear S.P. say “don’t touch my boobs” but then testified that he heard her say that and corrected Y.P. and sent S.P. to her own bed. However, he later changed that evidence because he massaged her legs and feet before she left floor. His evidence evolved and changed and is not credible.

(Reasons for Judgment, June 4, 2013 pp.15-16, para.69)

[9] The Appellant argues that the learned trial judge misstated and failed to properly apply the second branch of R. v. W.(D). The R. v. W.(D) test is stated as follows:

28. Ideally, appropriate instructions on the issue of credibility should be given, not only during the main charge, but on any recharge. A trial judge might well instruct the jury on the question of credibility along these lines:

First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit.

Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.

Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused.

If that formula were followed, the oft repeated error which appears in the recharge in this case would be avoided. The requirement that the Crown prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt is fundamental in our system of criminal law. Every effort should be made to avoid mistakes in charging the jury on this basic principle.

(R. v. W.(D) Supra para. 28)

[10] The R.v. W. (D) formulation has, as its primary objective, the avoidance of erroneously reducing the standard of proof in criminal case to one of balance of probabilities. Judges, and juries, must not simply be content to decide whom they find more believable. The prosecution, in cases of a denial by the person charged, must convince the Court that the evidence of the person charged is not believable, even to the extent of residually raising a reasonable doubt upon the rejection of the testimony generally.

[11] The second branch of the R.v. W.(D) formulation has to do with evidence of a person charged which might, though substantially rejected, raise a reasonable doubt. As stated by Justice Binnie in R.v. S. (J.H.) 2008 SCC 30, 2008 SCJ 30, at paragraph 11.

11. As to the second question, some jurors may wonder how, if they believe none of the evidence of the accused, such rejected evidence may nevertheless of itself raise a reasonable doubt. Of course, some elements of the evidence of an accused may raise a reasonable doubt, even though the bulk of it is rejected. Equally, the jury may simply conclude that they do not know whether to believe the accused’s testimony or not. In either circumstance the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

[12] The Appellant’s contention is that the learned trial judge, in the present case, both misstated and failed to apply the second branch of the R. v. W. (D) formulation. On a plain reading of the second branch of R. v. W. (D) as compared to the formulation set out by the learned trial judge, there is a difference.

“If you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit” in R. v. W. (D) versus

“If I disbelieve the accused’s evidence has a reasonable doubt been raised in the evidence I do accept” in the present case.

[13] The examination of this question must take into consideration the reasons for judgment as a whole.

[14] The Court, at trial, clearly rejected the testimony of the Appellant in its entirety as it related to the events giving rise to the charges. Though summarized briefly, the reasons for rejecting the testimony of the Appellant include no fewer than 15 precise examples of inconsistencies, improbabilities and unresponsive answers.

[15] The Court concluded that, for the reasons given, the complainant’s testimony was worthy of belief.

[16] Implicit in the learned trial judge’s reasons for judgment is the total rejection of the Appellant’s testimony on the material facts in dispute.

[17] I would conclude that the learned trial judge’s use of the expression “If I disbelieve the accused’s evidence, has a reasonable doubt been raised on the evidence I do accept” must necessarily be interpreted to signify “the evidence of the accused which I accept”.

[18] In any event, read as a whole, the reasons for judgment neither shift the evidentiary burden to the Appellant nor dilute the standard of proof in a criminal case to a credibility contest.

[19] The R. v. W. (D) formulation, though helpful, was not intended to be a universal analytical framework within which to assess competing evidence. R.v. Lake 2005 NSCA 162, R.v. R .(J) 2014 QCCA 869, 2014 QCCA869. It sought to assist judges in avoiding the unfortunate expression used at the very conclusion of the trial judge’s recharge to the jury in R. v. W. (D). At the end of the day, the core issue to be determined by yourselves is whether you believe the complainant or whether you believe the accused.

[20] In reviewing the entirety of the learned trial judge’s reasons for judgment and her assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, I am unable to conclude that the findings of the Court at trial were either unavailable or made upon the application of an improper burden of proof.

[21] The Appellant has cited three authorities for the proposition that failure to properly consider the second branch of R. v. W. (D) constitutes a reviewable error in law;

R.v. Thompson [2001] O.J. No. 2194 (Ont.C.A.)

R.v. Cooper [2000] O.J. No. 1146 (C.A.)

R.v. J.J. [1997] O.J. No.273 (C.A.)

[22] Thompson and J.J., as brief endorsements, are of little jurisprudential value and difficult to assess in their application to the present case.

[23] In R.v. Cooper, the Court of Appeal observed specifically that the trial judge found the Appellant’s evidence, at times, “not unreasonable” and concluded that, in those specific circumstances, the need to conduct the second stage of the R.v. W.(D) analysis was particularly pressing. In the present case, the evidence of the Appellant was rejected in all material aspects and therefore devoid of residual evidentiary value which may attach to evidence which is substantially rejected. The appeal is therefore denied on the first ground of appeal.

[24] The second ground raised in the present appeal has to do with the Court’s intervention during the cross-examination of the complainant and a suggestion that at the time of the second incident, the Appellant stated to his son that he should not touch his sister inappropriately, tending to suggest that if indeed the complainant was subjected to unwanted touching, it was at the hands of her younger brother.

[25] The learned trial judge likened this form of evidence to a prior exculpatory statement and invoked the principles governing the admissibility of such statements. In doing so, the Appellant contents that the Court prejudiced him in his defence.

[26] In order to properly consider this portion of the trial, the entire exchange between counsel and the Court must be examined. The relevant portions of the trial transcript are as follows:

MR. SMITH: Yes.

Q. So I’m going to suggest to you that while you, Y.P. and your dad are on the floor with the sheets and the blankets, that you say at one point “Hey Y.P., don’t touch my boobs.”

A. No, I disagree.

Q.. Okay. So you’ll disagree with my next suggestion then that your dad would have said “Y.P., stop playing with your sister’s breasts.”

A. Yeah, I disagree.

THE COURT: Okay, can I speak to counsel inside, please?

MR. SMITH: Yes, absolutely.

THE COURT: We’ll be right back. Do you want to take a break? We’ll go to about 4:30, so would you like to take a 15-minute break now?

A. Sure.

THE COURT: Okay.

A. Thank you.

THE COURT: Go ahead. I just want to make sure that your client is going to be testifying?

MR. SMITH: Yes. It – I expect he will.

THE COURT: Well, it’s not a question of I expect he will be, either he is or you’re not putting these questions to her.

MR. SMITH: Right. I’m happy to say that he will be testifying.

THE COURT: Well, I don’t feel….

MR. SMITH: I’m also….

THE COURT: …really confident about that.

MR. SMITH: Well, I mean I – my position is that the client’s election takes place at the close of the Crown’s case, I’m happy to indicate that I expect he will be testifying at this juncture, but my – my understanding of how things work is that the client will get his election at the close of the Crown’s case.

THE COURT: No problem, but you cannot then be trying to put statements that he will be making if he chooses to testify in if you’re not sure he’s going to testify and that’s what I’m saying right now.

MR. SMITH: Right.

THE COURT: Either don’t ask those questions or make a clear answer that he’s going to be testifying.

MR. SMITH: Just- just a point that I’d like to bring to Your Honour’s attention and MR. P. touched upon this – and in fairness Your Honour has, at this point, no knowledge about what my client’s statement might be, but my client has allegedly made statements to persons in authority, he’s made a video statement that my friend intends to play and he’s also made an utterance to an officer that participated in the arresting process of my client, so my foundation, at least in part for this line of questioning, comes from utterances that he would have made to an arresting officer.

THE COURT: Well, what are these utterances? Because I want to know the extent of them before we go into…

MR. SMITH: Yes.

THE COURT: …a number of suggestions that I don’t know whether he’s going to testify or not testify to. And if he hasn’t testified – if he’s not going to testify to – to what you’re asking and it’s not part of the utterances that I’m going to hear, then there’s no basis to put them to the complainant and that’s what I’m asking.

MR. SMITH: I’ll get – I’ll get MR. P. to answer this, but I – I see it as a situation where if he was not to testify, MR. P. would put forward utterances and a statement by my client which would include the suggestions that I’ve – I’ve put to this witness, at least in terms of things that Y.P. and my client would have said according to my client.

THE COURT: Okay. And are those the video statement or whatever statement – is that going in for the truth of its contents, for its substantive purpose, or is it going in for purposes of cross-examination?

MR. P.: I haven’t fully decided yet, but I’m not afraid of this suggestion, I think it’s ridiculous and….

THE COURT: I know but that’s what I’m trying to…

MR. P.: Okay.

THE COURT:…look at this witness…

MR. P.: Yes.

THE COURT: …and I don’t want some useless or something…

MR. P.: No.

THE COURT: …that is not – should not be put to her put to her.

MR. P.: Well, I can tell you that my friend is correct, the man, on his arrest, at a time after his arrest, on the drive in to the police station, says in essence this that, “It’s my son Y.P. touching my daughter’s breasts.”

THE COURT: Okay. Are you putting those statements in?

MR. P.: I may well. I’m going to argue to you that it’s absolutely – ridiculous to think this girl got it confused as to whether her dad or her brother was touching her. I think it shows – I mean I might as well put my cards on the table because my argument is that he thereafter goes and leans on her, guilt trip of epic proportions….

THE COURT: Okay, I don’t need to know what the evidence is going to be. I need to know what the statements are and what use the Crown is making of them, and there’s no issue as to the voluntariness, there’s no issue…

MR. SMITH: No.

THE COURT: …as to their admissibility, they’re all going in.

MR. P.: Well, I’ll have to – I’ll have to talk to my friend about that, I mean….

THE COURT: I think you need to talk to each other and make some decisions before we continue with this line of questioning.

MR. P.: All right.

R E C E S S [15.:32 p.m.]

U P O N R E S U M I N G [15:48 p.m.]

MR. P.: Your Honour, the statements in question in possession of the Crown aren’t being led as part of the Crown’s case, they’re just agreed to be voluntary so as not to require a voir dire, and they’re being essentially held by the Crown for the possible cross-examination. My friend though essentially – we spoke earlier this morning, it was always understood in a case like this, that the accused would almost certainly want to testify about his version before the Court, so I expect that to happen and – the questions have been asked, they’ve been answered, I suggest we just continue with the witness and I think you can expect to hear from the accused and I think you’ll hear those utterances again in the form of cross-examination by the Crown.

THE COURT: Well, no, if – if he is going to testify, then the statements are proper – these statements are properly put, if he’s not going to testify, then they shouldn’t be asked.

MR. P.: Well, it’s just – all right, that’s Your Honour’s position and I accept it, but I think it’s – at this point it’s not necessary, in my respectful view, to get stuck on the point, because he has every intention to testify, so problem solved basically, and I suggest we continue on. But so you know….

THE COURT: But my problem – my issue with it is, that’s fine, he has every – that’s not the answer that I got from Mr. Smith, it was “I’m not sure, I’ll make that decision or he will make that decision or be put to his election after the Crown’s evidence is in.”

MR. P.: Okay.

THE COURT: I know that you’re anticipating Brown and Dunn maybe and that’s required, but if you don’t have a full intention that he is going to testify, then not every – I mean these are serious suggestions and allegations and I don’t want to put a witness through this without being sure that this is being done for a proper purpose, and if there’s any doubt that he’s going to testify, then they should not be being put to her.

MR. P.: Okay, but I – I – respectfully, Your Honour, my friend does have a good faith basis for these suggestions, they – they – these utterances are in the Crown brief as disclosed to him – it could have been possibly – I say possibly with emphasis because highly unlikely, but possible the witness could have responded in the affirmative, “Yes, that did happen. I did say “Eh, Y.P., don’t touch my boobs and yes, my father did say….

THE COURT: Well, that’s what I’m asking, are these – these are being put to her as – as statements that Mr. L.P. would have made to somebody.

MR. P.: Only in her presence, yes, made to her….

MR. SMITH: But also me….

THE COURT: I don’t think that that’s the way it’s being asked.

MR. P.: Well, the second one was made to her.

MR. SMITH: Beyond the context that is being offered by my friend, there is also a context where Mr. L.P. would have disclosed these things to an arresting officer as well, so – I think….

THE COURT: My whole point, and I don’t – I don’t know if I’m not saying it clearly or if counsel is not understanding it, is if Mr. L.P. has made these statements and they’re being put to her as his statements, which I understood the questions to be, correct?

MR. SMITH: Yes.

THE COURT: If he is not going to testify, they should not be being put, so whether they’re on a good faith basis, they’re still his statements that aren’t before the Court and won’t be before the Court unless he testifies.

MR. P.: And I am told that he will testify.

MR. SMITH: But just to sort of protect the record…

THE COURT: What I’m saying….

MR. SMITH: …and protect my client’s position, my client does not have to let the Court know that he will or will not be testifying before the Crown has closed their case. We can have of course certain expectations regarding these things, but – my client is properly put to his election once the Crown case is closed, at least that’s my understanding.

THE COURT: Then the statements aren’t going to be put to the complainant. The accused’s evidence is not going in to the complainant unless there is an assurance that he is testifying.

MR. P.: Can we continue on and revisit this if necessary? I just don’t want to waste the day, I was trying to get her done today, that’s all.

THE COURT: We can continue with this witness but the accused’s statements are not being put to her.

MR. P.: Okay. I think you’ve made that clear, Your Honour, and – thank you.

MR. SMITH: Thank you. Can everyone hear me?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SMITH: Okay, thank you.

(Transcript of trial proceedings, April 24, 2013 p. 64, line 13 to p. 71, line 13)

THE COURT: I want to address counsel before…

MR. SMITH: Oh, yes.

THE COURT:…Mr. L.P. takes the stand again. Just the other day during your examination – cross-examination of the complainant I intervened when certain statements – I believed there were statements of the accused – were being put into evidence through that witness and – and asked whether Mr. L.P. was going to testify or not. And you said at that time that likely Mr. L.P. was going to testify and this is Mr. Smith, but that the decision had not been made at that time, as he only had to make his election after the Crown’s case was in. And there may have been confusion as to what I was directing and – because we were also talking about what statements were being put in for what use and it was really only the voluntariness of the accused’s statement that was not in issue. The statement wasn’t in evidence. And I may have been a bit confused about that, that was clarified at that time, but - you may have been confused that I was not allowing you, Mr. Smith, to cross-examine the complainant on the accused’s statements – was there confusion about that, about putting a different version to her, in terms of Brown and Dunn? Because I was talking about statements and I’m just concerned that if there was confusion, how do we address it and one option that I thought at this point is having the complainant come back and you being able to cross-examine her on different versions if that’s – if there was confusion.

MR. SMITH: There were actually a couple of other statements that I had hoped to – or utterances I should say that I had hoped to put to this complainant, utterances where Mr. L.P. would have allegedly said certain things in her presence and given the ruling I didn’t put those, I think they’re – I’d have to check my notes, but I think there’s two additional ones that I had planned….

THE COURT: Wait, but I’m still not talking about – I mean I guess at this point he’s testifying – you know, that wasn’t the issue – you can’t put an accused’s statements in through another witness unless he’s going to testify, so my ruling about the statements at that point, given that you didn’t know whether he was going to testify or not, I think is fine. What I’m talking about is did you understand that to mean that you couldn’t put any other version, not including statements, to the complainant?

MR. SMITH: No, I – I fully understood that I could continue to put versions to this complainant that were inconsistent with her evidence.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SMITH: I took – I understood that I could continue to do that and – I believe I did do that during my cross-examination of her.

THE COURT: Okay. Does the Crown have any submissions on this? I mean I’m addressing the fairness issue here and – and the ground in Dunn, that’s what I’m trying to deal with and I feel that my decision the other day, if it was strictly about accused’s statements, when we didn’t know whether he was going to testify or not is on sound legal principle, but I wanted to make sure that you were clear that you were able, Mr. Smith, to cross-examine her on any other version that was inconsistent with her version, in terms of Brown and Dunn, and that you did that as – to your – best of your satisfied – or you’re satisfied you did that?

MR. SMITH: Yes, in terms of different versions, I’m satisfied.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. P.: I have nothing to add then given Mr. Smith’s…

THE COURT: Okay. Then we can just continue.

(Transcript of trial proceedings, April 25, 2013. P. 1 line 10 to p. 3 line 22)

[27] The learned trial judge was concerned about the admissibility of a prior exculpatory statement by the Appellant. The complicating factor in this case is that the exculpatory statement was made, according to the Appellant, at the time of the incident giving rise to the charge itself. The statement, if made, was therefore exculpatory in nature however inextricably bound to the narrative. Standing alone, and when not part of the narrative, exculpatory statements by a person charged are not admissible subject to the principles set out in R.v. Edgar 2010 ONCA 529, [2010] O.J. No. 3152 (Ont.C.A.). In Edgar, the Court recognized the admissibility of utterance by an accused person upon arrest as evidence of state of mind or reaction to being informed of the reasons for the arrest. At paragraphs 72 and 73, the Court stated:

72. I conclude, therefore, that it is open to a trial judge to admit an accused’s spontaneous out-of-court statements made upon arrest or when first confronted with an accusation as an exception to the general rule excluding prior consistent statements as evidence of the reaction of the accused to the accusation and as proof of consistency, provided the accused takes the stand and exposes himself or herself to cross-examination. As the English cases cited above hold, the statement of the accused is not strictly evidence of the truth of what was said (subject to being admissible under the principled approach to hearsay evidence) but is evidence of the reaction of the accused, which is relevant to the credibility of the accused and as circumstantial evidence that may have a bearing on guilt or innocence.

73. As a practical matter, once the accused has testified, he or she should be entitled to call in reply the police officer who heard and recorded the statement to verify to the jury the fact that it was made.

[28] In the present case, the Appellant sought to cross-examine the complainant on the subject of a purportedly exculpatory statement, with a view to possibly eliciting the evidence of a similar statement by the Appellant to the police upon his arrest. The statement purportedly made by the Appellant at the time of the events was admissible under the res gestae exception. See R.v. Graham 1972 172 (SCC), [1974] S.C.R. 206, R.v. Risby 1978 184 (SCC), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 139.

[29] The simple questioning of the complainant with regards to statements purportedly made by the Appellant at the very moment of the conduct complained of should not have therefore raised any concerns.

[30] I would nonetheless conclude that the Appellant was not prejudiced in his defence nor that a miscarriage of justice has occurred for the following reasons.

[31] Firstly, the questions were asked of the complainant whether her brother had touched her breasts and whether the Appellant intervened by telling the complainant’s brother not to do so. The complainant denied that either statement was made before the Court intervened.

[32] The Court was subsequently informed that the statement made by the Appellant to police upon his arrest, the admissibility of which was not in issue, contained a similar reference. Counsel for the Appellant, being unaware of the prosecution’s intentions in presenting the statement as part of the Crown’s case or not, was legitimately concerned with establishing an evidentiary record, though the complainant, of words spoken by the Appellant at the operative time.

[33] As the discussion between counsel and the Court also revolved around the statement made upon arrest, the learned trial judge was correct in requiring an undertaking, referred to as an assurance, that the Appellant would testify.

[34] Finally, if there was any confusion or doubt on the subject, the learned trial judge stipulated at the start of the second day of trial that if the Appellant chose to testify and relate statements made by him at the time of the events or after, the complainant could be recalled in order to be confronted with such purported statements. As it turned out, such was not necessary as the complainant was already on record as stating that she did not accuse her brother of touching her inappropriately at the operative moment, and that the Appellant did not, according to her, tell the complainant’s younger brother to cease doing so. The Appellant testified and did not give evidence of any further statements made at the time, either by the complainant or himself.

[35] I am therefore unable to conclude that this portion of the trial hindered the Appellant in his defense or that a miscarriage of justice occurred.

[36] In the result, both grounds of appeal having been rejected, the appeal is dismissed.

[37] The Appellant shall report to the Regional Detention Center within 72 hours of the release of the judgment herein in order to complete his sentence.

Pelletier, J.

Released: October 8, 2015

COURT FILE NO.: 11-SA5112

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent

– and –

L.P.
Appellant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Pelletier, J.

Released: October 8, 2015