Robert P. Armstrong

The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside an OSC order requiring disclosure of compelled material to respondents in a s. 127 proceeding.

The material, including audit files and testimony, had been compelled from Deloitte & Touche LLP during an investigation into Philip Services Corp. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the OSC's order, finding that the Commission's application of the Stinchcombe relevance standard and its balancing of the public interest against Deloitte's confidentiality expectations were reasonable.

The appellants appealed an order appointing the respondent as receiver of two corporations, alleging a conflict of interest due to the respondent's role as trustee in bankruptcy for related parties.

The Court of Appeal first determined it had jurisdiction, finding the appointment order was final rather than interlocutory.

The Court admitted fresh evidence—a statement of defence filed by the respondent in related litigation—which crystallized a pervasive conflict of interest.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order appointing the receiver, and referred the matter back to the Commercial List Court, also setting aside the provision granting priority to the receiver's fees.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual touching of his five-year-old stepdaughter.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately warn himself about the frailties of the child's evidence, erred in relying on confirmatory evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding an undisclosed interaction between the Crown and the complainant's mother outside the courtroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and credibility.

The application to admit fresh evidence was dismissed as it did not meet the Babinski test for admission based on non-disclosure.

The appellant's previous counsel was removed from the record shortly before trial, and the appellant was warned the trial would proceed peremptorily.

On the trial date, the appellant sought an adjournment to obtain new counsel and review disclosure, which the trial judge refused.

During the trial, the appellant applied for prohibition and a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to a fair trial was infringed.

The applications judge denied the application, and the appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that prerogative remedies should not be sought during a trial and the normal remedy is an appeal at the end of the trial.

The Court also denied the appellant's request to be represented by a non-lawyer agent.

The appellant appealed his conviction and six-month custodial sentence for an offence involving a young teenager.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the probative value against the unfair prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle given the breach of trust involved.

The Crown appealed an order awarding costs to the accused following a stay of proceedings.

The stay was granted because the Crown failed to disclose notes of an eyewitness interview until the second week of a manslaughter retrial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the failure to disclose was a marked and unacceptable departure from the reasonable standards expected of the prosecution, justifying the rare award of costs against the Crown.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal in a bankruptcy proceeding.

After receiving submissions from the parties, the court fixed costs in favour of the respondent trustee in bankruptcy at $10,000 and in favour of the respondent creditor at $2,000, both inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for criminal negligence causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The respondent, while under the influence of alcohol, struck and killed a pedestrian at high speed, then fled the scene and failed to seek assistance.

The Court of Appeal held that the conditional sentence was manifestly unfit as it failed to reflect the gravity of the offences and the principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

The appeal was allowed and a sentence of 20 months' imprisonment was imposed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of indecent assault against his two step-daughters for incidents occurring between 1975 and 1980.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in treating the complainants' evidence as mutually confirmatory, in assessing credibility, and in dismissing an application for third-party records from the Children's Aid Society.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence's probative value outweighed its prejudice and that the third-party records did not meet the test for likely relevance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's sleep apnea was adequately accommodated in custody.

The appellant appealed an order finding him in contempt of a Mareva injunction for depleting his self-directed RRSP and imposing various sanctions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding but found the sanctions, which effectively granted final judgment to the respondent on multiple claims, were disproportionate to the disobedience.

The Court set aside the disproportionate sanctions, including the striking of the appellant's defence, and substituted an order requiring the appellant to pay the value of the depleted RRSP into court as security.

The appellant appealed his youth court convictions for offences including forced sexual intercourse, forcible confinement, and assault with a weapon against his ex-girlfriend.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made several fatal errors in assessing the evidence, including improperly excluding the appellant's spouse's testimony as hearsay, admitting highly prejudicial hearsay evidence from a police officer, and applying a double standard in assessing the credibility of the complainant versus the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and kidnapping and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment.

At trial, the defence argued the complainant was a willing participant in an insurance fraud scheme, relying on the appellant's statement to police.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, motive, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 5-year sentence was not manifestly unreasonable despite the appellant being a first offender.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for a sophisticated fraud committed while on probation for another crime of dishonesty.

The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding it was not demonstrably unfit given the aggravating circumstances, including the appellant's prior record and lack of remorse.

Laskin J.A. dissented, finding the sentence unfit based on recent sentencing decisions.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the appeal judge exhibited bias during the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found that while the appeal judge's remarks were rude and intemperate, they did not reach the level of actual or apparent bias.

The Court further held that there was no basis to interfere with the trial decision, as the Justice of the Peace was entitled to accept the police officer's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order settling a prior order that approved the sale of a bankrupt company's assets, including a trademark licence agreement and shares, to Stanfield's Limited, as well as a vesting order.

The appellants argued the sale should not have been approved prior to determining entitlement to the interest in the licence agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge had jurisdiction under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to order the sale prior to determining entitlement, especially given evidence that the value of the licence agreement was deteriorating.

The dismissal of the appellants' cross-motion for an adjournment was also upheld.

The respondents originally brought an oppression application, and the appellants brought a cross-application.

The motion judge struck the cross-application on the basis that it sought relief that was or could have been sought in an earlier action commenced by the appellants, which had been dismissed on consent.

On appeal, the appellants sought to resurrect claims for an accounting and compensation for oppression.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claims were barred by res judicata.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application to vary support.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in rejecting the appellant's medical evidence, which indicated he was unable to work full-time.

Given the conflicting evidence regarding the appellant's ability to work, the motion judge should have ordered the trial of an issue.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and the trial of an issue ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision granting the respondent condominium corporation relief to enforce a parking by-law and rules.

The appellant argued the by-law was invalidly passed, unreasonable, and selectively enforced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding evidence supported the by-law's validity, reasonableness, and consistent enforcement.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the quantum of parking fines, reducing the arbitrary $6,000 award to the proven amount of $2,440.