Peter K. Doody

The accused was charged with assaulting the complainant by banging his head against a wall twice and tearing his lip, requiring eight stitches.

The complainant and accused were in a polygamous marriage under Sharia law.

The accused denied the assault, claiming the injury was self-inflicted or caused by someone else.

The court found the accused's evidence credible and corroborated by her daughter's testimony.

The complainant's evidence was found to be internally inconsistent, inconsistent with his prior affidavit, and motivated by financial and community concerns.

The court concluded the complainant intentionally injured himself after leaving the home and fabricated the assault allegation to gain leverage in family law proceedings and minimize his financial obligations.

This was a preliminary inquiry into 30 counts of criminal offences involving drug trafficking and firearm possession.

The Crown alleged that the two accused were engaged in a joint enterprise to traffic in street drugs over a two-month surveillance period.

The court examined whether there was sufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking, firearm offences, breach of recognizance, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The key issues were whether the evidence supported reasonable inferences of possession and control over drugs and cash found at various locations, and whether the accused had knowledge of and control over a handgun found at one accused's residence.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The total delay from the swearing of the first information to the end of trial was 21 months and 12 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan by 3 months and 12 days.

The court found that defence delay totalled 4 months and 13 days, resulting in a net delay of 16 months and 30 days, which fell within the presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was found sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle at 3:11 a.m.

The Crown relied on the statutory presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant testified that he had driven to a bar with the plan to take an Uber home if he drank, that he had lost his car key while attempting to retrieve his personal belongings from the vehicle, and that he had no intention to drive.

The court found that the defendant had rebutted the presumption and that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a realistic risk of danger.

The offender was convicted after trial of robbery of a gas bar.

He entered the store, approached the cashier with his hand in his pocket as if he had a gun, and demanded money.

He obtained over $100 and left.

There was no actual weapon, no violence, and no physical injury to the victim, though the victim was anxious.

The offender is 44 years old, employed as a journeyman refrigeration and air conditioning mechanic, and has a dated criminal record from 2007-2008.

He has a significant alcohol addiction that motivated the offence, which occurred during a three-day drinking bender.

He has a 13-year-old son whom he supports and sees on weekends.

The Crown sought one year incarceration followed by probation; the defence sought 90 days served on weekends followed by probation.

A young person was charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon (knife), possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and breach of an undertaking not to possess a weapon, following an altercation on Rideau Street in Ottawa.

The Crown relied on direct evidence from a security guard that the defendant stabbed the victim twice.

The defence argued self-defence and contended the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally stabbed the victim.

The court found the direct evidence unreliable due to poor lighting, obstructed views, and significant inconsistencies among the three security guards' accounts.

While circumstantial evidence established the defendant held the knife when it came into contact with the victim, the court could not conclude the stabbing was voluntary or intentional.

The court found an air of reality to the self-defence claim, as the defendant was being attacked by multiple persons, including being struck with a construction pylon.

All charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with nine offences arising from a tumultuous marital relationship: uttering threats to cause death, three counts of assault, wilful damage to property, criminal harassment, and three counts of voyeurism.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the credibility of the complainant and her children.

The defendant denied all allegations and asserted the complainant fabricated evidence to destroy him.

The court found the complainant generally credible despite her delayed reporting and attempts at reconciliation.

The defendant was found guilty of assault on three dates, two counts of voyeurism, but acquitted on the threat charge, property damage charge, and criminal harassment charge.

The voyeurism convictions were upheld despite the defendant's public good defence, as the court found no objective evidence that the surreptitious recordings served any public purpose.

The defendant pleaded guilty to multiple offences including assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, simple assault, and possession of a prohibited firearm with ammunition.

All assaults were committed against his former common-law partner over a six-month period.

The defendant had an extensive criminal record spanning over twenty years, including prior convictions for violence, weapons offences, and breaches of court orders.

The court imposed a total custodial sentence of six years and thirty-four days, rejecting the defendant's submissions regarding rehabilitation prospects and emphasizing the primacy of denunciation, deterrence, and public protection.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was stopped on Highway 417 in Ottawa after driving at high speed without headlights.

He failed an approved screening device test and was arrested.

The defendant challenged whether the Intoxilyzer breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued that delays at the roadside scene and during a stop on Metcalfe Street to provide rights to counsel and formal breath demand violated the statutory requirement.

The court found that the officer acted reasonably promptly throughout and that the Intoxilyzer tests were administered within a reasonably prompt time in the overall circumstances.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer tests taken more than two hours after the defendant was stopped, requiring expert toxicology evidence to establish the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The Crown's expert opined the defendant's BAC was 95 to 140 mg/100ml at the time of driving, based on an assumption of no "bolus drinking." The defendant challenged the admissibility of his weight statement on Charter grounds and argued the Crown failed to prove the absence of bolus drinking.

The court rejected the Charter challenges, admitted the defendant's weight statement, and found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not consume two standard drinks within 20 minutes before driving.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from driving contrary to section 259(4) of the Criminal Code.

A police officer observed a vehicle with a disqualified owner enter a dealership parking lot and detained the defendant standing beside the vehicle.

Without informing the defendant of the reason for detention or his right to counsel, the officer obtained admissions that the defendant had no driver's licence and had been driving that day.

The court found that the detention was lawful based on reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence, but the officer breached sections 9 and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by failing to advise the defendant of the reason for detention and his right to counsel before questioning.

The court excluded the defendant's statements under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on the defendant's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

With the Crown's essential evidence excluded, the charge was dismissed.

The offender was convicted after trial of possessing a weapon (knife) for the purpose of committing a criminal offence and knowingly uttering a threat to cause bodily harm.

He subsequently pled guilty to failing to appear in court and breaching a recognizance condition.

The central sentencing issue was whether to impose a conditional discharge or a suspended sentence, given the offender's status as a permanent resident and the potential immigration consequences of a conviction.

The court considered the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Pham regarding the relevance of collateral immigration consequences to sentencing decisions and concluded that while such consequences may be considered, they cannot dominate the sentencing process or result in inappropriate sentences.

The court imposed suspended sentences with probation rather than a discharge, finding that the serious nature of the offences and the offender's disregard for the justice system precluded a discharge despite significant personal mitigating circumstances.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault of the complainant on June 10, 2016.

The complainant testified that the defendant invited her to his apartment under the pretext of retrieving a mug, and while there, hugged, kissed, and rubbed her body without consent.

The defendant denied ever being alone with the complainant.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and internally consistent, corroborated by her friend's testimony and video evidence from building security cameras.

The court rejected the defendant's mistaken belief in consent defence, finding no air of reality to the defence and concluding that the defendant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The defendant was found guilty of sexual assault.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was found sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with the engine off and keys in the cupholder.

The Crown relied on a statutory presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant rebutted the presumption by establishing on a balance of probabilities that he did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The court found that even if the presumption applied, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant created a realistic risk of danger.

The charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with possessing child pornography found on three devices: a desktop computer, an iPad, and a laptop computer, all seized on March 11, 2015.

A total of 1,288 images and 196 videos constituting child pornography were located across the devices.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence and the assertion that the defendant was the only person with access to the devices.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the child pornography, as multiple other individuals had access to the devices and the investigating officer failed to investigate alternative suspects.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault on March 8, 2014.

The complainant testified that the defendant sexually assaulted her in four separate locations: in an elevator, on a bus, on stairs, and in a parking lot.

The defendant testified that he was extremely intoxicated and had no memory of the events after 3:00 a.m.

The court found that while the complainant presented as credible, there were significant inconsistencies between her evidence and that of other witnesses, as well as inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her prior statements to police.

The court concluded that these inconsistencies left a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt and acquitted him.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaching a long-term supervision order by consuming cocaine on June 2, 2016.

The Crown sought a 12-month sentence, while defence counsel sought six months with immediate release given time served.

The court imposed a sentence of seven months incarceration with a 1.3:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in one day's custody remaining.

The decision emphasizes the principles established in R. v. Ipeelee regarding sentencing for breaches of long-term supervision orders, with particular attention to Gladue factors and the offender's Aboriginal background.

The court found that while the breach was serious given the offender's history of violence linked to cocaine use, the context of the relapse, his significant rehabilitation progress over eight years, strong community support, and diminished moral culpability warranted a substantially lower sentence than the Crown sought.

The defendant was charged with driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood and impaired driving.

The Crown conceded that the impaired driving charge could not be supported and it was dismissed.

The court considered three issues: whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device (ASD) sample; whether the ASD demand was made "forthwith"; and whether the Intoxilyzer samples were taken "as soon as reasonably practicable." The court found that while reasonable suspicion existed based on the odour of alcohol on the defendant's breath, the ASD demand was not made forthwith—there was at least a nine-minute delay between formation of suspicion and the demand.

Additionally, the Intoxilyzer tests were not taken as soon as practicable, as the officer believed he had three hours to conduct the tests rather than understanding the requirement for prompt administration.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and acquitted the defendant on the remaining charge.

The accused was charged with sexual assault of a 19-year-old Algonquin College student on January 16, 2016.

The complainant was walking on campus with a crutch when the accused, a 21-year-old University of Ottawa student, approached her and touched her buttock without consent.

The central issue was whether the accused held an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and found that there was an air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief in consent.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the complainant was not consenting, and that the accused had taken reasonable steps to ascertain consent by asking permission before touching.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference following an alleged incident on May 2-3, 2015, when the complainant, a 15-year-old girl, was sleeping at a friend's house.

The complainant testified that she awoke to find the defendant with his fingers inserted under her shorts and underwear, touching her crotch.

The defendant denied entering the room or having any contact with the complainant.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, noting multiple corroborations and inconsistencies in the defendant's testimony.

The defendant was convicted of both sexual assault and sexual interference.

The court also addressed the legal issue of whether the Crown must prove the defendant's knowledge of the complainant's age for the sexual interference charge, concluding that the Crown bears no such burden unless the defendant introduces evidence of his belief regarding the complainant's age.