Paul S. Rouleau

The appellant appealed his convictions for three robbery-related offences, arguing the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons.

The trial judge made only passing reference to the appellant's testimony and did not explain why it was rejected or failed to raise a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found this omission constituted an error of law, as the reasons did not meet the appellant's entitlement to know why he was convicted and precluded meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for counselling to commit aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge's reasons were insufficient regarding his intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge implicitly but clearly rejected the appellant's evidence and properly applied the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The reasons were deemed sufficient under the Sheppard standard.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give credit for 21 days of pre-trial custody served in 2002.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in failing to give credit for the 21 days, but found that given the gravity of the offences and the appellant's record, the sentence imposed was fit even if credit had been given.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a fourteen-year effective sentence imposed for possession of child pornography and multiple sexual assaults against children and a teenage victim, arguing the sentence was demonstrably unfit and should be increased to eighteen years.

The Court of Appeal held that appellate intervention on sentence is available only where the sentence reflects a substantial and marked departure from sentences customarily imposed for similar offenders committing similar crimes.

The court found no error in principle, accepted that the sentencing judge properly weighed the gravity of the offences, the offender's position of trust, the profound impact on the victims, mitigation, and totality, and declined to vary the sentence.

The court also refused to intervene regarding an alleged four-month error in calculating pre-trial custody.

The appellant was convicted of discharging a firearm with intent.

At trial, the appellant's girlfriend recanted her videotaped police statement implicating him, and then absconded before cross-examination before the jury.

The trial judge admitted the videotaped statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding necessity and threshold reliability.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission, finding the trial judge correctly applied the legal criteria and that the transcript of the voir dire cross-examination adequately compensated for the inability to cross-examine before the jury.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, aged 75 and in very poor health, was convicted of indecent assault and sexual assault and sentenced to 14 months' incarceration.

After serving 2.5 months, he was granted bail pending appeal.

On appeal, fresh evidence showed his health had further declined, requiring 24-hour nursing care, and that provincial facilities were inadequate for his needs.

With the Crown's consent, the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and varied the remainder of his sentence to a 12-month conditional sentence with strict conditions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and related offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in relying on palm print evidence found on the victims' car and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to conclude the circumstantial palm print evidence was consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.

The Court also held that the trial judge properly analyzed and rejected the defence's speculative explanations without shifting the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed an order quashing a costs order made by a justice of the peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reviewing judge that the justice of the peace erred by making the costs determination without providing the Crown an opportunity to respond.

The matter was remitted to a different justice of the peace.

The appellant defaulted on a mortgage and challenged the inclusion of a three-month interest pre-payment penalty in the redemption amount.

He also moved to set aside a registrar's order striking his appeal, arguing the registrar was not bilingual as required for a bilingual proceeding under s. 126 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the pre-payment penalty due to an incomplete record.

While the Court agreed the registrar's hearing breached the appellant's substantive right to a bilingual proceeding, it declined to set aside the order because the underlying appeal was moot, as the mortgage had already been redeemed.

The appellant defaulted on a mortgage, leading the respondents to issue a notice of sale.

The appellant challenged the redemption amount, specifically a three-month interest prepayment penalty, and appealed the motion judge's order.

The appellant also sought to set aside a registrar's order dismissing a related appeal, arguing the registrar was not bilingual as required by the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the prepayment penalty, found the bilingual rights issue moot because the mortgage had already been redeemed, and declined to determine the final redemption amount, leaving it to the master.

The moving party, a self-represented mortgagor, sought leave to appeal an order quashing his appeal to the Divisional Court regarding the amount required to redeem a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal agreed the appeal to the Divisional Court was properly quashed because the original order was final, meaning the appeal lay to the Court of Appeal as of right.

Recognizing the moving party's consistent intention to appeal the substance of the original order, the Court treated the motion as one for an extension of time to appeal and granted it.

The Court directed written submissions on the merits of the appeal concerning a disputed prepayment fee.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Divisional Court that quashed his appeal of an order fixing mortgage arrears.

The Court of Appeal agreed the Divisional Court appeal was properly quashed because the original order was final, not interlocutory.

However, recognizing the applicant's consistent intention to appeal the merits of the original order, the Court treated the motion as one for an extension of time to appeal the original order and granted the extension.

The Court directed written submissions on the specific issue of a prepayment penalty.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Deputy Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission refusing a temporary extension of its liquor licence for the Taste of the Danforth event.

The Deputy Registrar had previously recommended revoking the applicant's licence due to alleged infractions and relied on this to deny the extension.

The court found the Deputy Registrar confused her prosecutorial role with her discretionary role under s. 97 of Regulation 719.

The decision was quashed and remitted for a new decision.