Paul S. Rouleau

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision and the associated award of substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the motion judge's findings of fact.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and substituted an award of partial indemnity costs, as the parties had not made submissions on costs and there was no basis for substantial indemnity costs.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The appellant, the Office of the Independent Police Review Director, appealed a Divisional Court order requiring it to produce a comprehensive record of proceedings under the Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA) after screening out the respondent's police complaints.

The Court of Appeal held that the Director's decision to screen out a complaint under the Police Services Act is the exercise of a statutory power of decision, as it decides a complainant's legal right to have their complaint pursued.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Divisional Court's order regarding the contents of the record was overly broad, and substituted a narrower requirement for the record of proceedings.

The proposed intervenors brought a motion for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning a family business dispute.

The respondents opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to enforce an alleged settlement of the intervention motion under Rule 49.09.

The Court of Appeal held that the pre-litigation exchange of letters did not constitute a valid Rule 49 offer because there was no pending motion at the time.

The court granted the motion to intervene, finding that the proposed intervenors' interests could be adversely affected by the appeal, and dismissed the cross-motion to enforce the settlement.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals for second degree murder and attempted murder.

The trial judge had ruled that the Crown could not call alibi evidence in reply to the defence's alternate suspect theory, forcing the Crown to call the evidence in-chief and prejudicing its case.

The trial judge also excluded the Crown's expert evidence regarding the type of instrument used to inflict the fatal wound, erroneously concluding it would not assist the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in both rulings, which had a material bearing on the acquittals, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of causing a disturbance after yelling obscenities at police officers who were arresting his girlfriend and father on his rural property.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge found that his conduct contributed to raising tension at the scene.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the lower courts erred in law by failing to apply the governing principle that a disturbance requires an overtly manifested interference with the ordinary and customary use of a public place.

Emotional upset or raising tension is insufficient.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction set aside.

The appellant sued a police officer, alleging he suffered damages due to the officer's false testimony in a criminal trial where the appellant was ultimately acquitted.

The motion judge dismissed the claim under Rule 21.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's analysis and noting there was no basis to conclude the appellant suffered damages from testimony on a collateral issue.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for malicious prosecution against the respondents.

The trial judge had found that the appellant failed to establish the elements of malicious prosecution, specifically that the respondents, rather than the Crown, made the decision to prosecute.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the law or apprehension of the evidence, noting that her credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for injuries sustained in a slip and fall on an icy, sloped municipal boulevard connecting to a private driveway.

She argued the municipality owed a higher standard of maintenance because pedestrians occasionally cross there, and that the adjacent property owner was an occupier of the boulevard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the municipality's maintenance standard was for vehicles, not pedestrians, and the adjacent owner did not exercise control over the boulevard to qualify as an occupier.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action regarding the stigma of a haunted property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate given the lack of direct evidence of economic loss or strange occurrences at the property.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order in a CCAA proceeding regarding a priority claim for reimbursement of fees and the imposition of a constructive trust.

The Court of Appeal applied the four-part test for leave to appeal in the CCAA context and denied leave.

The court found that the proposed appeal lacked sufficient merit and involved well-settled matters of law that were not of significance to the practice.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment on a mortgage and a promissory note.

The Court of Appeal upheld the mortgage enforcement but referred a $5,000 default fee to a Master.

The court set aside the default judgment on the promissory note, directing that it be pursued in Small Claims Court.

The appellant was granted a one-month stay of enforcement to allow for refinancing.

Following an appeal and cross-appeal, the court determined the quantum of trial costs payable to the cross-appellant, a lawyer who represented himself at trial.

The cross-appellant sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $49,600, while the respondent suggested $1,000.

Applying the principle that self-represented lawyers are entitled to costs for work ordinarily done by retained counsel that results in an opportunity cost, the court fixed the cross-appellant's trial costs at $15,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant appealed a discretionary order of the motion judge who denied an adjournment after allowing counsel to be removed from the record and granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the claim was clearly statute-barred and there was no basis to interfere with the motion judge's finding.

The appellants appealed an interim order that allowed condominium owners with outstanding parking assessments to vote at an upcoming Annual General Meeting.

The motion judge made the order to facilitate the meeting after finding the appellants in breach of a previous production order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the interim order suspended the determination of the underlying liability issue and fell within the motion judge's broad discretion under section 134(3)(c) of the Condominium Act.

The self-represented appellant brought multiple appeals and applications before the Court of Appeal, including an application to appoint counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code, an application to review the dismissal of an extension of time to appeal, an appeal of a procedural order restricting his filings, appeals from multiple convictions based on guilty pleas, and an appeal from the dismissal of a stay of proceedings.

The Court dismissed the application for counsel, noting the appellant had previously discharged appointed counsel.

The Court dismissed all other appeals and applications, finding no error in the lower courts' decisions and concluding that the appellant's guilty pleas were voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for an annulment.

The parties agreed the marriage was never consummated, but the application judge required independent evidence of incurability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a reasonable inference of the respondent's psychological inability to consummate the marriage was sufficient to grant the annulment.

The appellants appealed an order permanently staying their Counter Application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's determination that the Counter Application had no reasonable prospect of success and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her solicitor's negligence claim and the award of full indemnity costs against her.

The claim arose from advice regarding a separation agreement and the treatment of a severance payment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the solicitor did not breach the standard of care and that the appellant suffered no damages.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred in awarding full indemnity costs based on the appellant's conduct at trial.

The trial costs award was reduced from $160,706.99 to $60,000 on a partial indemnity scale, emphasizing the principle of proportionality.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in handling contradictions between the complainant and her mother regarding disclosure, and failed to reconcile other inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the contradictions and inconsistencies in the context of historical allegations and a reluctant complainant, and noted there was independent corroborating evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the circumstances of the appellant's confinement justified a 1.5 to 1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to time served.