Paul S. Rouleau

The appellant, a third party claiming an interest in forfeited property, appealed a forfeiture order made under section 16 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that section 16(3) expressly limits the right of appeal to the person convicted or the Attorney General, and grants no right of appeal to third parties.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claims against Royal Trust for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence regarding an option agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the option agreement was unambiguous and had become null and void after the sale of the business.

The Court also agreed that Royal Trust acted prudently in selling the estate assets and that summary judgment was appropriate under the Hryniak framework.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and kidnapping and was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by treating his alleged involvement in planning the offences as an aggravating factor, despite it not being proven by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the appellant was outside the store when the offences were initiated.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to six years concurrent, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision, arguing that the court below erred in its assessment of credibility and the risk of witness tainting.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the appeal did not raise a question of law requiring clarification and that the arguments were not sufficiently strong to warrant a second appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable based on differences in transaction methodology, lack of exclusive opportunity, and logistical improbability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of different methodologies, noting the appellant was caught on video misappropriating funds and had the victim's PIN, and concluding the logistics pointed to the appellant rather than anyone else.

The appellant appealed the decision of the motion judge granting summary judgment and awarding costs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed an order for possession.

On consent, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the condition that the order for possession not be enforced until July 1, 2014.

The respondents were awarded costs of $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their fraud action based on a release, while the respondents' counterclaim on two promissory notes was sent to trial after a mini-trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to assess the advisability of a staged summary judgment process in the context of the litigation as a whole.

Because the release and the promissory notes were part of the same series of transactions, and credibility was a central issue, both the claim and counterclaim were required to proceed to trial to avoid inconsistent findings and substantive injustice.

The appellants were arrested in an undercover drug trafficking operation and experienced a delay of nearly two and a half years before trial.

They applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, which was dismissed by the application judge.

On appeal, the appellants argued the judge erred in allocating periods of delay and failing to penalize the Crown for tactical decisions.

The Court of Appeal adjusted the delay calculations but found the total delay still fell within the Morin guidelines.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a fatal barroom altercation.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding self-defence under sections 34(2) and 35 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to assess the lawfulness of the victim's assault from the accused's perspective rather than the victim's, and by failing to leave section 35 with the jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed from convictions entered by a judge sitting without a jury.

The appellant tendered fresh evidence by way of an agreed statement of fact.

The Crown consented to the admission of the fresh evidence, the setting aside of the convictions, and the ordering of a new trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed and ordered a new trial pursuant to s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment setting aside a transfer agreement on grounds of undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and unconscionability.

The appellants argued the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction under a bifurcation order and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's order was within the scope of the bifurcation order and his factual findings were well-supported by the evidence.

The parties settled their matrimonial litigation in 2008 with a consent order providing for $3,000 monthly spousal support with no termination date.

In 2010, the respondent sought to terminate support and obtain child support, citing a decrease in his income and the appellant's unexplained accumulation of wealth.

The trial judge found a material change in circumstances, terminated spousal support, and ordered the appellant to pay child support.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding of a material change but found the trial judge erred by failing to consider the circumstances at the time of the original consent order, effectively rescinding rather than varying it.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a high yield investment scam.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert profiling evidence, giving confusing jury instructions on conspiracy, and admitting preliminary inquiry evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the expert evidence was properly admitted and the preliminary inquiry evidence met the statutory requirements.

However, the trial judge erred in his conspiracy instructions by presenting it as an 'all or nothing' proposition and failing to properly explain the Carter stages.

The conspiracy convictions were set aside.

The court also reduced one appellant's restitution order by two-thirds to reflect the shared responsibility of all three co-accused.

The Republic of France sought the appellant's extradition for his alleged role in a 1980 terrorist bombing in Paris.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for surrender based primarily on a French handwriting analysis linking him to the bombing, finding the report was not manifestly unreliable despite methodological criticisms.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the appellant's surrender, rejecting arguments that France had not yet decided to put him on trial and that the case relied on intelligence reports potentially derived from torture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal from the committal order and his application for judicial review of the surrender order, upholding the extradition judge's application of the test for committal and finding the Minister's surrender decision reasonable.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents in the amount of $10,000.

The appellants appealed an order regarding the assessment of solicitor accounts under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the authorization and direction signed by the appellants precluded them from disputing the respondent's right to assess all the accounts in issue.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $2,500.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision and the associated award of substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the motion judge's findings of fact.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and substituted an award of partial indemnity costs, as the parties had not made submissions on costs and there was no basis for substantial indemnity costs.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The appellants appealed the application judge's interpretation of a clause in Schedule A of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the clause was not ambiguous and upheld the application judge's interpretation based on the wording and commercial reality of the transaction.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.