Patricia C. Hennessy

The accused, an OPP officer, was charged with attempted murder, arson, and administering a noxious substance after a fire broke out in her daughter-in-law's bedroom.

The Crown alleged the accused drugged the victim's drink with diphenhydramine during a visit to discuss a bitter custody dispute, then set fire to the bedroom closet once the victim was asleep.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and expert evidence regarding the fire's origin and the toxicology results.

The accused was found guilty of arson and administering a noxious substance, but acquitted of attempted murder as the specific intent to kill was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Superintendent of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario refusing to stay discipline proceedings against him for delay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that judicial review of interim administrative decisions is generally refused absent exceptional circumstances.

The court found no reasonable apprehension of bias or denial of procedural fairness that would justify intervening before the hearing on the merits.

The accused brought a motion to exclude evidence discovered during a warrantless search of his apartment after police detained him under s. 17 of the Mental Health Act following an emailed threat.

While the court held the detention lawful, it found that police had no authority to conduct a warrantless search of the residence once the accused had refused consent and no exigent circumstances existed.

Officers had time to obtain a telewarrant and possessed no information suggesting imminent danger.

Applying the s. 24(2) Charter framework from Grant, the court concluded the breach of the accused’s privacy interest in his dwelling was serious and had a significant impact on his Charter rights.

The marijuana grow-operation evidence was excluded.

The appellant law firm appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for unpaid forensic accounting services rendered by the respondent consulting firm.

The services were requested by a partner of the law firm who subsequently died.

The appellant argued that under s. 13 of the Evidence Act, the respondent's evidence regarding the retainer required corroboration because the partner was deceased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory protection of s. 13 applies only to heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators, or assigns, and cannot be extended to a law firm partnership.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their application for security for costs and awarding substantial indemnity costs against them.

The defendants argued the corporate plaintiff failed to prove impecuniosity because it did not provide evidence that its creditors refused to fund the litigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding there is no absolute requirement in every case for a plaintiff to show creditors declined to fund the litigation to establish impecuniosity.

The court also upheld the motion judge's findings on the merits of the claim and the costs award.

The defendants brought a motion to quash the applicant's application for judicial review.

The applicant sought review of 61 decisions made by various police oversight bodies regarding his complaints, but failed to provide specific grounds for any particular decision.

The applicant conceded he actually sought a general audit and review of policing in his community under section 25 of the Police Services Act.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding the application too broad, lacking specific grounds, and seeking relief for a non-justiciable issue, while granting the applicant liberty to bring a new, properly specified application.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography.

He had a lengthy criminal record including sexual assaults on children and a prior conviction for possession of child pornography.

The Crown sought a Long Term Offender declaration.

The court accepted a joint submission for a two-year penitentiary sentence to allow the offender to participate in an intensive sex offender treatment program.

The court also declared the offender a Long Term Offender and imposed an eight-year long-term supervision order with stringent conditions, including psychiatric treatment and restrictions on internet access.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her child a Crown ward.

The motion judge had found no genuine issue for trial regarding whether it was in the child's best interests to return to the mother's care, given the mother's health issues and inability to provide a stable environment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence of the Society's efforts to assist the family and no adequate plan from the mother to care for the child.

Fresh evidence filed on appeal did not raise a triable issue.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing its application to evict the tenants.

The landlord had applied for eviction under s. 51(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 to conduct extensive renovations.

The Board dismissed the application on the basis that the landlord failed to establish it required the unit for demolition.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by failing to address the application based on renovations.

The Court substituted its own decision, granting the eviction order on consent terms, including three months' rent compensation.

The appellant franchisees appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class proceeding against the respondent franchisor and distributors.

The appellants alleged price maintenance under the Competition Act, civil conspiracy, and breach of contract regarding mark-ups and sourcing fees for supplies.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in principle by focusing exclusively on the individualized nature of damages and failing to recognize that the breach of the Competition Act, breach of contract, and the fact of loss were common issues.

The Court conditionally certified the class action, concluding it was the preferable procedure to achieve judicial economy, access to justice, and behaviour modification.

The appellants appealed a trial decision dismissing their claim for damages arising from the negligent design of their home's HVAC system.

The trial judge found the defendants negligent but dismissed the claim because damages and causation were not proven.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction under s. 19(1.1) of the Courts of Justice Act because the claim dismissed was for more than $25,000, and a dismissal for unproven damages is not equivalent to an 'award' of zero under s. 19(1.1)(d).

In the alternative, the court held it would have dismissed the appeal on the merits as the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board that reduced his compensation award from $8,000 to $5,000 due to his failure to report the assault to the police.

The appellant argued the Board erred in law by failing to consider evidence that a possible concussion inhibited him from reporting the incident.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law and noting the Board had ample evidence from medical records to conclude the appellant was not suffering from a concussion that would have affected his ability to assist the police.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to close the Collège des Grands Lacs, a francophone college.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application primarily due to the applicants' undue delay of 29 months in perfecting the application, which caused significant prejudice.

In the alternative, the court found that the Minister did not breach the unwritten constitutional principle of protection of minorities, as the college was failing and alternative francophone education was arranged.

The court also held that the Minister had the statutory authority to close the college and the decision was not patently unreasonable.

The respondent was sexually assaulted by an ultrasound technician at a private clinic.

The technician performed unauthorized tests and surreptitiously videotaped her.

At trial, a jury found the clinic negligent and vicariously liable, awarding substantial damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the finding of negligence against the clinic, concluding it was plainly unreasonable.

However, the Court upheld the finding of vicarious liability, determining that the clinic's enterprise materially increased the risk of the assault.

The Court also significantly reduced the general and aggravated damages from $175,000 to $25,000, finding the jury's award excessive.

The respondents brought a medical malpractice action against several doctors, alleging a failure to diagnose the deceased's ovarian cancer.

The trial judge found the appellant gynaecologists liable for failing to detect the cancer when they treated her for pelvic inflammatory disease.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by ignoring evidence that the deceased did not return to see one of the appellants, establishing a break in the chain of causation, and dismissed the claim against her.

For the other appellant, the Court found the trial judge made contradictory findings regarding the visual appearance of the ovaries during a laparoscopy and failed to properly assess expert evidence on cancer survival rates.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment set aside, and a new trial ordered for the remaining appellant.

Supplementary reasons regarding a sealing order and costs following an appeal.

The court varied the broad sealing orders made by the Master and a single judge, restricting the sealing order to only the inadvertently disclosed privileged document, as there was no demonstrable prejudice to justify sealing the entire court file.

The court also fixed the successful plaintiff's costs of the motion for leave to appeal and the appeal at $25,000 on a partial indemnity basis, declining to award substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board which held that the appellant was estopped from relitigating the June 30, 1996 current value of its property for the 2000 taxation year.

The appellant had previously challenged the same value for the 1998 and 1999 taxation years, and the Board had confirmed the assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the doctrine of issue estoppel to administrative proceedings, as the same issue had been previously decided between the same parties in a final decision.

The applicant, a medical director, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board requiring him to attend before the Complaints Committee to be cautioned about using unqualified practitioners for Independent Medical Examinations.

The applicant argued a lack of procedural fairness and that the decision was patently unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the procedural fairness issues were not raised before the Board and that the Board had an evidentiary basis for its conclusions.

The defendant appealed a decision of a Superior Court judge that overturned a Master's order removing the plaintiff's solicitors of record.

The plaintiff's solicitors had inadvertently received a privileged opinion letter from the defendant's counsel.

Applying the test from Celanese Canada Inc., the Divisional Court found no real risk of material prejudice to the defendant, as the document could not be used at trial and the solicitor had not read the details.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision upholding the termination of a grievor for innocent absenteeism.

The Divisional Court applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determining that the standard of review for whether the grievor suffered from a disability was reasonableness.

The court found the arbitrator reasonably concluded the grievor was not disabled, given the lack of medical evidence regarding his absences.

The court also upheld the arbitrator's finding of just cause for dismissal based on the grievor's attendance record.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.