Patricia C. Hennessy

Following a judge-alone trial, the court convicted the accused on all remaining counts arising from a prolonged pattern of online grooming and sexual exploitation of vulnerable adolescent boys in a small northern community.

The court admitted similar fact evidence on both identity and actus reus, applying the frameworks in Handy and Perrier, and found overwhelming similarities among the fake-profile communications, the sexualized dares, the rewards of money, alcohol, and drugs, and the complainants’ shared vulnerability.

The defence theory that the accused was merely a generous helper to troubled boys was rejected as implausible.

The court held that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused operated the social media profiles and used them to facilitate multiple sexual offences.

Convictions were entered on all counts except two counts previously stayed at the Crown’s request.

The plaintiff general contractor sued the defendant flooring subcontractor for breach of contract after the installed resilient flooring exhibited loose, lifting, and telegraphing tiles.

The plaintiff replaced the defective flooring and sought to recover the costs.

The defendant argued the issues were caused by excess moisture in the concrete slab, for which it had obtained a liability release.

The court found that the defendant failed to properly prepare the concrete substrate in accordance with the contract specifications, causing the delamination and telegraphing.

The plaintiff was awarded the replacement costs, less the amount claimed for profit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to comply with a demand for a roadside breath sample, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider material evidence regarding the equivocal nature of his refusal.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a careful analysis of the evidence, including the officer's cross-examination, and was entitled to conclude that the appellant's final response constituted a clear and unequivocal refusal, despite earlier potentially conditional statements.

The court affirmed that a trial judge is not required to recite every piece of evidence or make a finding on exact words, as long as the reasons are intelligible and allow for meaningful appellate review.

The applicant, Nicole Jean St. Dennis, sought a declaration that her student loan debt from her first period of post-secondary study was discharged by her assignment in bankruptcy.

The case required an interpretation of s. 178(1)(g)(ii) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, specifically determining when an individual "ceased to be a full- or part-time student" for the purpose of the seven-year delay period for student loan discharge.

The applicant advocated for a "multiple date approach" where the seven-year period runs from the cessation of studies related to the specific loan.

The respondent argued for a "single date approach" where the period runs from the last date of any studies.

The court adopted the multiple date approach, finding that the applicant ceased to be a student for the purposes of her student loans in October 2004, thus meeting the seven-year delay requirement before her December 2011 bankruptcy.

The application was granted, and the student loan debt was discharged.

The appellant appealed convictions for harassment in a domestic context and breach of a peace bond, following a trial where he was acquitted of uttering threats.

The appeal raised issues concerning the trial judge's interpretation of facts, witness influence, the reasonableness of the verdict, rejection of defence evidence, and incomplete disclosure.

The Superior Court, sitting as a summary conviction appeal court, dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's thorough examination of evidence, detailed reasons for credibility findings, and proper handling of the disclosure issue, which the appellant had consciously waived at trial.

The court emphasized the limited scope of appellate review for factual findings and credibility.

The plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action against his former employer and its owners, alleging age discrimination.

The personal defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the age discrimination claims against them.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on the entire claim.

The court granted the personal defendants' motion, finding no employment relationship and no factual foundation for the age discrimination claim.

On the plaintiff's motion, the court found no cause for termination and that the plaintiff had mitigated his damages, leaving only the quantum of notice to be determined at a later date.

The defendants were successful on a motion to produce a document over which the plaintiff had asserted solicitor-client privilege.

The defendants sought costs of $11,406 on a partial indemnity basis, while the plaintiff submitted a bill of costs for $3,566.52.

The court found the defendants' claimed hours excessive for a relatively straightforward motion and emphasized the principle of proportionality.

Applying Rule 57, the court fixed costs payable to the defendants at $5,000 plus HST and disbursements.

The defendant Civita Vitiello brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred due to the expiration of the limitation period.

The central issue was discoverability, specifically when the plaintiff, Marie Leblanc, discovered or ought to have discovered her claim against Civita Vitiello.

The court found that Marie Leblanc had sufficient knowledge or suspicion of Civita Vitiello's involvement by December 2010, and her son's 2014 disclosure did not constitute new information to trigger a fresh limitation period.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in pursuing her claim.

Consequently, the action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The plaintiff accounting firm brought an action to recover unpaid professional fees for work performed for the defendants (a numbered company operating a resort lodge and its sole shareholders) in 2012 and 2013.

The defendants asserted a fixed-rate agreement but failed to present any evidence to support this claim.

The court accepted the plaintiff's evidence, which included signed engagement letters and regular invoices, establishing that work was billed at standard hourly rates.

The court found the plaintiff had proven its claim for $44,052.72, with the individual defendants personally liable for $34,939.21 of that amount based on a specific engagement letter.

Additionally, a motion for recusal brought by one of the defendants at the outset of trial, based on the judge's prior stay at the lodge and presiding over an unrelated motion, was dismissed as there was no perceived partiality or link to the current case.

The minor plaintiff, Bayden Zachary Azzeh, brought a motion to add the City of Greater Sudbury and other parties as defendants in an action for traumatic brain injuries sustained in a 2007 motor vehicle accident.

The City opposed, arguing prejudice due to late addition, an expired limitation period, and failure to meet the Municipal Act's ten-day notice requirement.

The court found no uncompensable prejudice to the City, determined the limitation period for the minor did not run until a litigation guardian was appointed (June 2014 at earliest), and accepted that being an infant constituted a reasonable excuse for the initial lack of municipal notice.

The court further found that the subsequent litigation guardian provided notice within ten days of her appointment.

The motion to add the City as a defendant was granted, and other parties were added by consent, with the order made nunc pro tunc.

The accused was tried on charges arising from text and internet communications in which he solicited assistance from a sex worker to abduct and sexually assault a child, and later engaged in sexually explicit online discussions with an undercover officer posing as a mother.

The central issue was whether the communications were mere fantasy and role play or reflected the subjective intent required for counselling offences and for making arrangements under s. 172.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the role-playing explanation as not credible, relied in part on similar fact evidence from other sex workers, and found that the communications with the sex worker were specific, repeated, and grounded in price, place, and timing.

Findings of guilt were entered on counselling, making arrangements, child pornography, and recognizance breach counts, but the accused was acquitted on the undercover-officer arrangement count because the communications remained too preliminary.

The father brought a motion to change a 2013 child support order, arguing a material change in his income due to a significant drop in his landscape design business revenues.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing he was intentionally underemployed and that the motion should be barred due to an unpaid costs award.

The court found a material change in income, declined to impute income due to insufficient evidence, and allowed the motion to proceed despite the unpaid costs.

Child support was varied retroactively based on the father's actual income for 2014 and 2015, and enforcement of arrears was stayed for six months.

The Crown brought applications to quash subpoenas issued by the defence against two prosecutors, David Holmes (federal) and Steven Scharger (provincial).

The defence sought to compel their testimony at a preliminary hearing regarding an officer's alleged history of misconduct and excessive force, arguing it was material to the officer's credibility and the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The court found that the proposed evidence was not likely material to the preliminary hearing issues, was governed by the collateral fact rule, and that the necessity test for compelling counsel's testimony was not met.

The applications to quash the subpoenas were granted.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that allowed them to amend their statement of claim to increase damages from $550,000 to $2,500,000, exposing the defendants personally beyond their $1 million insurance policy limits.

The motion judge granted the amendment but imposed terms, including suspending prejudgment interest on the increased amount until the date of the amendment.

The plaintiffs argued this term was punitive and conflicted with existing case law.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's exercise of discretion to compensate the defendants for the prejudice caused by the late amendment.

The applicant, Dirk Plate, sought an order to be tried separately from his co-accused, Paul Caron, on charges of fraud and theft arising from an alleged $20 million kickback scheme.

The Crown alleged a common criminal enterprise, invoking the Carter rule for the admissibility of evidence.

The court balanced the factors under the interests of justice test, including the truth-seeking function, judicial economy, and potential prejudice.

The court found that a joint trial was the best way to assess witness credibility and avoid inconsistent findings, and that the applicant failed to demonstrate a real likelihood of injustice if tried jointly.

The application for severance was dismissed.

The accused applied for bail after being charged with first degree murder arising from a group assault that culminated in the fatal stabbing of the deceased by a co‑accused.

The court considered the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

Although the Crown argued the evidence was overwhelming and that detention was necessary to maintain public confidence, the court found the accused’s role in the fatal act was uncertain and that a strict release plan with multiple sureties, house arrest, and extensive conditions sufficiently mitigated risks.

The proposed sureties were found credible and capable of supervising the accused.

The court concluded detention was not justified and ordered release on stringent conditions.

The applicant sought a declaration that the informal name “Domestic Violence Court” was unconstitutional and should be replaced with “Domestic Court”.

He alleged the name violated ss. 7, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by stigmatizing accused persons and affecting fairness in criminal proceedings.

The court held the applicant failed to establish any deprivation of security of the person or other Charter rights, noting that subjective feelings of stigma were insufficient without objective evidence of serious psychological harm.

The court also found the name rationally connected to the court’s legitimate purpose of addressing domestic violence cases and rejected claims of cruel and unusual treatment or discrimination.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff sued police officers and a police services board alleging negligent investigation, bad faith, and Charter breaches after he was charged with sexual assault and related offences but later acquitted at trial.

He alleged the police relied on an unreliable complainant, fabricated evidence, failed to pursue exculpatory witnesses, and caused reputational harm through media reporting.

Applying the framework from Hill v. Hamilton‑Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, the court held that the officers had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and charge based on the complainant’s statement, observed injuries, and corroborative circumstances.

The investigation, although imperfect, fell within the bounds of reasonable police discretion.

The court found no evidence of fabrication, bad faith, or Charter violations and dismissed the claim.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings under the Fisheries Act arising from a highway washout that deposited debris into fish-bearing waters and damaged fish habitat.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in rejecting a due diligence defence and in concluding that a highway and culvert constituted a “work or undertaking” under the Act, and further argued that the Kienapple principle should bar convictions on both counts.

The court held that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in rejecting the due diligence defence and properly applied the relevant factors.

It further held that maintaining road infrastructure constitutes “carrying on a work or undertaking” for the purposes of s. 35 of the Fisheries Act and that the two offences addressed distinct statutory purposes.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a successful trial, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs after obtaining a judgment exceeding its settlement offer.

The defendant argued that proportionality warranted a reduced costs award.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principle of proportionality under Rule 1.04(1).

The court held that the defendant could not rely on proportionality after forcing the plaintiff to prove every aspect of its claim despite an earlier favourable default judgment and an unaccepted settlement offer.

The requested costs were found to be fair and reasonable and were awarded in full.