ODC 2012

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that granted retroactive child and spousal support and a charging order against the respondent father, who had repeatedly failed to provide financial disclosure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions that applied different legal principles and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, given the father's egregious conduct and failure to disclose.

The respondent was successful on appeal and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $9,458.72.

The appellant challenged the amount based on proportionality.

The Divisional Court fixed costs at $6,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, noting the appeal was not complicated and took half a day to argue.

The appellant grandmother appealed a summary judgment order finding her grandson to be a child in need of protection and making him a Crown ward with no access.

The grandmother argued the motions judge erred in applying the summary judgment test and assessing credibility.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the test and did not improperly weigh evidence or assess credibility, as the material issue was the undisputed lack of a relationship between the grandmother and the child.

The applicants, who were self-represented litigants, sought leave to appeal a costs award from a motion judge.

They argued they were entitled to compensation for personal time devoted to the litigation, challenging the common law rule regarding costs for self-represented litigants and claiming it violated s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the motion judge correctly applied binding legal principles and that the Charter arguments were without merit.

The court noted that leave to appeal a costs award is granted sparingly, and the applicants failed to demonstrate strong grounds or an error in principle.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order granting the respondent $45,000 plus costs.

The appellant argued there were genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial, relying on defences of gratuitous bailment and ex turpi causa.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the full appreciation test from Combined Air.

The motions judge was entitled to evaluate credibility under Rule 20.04(2.1) and properly concluded the appellant's evidence was unbelievable and full of contradictions.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict and a trial judge's ruling on a threshold motion following a motor vehicle accident.

The jury found the appellant 10% liable and awarded $4,000, which was reduced to zero due to income replacement benefits.

The trial judge dismissed the claim for non-pecuniary damages, finding the appellant did not sustain a permanent serious impairment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial accommodations, evidentiary rulings, the threshold decision, the jury charge, the verdict, and alleged trial judge bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's rulings and ample evidence to support the jury's verdict.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a $50,000 substantial indemnity costs order made after the parties reached a consent resolution on a relief from forfeiture application.

The court found the costs order was interlocutory, as the underlying consent order did not finally dispose of the parties' rights.

Leave to appeal was granted because there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the costs order, particularly regarding the motions judge's reliance on untested affidavit evidence, the characterization of the tenant as the successful party, and the awarding of costs against a corporate officer personally.

The court also found the proposed appeal involved matters of general importance regarding costs awards following settlements.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their application for security for costs and awarding substantial indemnity costs against them.

The defendants argued the corporate plaintiff failed to prove impecuniosity because it did not provide evidence that its creditors refused to fund the litigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding there is no absolute requirement in every case for a plaintiff to show creditors declined to fund the litigation to establish impecuniosity.

The court also upheld the motion judge's findings on the merits of the claim and the costs award.

The tenants appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board regarding the landlord's implementation of smart metering for electricity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably interpreted the Residential Tenancies Act in concluding that the landlord was entitled to increase rent for adding electricity as a prescribed service and that payments to an independent contractor were not illegal charges.

The court also held that the Board's findings on harassment and coercion were factual and raised no question of law.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding him personally liable for unpaid invoices for poker tournament services provided by the respondent.

The trial judge had found a partnership or joint venture existed between the appellant and another individual, avoiding the need to pierce the corporate veil.

The Divisional Court held this was a palpable and overriding error, as the respondent's own evidence was that it believed it was dealing with the corporate entity, not the appellant personally.

The court set aside the personal judgment against the appellant and replaced it with a judgment against the corporate defendant.

The appellant mother appealed the dismissal of her application for child support under the Divorce Act.

The hearing judge had dismissed the application on the basis that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction because there was a prior child support order made under the Family Law Act in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that an application for corollary relief under the Divorce Act is a stand-alone application that supersedes a prior provincial order, and the Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear it.

The appellant contractor appealed a trial judgment that dismissed his claim for unpaid renovation fees and the respondents' counterclaim for defective work, while ordering the appellant to pay substantial indemnity costs.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by implying a contractual term requiring the appellant to provide warranties, which contradicted the express written terms of the contract.

The court set aside the trial judgment, dismissed the counterclaim, and awarded the appellant his unpaid invoices totaling $22,727.54.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court order dismissing her motion for a new trial and brought a separate application challenging the same proceedings.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals, dismiss the application, and obtain an order prohibiting the appellant from bringing further proceedings without leave.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding it lacked jurisdiction under section 31 of the Courts of Justice Act because the amount in dispute was less than the $2,500 prescribed limit.

The application was also dismissed as an abuse of process constituting a collateral attack on the Small Claims Court order.

The court declined to make a vexatious litigant order, noting such relief must be sought by way of an originating application rather than a motion, but directed that garnished funds held in court be paid out to the respondent.

The appellant, a city councilor, appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for defamation arising from an email exchange with the respondent, a community activist.

The trial judge had found that the appellant's email was defamatory and that the defence of qualified privilege was defeated by malice.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to state and apply the correct legal tests for qualified privilege and malice.

Specifically, the trial judge erred by conflating the objective and subjective standards for honest belief and by failing to determine whether an improper purpose was the appellant's dominant motive.

The defendant sought leave to appeal a decision certifying a multi-jurisdictional class proceeding regarding the prescription of CHAMPIX, a smoking cessation medication, and the subsequent $300,000 costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the certification decision.

The court held that the motions judge applied well-established legal principles and made no palpable and overriding error of fact or law.

The costs award was also upheld as there was no error in principle.

The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent transit authority's decision to enter into a contract for diesel multiple units for an air-rail link.

The applicant argued the respondent exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to conduct an electrification feasibility study and improperly accepting ministerial direction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision to enter a commercial contract did not constitute a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act as it did not determine any legal rights.

Furthermore, the court held that the respondent acted within its statutory authority under its governing legislation.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario summarily dismissing his complaint against the Toronto Police Service and Toronto Police Services Board.

The applicant alleged discrimination based on mental disability, race, and country of origin, as well as threats of reprisal.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Tribunal reasonably concluded there was no evidence of discrimination or reprisal.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness or bias.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The appellant husband sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring him to pay spousal support.

He argued the motion judge erred by basing support on his previous year's income rather than his projected current year income.

The court dismissed the application, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's exercise of discretion and noting that appeals from interlocutory family law orders are discouraged.

The court held the issue was fact-driven and not of general importance.

The plaintiffs (respondents on appeal) brought a motion to quash the defendant's appeal to the Divisional Court on the basis that the aggregate judgment amount exceeded the $50,000 monetary jurisdiction threshold.

The defendant argued that only the costs order was being appealed, which was under $50,000, and that a single judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion because leave to appeal costs requires a full panel.

The court held that a single judge has jurisdiction to quash an appeal outside the court's monetary jurisdiction.

The court further held that jurisdiction is determined by the aggregate of the sums awarded in the judgment, not just the portion being appealed.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The appellant moving company appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent $22,419.00 in damages for retaining her personal property.

The dispute arose when the appellant demanded $889.88 for a move the respondent understood to be a fixed price of $500.00.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no overriding and palpable error in the trial judge's conclusions that a fixed price contract existed, the damage award was appropriate, and there was no bias shown by the trial judge.