Court of Justice

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual touching of his granddaughter between December 2013 and February 2014, when the complainant was twelve years old.

The Crown alleged that the accused licked the complainant's legs and stomach on separate occasions and placed his hand down her shirt.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found that while the complainant had motive and animus to fabricate the allegations due to her unhappiness with living arrangements and disciplinary conflicts over internet use, the accused's testimony was straightforward, uncomplicated, and credible.

The court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the allegations were proven and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel brought motions pursuant to section 74 of the Child and Family Services Act seeking orders for the production of records from ten third parties and institutions regarding two children and their mother.

The children had been apprehended and were in the temporary care of the Society.

The mother opposed the production of records, arguing they were not relevant to the issues of harm and that disclosure would cause emotional harm to the children.

The court granted the Society's motions, finding that the records were relevant and necessary to determine whether the children were in need of protection and to assess appropriate disposition.

The court found that the children's consent to disclosure, the lack of opposition from third parties, and the mother's prior consent to some records outweighed privacy concerns.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual touching of his granddaughter between December 2013 and February 2014, when the complainant was 12 years old.

The Crown alleged that the accused licked the complainant's legs and stomach on multiple occasions and placed his hand down her shirt.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found that while the complainant had motive and animus to fabricate the allegations due to her unhappiness with living arrangements at the accused's home and disciplinary disputes over her computer use, the accused's testimony was straightforward, uncomplicated, and credible.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The offender pleaded guilty to defrauding her employer of over $219,000 over a five-year period using three separate methods, including forging a colleague's signature on cheques.

The Crown sought an 18-23 month custodial sentence with restitution and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a one-year custodial sentence, finding that a conditional sentence would be inconsistent with the fundamental purposes of sentencing, particularly denunciation and deterrence in cases involving breach of trust.

The court also imposed restitution orders and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The accused was charged with over 80 care or control and impaired care or control.

Police arrested the accused for possession of stolen property and subsequently made a breathalyzer demand based on observations of an odour of alcohol and allegedly slurred speech.

The defence brought a Charter application to exclude the breath sample results, arguing the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the demand.

The court found that the observations of alcohol odour and slurred speech were insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and the breathalyzer demand, constituting a section 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the seriousness of the breach and deprivation of liberty outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

A temporary care and custody hearing under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society sought to place two young children in its care with discretionary parental access.

The parents sought return of the children subject to supervision.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children faced risk of harm based on unsanitary home conditions, developmental delays, inadequate stimulation, and drug trafficking activities.

However, the court determined the children could be adequately protected through strict terms and conditions of supervision, making the least disruptive placement with the parents subject to comprehensive supervision orders.

A temporary care and custody hearing under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act wherein the applicant society sought to place a child in its care and custody with access at the society's discretion.

The respondent mother sought an order placing the child in her care subject to society supervision.

The child's counsel supported the mother's position.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the child would likely suffer harm if returned to the mother's care based on the mother's history of involvement with child protection agencies, her failure to protect children from relationships with men posing risk, and her lack of insight into protecting her children.

The court determined that a supervision order would be inadequate to protect the child given the mother's past non-compliance and her strongly held belief in the alleged perpetrator's innocence.

The court ordered the child placed in the temporary care and custody of the society.

A child protection agency sought a temporary order placing a child in society care following disclosures by an older sibling of prolonged sexual and physical abuse by the stepfather and allegations of physical assault against the younger child.

The mother denied the allegations and sought the child’s return under a supervision order after the stepfather left the home.

The court accepted the sibling’s detailed allegations and the younger child’s disclosure of choking as credible at the temporary stage and considered the family’s history with child protection authorities.

It concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe the child would suffer harm if returned to the mother and that supervision conditions would not adequately mitigate the risk.

Temporary society care with controlled parental access was therefore ordered pending the protection application.

A custody and access trial involving a seven-year-old child born to unmarried parents.

The father sought bi-weekly supervised access after nearly three years of no contact with the child.

The mother sought sole custody with no access.

The court found a history of domestic violence in the parties' relationship, with the father having a lengthy criminal record including assault convictions.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer recommended no access.

The court concluded that the child had developed significant fear and anxiety regarding the father, and that reintroducing him would cause emotional harm.

The court granted sole custody to the mother and ordered no access to the father, finding this was in the child's best interests despite the general principle that access is important.

Applications by both parents for leave to bring status review applications with respect to Crown ward children.

The mother sought placement of the children under a supervision order; the father sought access.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that neither parent had demonstrated a prima facie case for review.

The mother's application was particularly problematic given her deliberate violation of a no-access order through surreptitious contact and her demonstrated indifference to the children's best interests.

The father's application was undermined by outstanding criminal charges and the risk of further incarceration.

The court also issued a restraining order prohibiting the mother from contacting the children, given her relentless pursuit of contact in defiance of court orders.

The accused was charged with two counts of historical sexual assault and sexual interference against his daughter spanning from 1996 to 2003.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of similar acts from four other complainants to establish a pattern of predatory behavior.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of this similar fact evidence.

The court found that the Crown failed to meet its burden of proof regarding collusion and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value.

The similar fact application was dismissed due to lack of temporal proximity, insufficient similarity of circumstances, different relationships between the accused and the various complainants, and concerns about potential collusion among witnesses.

The accused was charged with operate over 80 following a traffic stop.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings from an Intoxilyzer device.

The court found that the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights were breached with respect to facilitation of the right to speak to counsel of choice.

The police failed to adequately facilitate contact with counsel of choice and instead imposed duty counsel upon the accused.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with sexually assaulting a 17-year-old complainant who worked as a dishwasher and cashier at a restaurant where the defendant was employed as a cook.

The alleged assault occurred on July 19, 2013, in the takeout counter area of the restaurant kitchen.

The complainant testified that the defendant engaged in unwanted touching of her buttocks and groin area over several weeks, culminating in a more serious incident on the date in question.

The defendant denied the allegations, claiming the physical contact was incidental to the tight working conditions in the kitchen.

The court found that while the complainant's evidence was preferable to the defendant's, certain inconsistencies and improbabilities in her account, combined with the defendant's testimony that raised reasonable doubt, resulted in an acquittal.

The applicants, the maternal aunt and uncle of a child, brought a motion to dispense with the biological parents' consent to adoption under section 138 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The child had been in the continuous care of the applicants since age 17 months following removal by child protection services due to the mother's drug addiction, mental health issues, and transience.

The biological father had minimal contact with the child and did not participate in the proceeding.

The biological mother opposed the adoption, expressing concern about losing contact with her daughter and stating she hoped to regain custody within 1-1.5 years.

The court found it was in the child's best interests to dispense with both parents' consent, emphasizing the child's existing family reality with the applicants, her thriving development, and the uncertainty of the mother's ability to parent in the foreseeable future.

The Crown applied pursuant to section 117.05 of the Criminal Code for an order to forfeit a collection of 16 shotguns seized by Toronto Police Service and for an ancillary general weapons prohibition order.

The seizure arose from a domestic dispute involving the respondent's wife reporting concerns about his mental state and suicide risk after discovering escort service numbers on his phone.

The respondent was apprehended under the Mental Health Act, assessed, and released.

At the hearing, the respondent provided evidence of his responsible gun ownership, compliance with all regulatory requirements, and mental fitness.

The court found that the Crown had not established on a balance of probabilities that it was "not desirable" in the interests of safety for the respondent to possess the firearms and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of her vehicle, which was stuck in a snowbank at the end of a residential driveway.

She had called for a tow truck and was waiting for its arrival when discovered.

The Crown conceded that the accused was impaired and over the legal limit but argued she was in care or control of the vehicle.

The trial judge found that the accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing that her occupancy of the driver's seat began for the purpose of awaiting the tow truck, not for setting the vehicle in motion.

The court further found no realistic risk of danger to the public, as the vehicle was immobilized in a snowbank and incapable of being set in motion.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of her vehicle, which was stuck in a snowbank at the end of a residential driveway.

She had called for a tow truck and was waiting inside the vehicle with the engine running for warmth.

The trial judge found that the accused rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing that her occupancy of the driver's seat began for the purpose of awaiting the tow truck, not for setting the vehicle in motion.

The court further found no realistic risk of danger to the public, as the vehicle was immobilized and incapable of being set in motion.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.