Court of Justice

The defendant was charged with committing an indecent act in a public place and failing to comply with a probation order.

The Crown alleged the defendant exposed his penis and masturbated inside and outside a coffee shop, and that he breached his probation by failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

The court found the defendant not guilty of the indecent act charge due to insufficient evidence of harm or substantial risk of harm as required under the harm-based test established in R. v. Labaye.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of failing to comply with the probation order, as his disruptive behaviour in the coffee shop constituted a clear breach of the peace.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code following a roadside sobriety check.

The defendant claimed he used the word "prefer" rather than "refuse" and believed he had the right to decline the roadside test based on legal advice received in the United States.

The court found the defendant guilty, determining that he unequivocally refused to comply with a lawful demand and that his conduct constituted a refusal regardless of the specific words used.

The court rejected the defendant's credibility and accepted the officer's evidence as reliable and truthful.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found no section 8 or 9 violation, as the officer reasonably believed the approved screening device was functioning properly.

However, the court found a section 10(b) violation when police refused to permit the accused to contact a third party to obtain a lawyer's name and contact information.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court admitted the breath samples, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

The accused was charged with extortion and sexual assault.

The primary issue was whether the complainant, a young woman with intellectual disabilities, properly identified the accused as the person who extorted her into sending nude photographs and subsequently sexually assaulted her at a marina.

The Crown's case rested entirely on identification evidence.

The accused denied ever meeting the complainant or engaging in any of the alleged conduct.

The court found the complainant's identification credible and reliable, distinguishing this case from typical eyewitness identification cases because the complainant had a photograph of the accused before meeting him in person.

The court rejected the accused's denials as implausible and found him guilty of both counts.

The defendant was charged with two offences: having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit.

The defendant admitted to being impaired and having a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The sole issue was whether the defendant had care or control of the motor vehicle.

The defendant entered his truck after declining a driving service, sat in the driver's seat, then moved to the passenger seat while waiting for another driving service to arrive.

The court found that the defendant had a concrete plan to obtain a ride home through a driving service and would not have changed his mind about driving.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating with excess blood alcohol following an erratic driving report.

A Charter application was brought to exclude evidence obtained following an alleged violation of the right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that police delayed providing the right to counsel for 26 minutes after arrest, constituting a breach.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence as the breach was serious and the impact on the accused's Charter rights was significant.

However, the court found the accused guilty of the included offence of care or control while impaired, as the Crown established the accused was in the driver's seat with keys in possession and was heavily intoxicated, presenting a realistic risk of danger.

The accused pleaded guilty to armed robbery of a pharmacy where he stole 110 bottles and packages of narcotics, including 75 fentanyl patches, using a knife as a weapon.

The Crown and defence proposed a joint submission of two years imprisonment plus presentence custody.

The court rejected the joint submission as contrary to the public interest and imposed a sentence of five years in the penitentiary.

The accused's application to withdraw his guilty plea was dismissed.

The court found no reasonable apprehension of bias and determined that withdrawal was not justified in the interests of justice.

This is a costs decision following a trial on a spousal support claim.

The mother was awarded $1,275 per month in spousal support commencing April 1, 2017.

The mother had served an Offer to Settle seeking $900 per month commencing September 1, 2017, which was more favourable than the trial outcome.

The father failed to accept the offer and did not file responding costs submissions.

The court awarded the mother full recovery of costs from the date of the offer and partial recovery prior to that date, totalling $14,203.30, payable within 45 days.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded as a blended hearing addressing both the merits and a motion to exclude evidence based on alleged Charter violations.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath and blood samples on grounds of violations to sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court rejected all Charter claims except finding a minor breach regarding the timing of the approved screening device demand.

Despite this breach, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and found the defendant guilty as charged.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging that sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were breached by the conduct of the arresting officers, such that all statements and breath samples should be excluded.

The defence ultimately conceded the 10(a) issue and proceeded only on the 10(b) claim, arguing that the officers failed to account for the accused's language difficulties when explaining his right to counsel.

The court found that the officers took appropriate steps to ensure the accused understood his rights, including arranging for a Farsi-speaking officer to translate, and that the accused was afforded a meaningful exercise of his right to counsel.

The Charter application was dismissed and the breath samples were admitted as evidence.

A conviction was entered.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and uttering death threats against his common law partner.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 9-12 months.

The defence sought a conditional sentence, emphasizing the accused's Aboriginal background, systemic disadvantages, and significant rehabilitative efforts.

The court imposed a six-month conditional sentence to be served in the community under electronic supervision, followed by two years' probation.

The decision extensively applied Gladue and Ipeelee principles, recognizing the accused's intergenerational trauma, addiction issues, and genuine rehabilitation efforts while balancing denunciation and deterrence principles applicable to domestic violence.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm (x2), assault (x2), mischief to property, and failure to comply with a recognizance (x4).

The offences involved a pattern of violent and degrading abuse against his dating partner over several months, including physical assault, humiliation, property damage, and confinement.

The accused violated court-ordered conditions by continuing contact with the victim.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 17 months less credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further 10 months incarceration, followed by three years probation with strict conditions including no contact and counselling.

The accused was convicted of failing to comply with a probation order, breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit mischief, assault, and forcible seizure.

The Crown sought a declaration that the accused be designated a Long-Term Offender under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code and sought an eight-year long-term supervision order.

The defence challenged the application on Charter grounds, arguing unreasonable delay in sentencing proceedings.

The court dismissed the Charter application and declared the accused a Long-Term Offender, imposing a 60-day custodial sentence on top of pre-sentence detention credit, followed by a seven-year long-term supervision order.

The court found a substantial risk of reoffending, particularly in the context of intimate partner violence, and determined that community control was possible only through a long-term supervision order.

A first-time offender pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm after unprovokedly assaulting a stranger on the street while intoxicated by alcohol and drugs.

The Crown sought 4-6 months custody followed by probation, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 9-month conditional sentence with restrictive conditions including house arrest and community service, followed by 2 years probation, along with a 3-year weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The sentencing emphasized rehabilitation prospects, the offender's youth, positive response to charges, and engagement with psychological counselling addressing underlying substance abuse and mental health issues.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 on March 19, 2016.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings on the third trial date, alleging unreasonable delay.

The first trial date did not proceed due to lack of judicial resources (no per diem judge available).

The second trial date was adjourned because a Crown witness was unavailable due to a booked vacation.

The court calculated the net delay at 17 months and 8 days, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the accused failed to demonstrate sustained efforts to expedite proceedings and that the case did not take markedly longer than reasonably expected.

The section 11(b) application was dismissed.

A temporary care and custody motion under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning child N.H., whose twin sibling died from inflicted injuries.

The Children's Aid Society sought placement of the child with the paternal great-aunt subject to supervision.

The parents sought return of the child to their care or alternatively placement with the paternal uncle with parental residence in that home.

The court found credible and trustworthy evidence of inflicted trauma to both children and determined that the child could not be returned to parental care even with supervision.

The court ordered the child remain in the temporary care and custody of the paternal great-aunt with supervised access to the parents at the society's discretion.

The accused, a nurse, was charged with sexual assault against a complainant who was brought to a hospital emergency room in a highly intoxicated and unresponsive state.

The complainant alleged that the accused engaged in multiple instances of inappropriate touching, including fondling her breasts and placing her hand on his genitals while inserting an intravenous line.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to her impaired cognitive state, internal inconsistencies, and demonstrated motive to tailor her testimony.

A credible eyewitness who observed the relevant portion of the alleged assault testified that he did not see any of the alleged inappropriate conduct.

The accused's evidence was consistent with the eyewitness account and video evidence.

The charge was dismissed.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle "over 80" contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The applicant brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, seeking exclusion of observations, statements, and breath test results.

The court found no breaches of the applicant's Charter rights.

The court held that the officer was authorized to conduct sobriety screening measures prior to making an approved screening device demand, that the right to counsel was limited during these screening measures in accordance with s. 1 of the Charter, that the applicant's right to counsel of choice was not violated by directing him to duty counsel when he did not identify a specific lawyer, that the officer had reasonable grounds to make both the ASD and breath demands, and that the detention was not arbitrary.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought costs following a successful motion on jurisdiction.

The respondent opposed the motion and sought a transfer to another region.

The court granted the applicant's motion and denied the respondent's motion.

Following the decision, the parties consented to a temporary order for access and child support.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis rather than full recovery, considering the absence of unreasonable conduct by the respondent, the lack of an offer to settle, and the respondent's limited financial means.

The applicant sought enforcement of a separation agreement and child support for two adult children, while the respondent sought to set aside the spousal support provisions and terminate his support obligations.

The court found that structured settlement annuity payments constitute income for child support purposes and should be grossed-up for tax purposes.

The court awarded table amount child support for both children, including an adult child enrolled in post-secondary education.

The court rejected the respondent's arguments to set aside the spousal support provisions and found no material change in circumstances warranting termination.

Retroactive child support arrears were rescinded based on the parties' oral agreement and the DBS factors.