Court of Appeal

The appellant appealed a decision recognizing and enforcing two Russian arbitral awards against it.

The application judge had refused to consider the appellant's evidence of alleged death threats, which the appellant claimed prevented its participation in the arbitration, on the basis of issue estoppel from a prior proceeding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that issue estoppel did not apply and that the application judge erred by failing to exercise residual discretion to prevent injustice.

The enforcement application was remitted for a fresh determination.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault endangering life, break and enter, assault with a weapon, and failing to comply with probation.

He sought to set aside his guilty plea, introducing fresh evidence that he was not HIV positive, contrary to an admitted fact during the plea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not undermine the conviction, as the appellant admitted to a severe beating with a vase, biting the victim, and being positive for Hepatitis B and C. The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the global 10-year sentence given the appellant's lengthy record and the significant consequences of the attack.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention.

He argued the Board failed to meaningfully consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Board failed to properly address the mechanisms for return under the Criminal Code if the appellant breached conditions, its ultimate decision was not unreasonable.

The appellant's lack of insight into his illness, history of non-compliance, and the stressors he would face in the community justified the Board's conclusion that he remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal where the trial judgment was set aside, the appellants sought their trial costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of their offer to settle, and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter.

The Court of Appeal held that while Rule 49.10 does not strictly apply when a plaintiff recovers nothing, the court retains discretion under Rule 49.13 and section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Finding that the respondents engaged in egregious conduct and wasted time during the litigation, the Court awarded the appellants their claimed trial costs of $80,755.19.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break, enter, and theft of coins, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding coin roll papers found in his motel room.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence in the record to support the alleged misapprehension.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if an error occurred, the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including eyewitness testimony and the appellant's unexplained possession of the stolen coins, rendered the verdict safe.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching, as well as his 15-month custodial sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding a sexual purpose for a massage, drawing inferences about access to a residence, rejecting his evidence, and refusing to admit counselling records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's comprehensive reasons and concluding the sentence was at the low end of the range.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the accused after finding him guilty of sexual assault and sexual touching.

The trial judge had granted the stay on the basis that lost police audiotapes and notes from a 1994 investigation prejudiced the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Crown had satisfactorily explained the loss of the audiotapes and that the lost evidence was not so prejudicial as to warrant a stay, given the availability of other records and evidence to challenge the complainants' credibility.

The Court set aside the stay and ordered a new trial rather than reinstating the guilty verdicts, as the trial judge had failed to factor the lost evidence into his assessment of the complainants' credibility.

The appellant, a paediatric dental surgeon, appealed a trial judgment regarding damages for a wrist injury sustained in a fall at the respondent hospital.

She argued the trial judge erred in calculating her 2007 and future income loss, provided insufficient reasons, and failed to apply the 'real and substantial risk' test for future loss.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly determined that the 2007 income drop was not caused by the injury, provided adequate reasons, and properly applied the real and substantial risk test to award $100,000 for future pecuniary loss based on the risk of a tendon rupture.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the respondent insurer was required to defend and indemnify a driver involved in an accident while driving a rented vehicle.

The respondent denied coverage on the basis that the rental company failed to identify the specific vehicle in its monthly fleet report.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the plain language of the fleet endorsement only required the rental company to report the number of leased vehicles in its fleet, not the particulars of each vehicle.

The defendants in a personal injury action sought an order to compel the plaintiff to attend a defence medical examination.

The plaintiff agreed on the condition that the examination be audio recorded, citing systemic bias among defence medical examiners.

The motion judge and Divisional Court allowed the condition.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered the examination to proceed without conditions, holding that an order to record a defence medical requires a specific factual foundation of potential abuse or concern regarding the specific doctor, not merely allegations of general systemic bias.

The appellant, a home care provider, was convicted of defrauding an elderly couple of over $35,000 and sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment.

She appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing that her s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed by a 33-month delay, and that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements from the deceased complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 11(b) analysis or his admission of the hearsay evidence based on necessity and reliability.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's allocation of pre-sentence credit was within his discretion and the sentence was fit given the significant breach of trust.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing he should have been designated a long-term offender.

He also sought to adduce fresh evidence regarding his post-sentence treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly interpreted s. 753.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code as requiring a reasonable possibility that the risk posed by the offender will be controlled within the duration of the long-term sentence.

Given the appellant's pedophilia, cognitive limitations, and need for life-long pharmacological treatment, the trial judge did not err in concluding this criterion was not met.

The fresh evidence was not admitted as it would not have affected the result.

The appellant, a former partner at the respondent law firm, appealed the dismissal of his action against the firm.

He alleged that the firm's management owed and breached a fiduciary duty to warn him that his remuneration would be significantly reduced under a newly implemented compensation system, which would have prompted him to withdraw from the partnership earlier.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that no such fiduciary duty existed under the partnership agreement or at common law, that no breach was proven even if a duty existed, and that the appellant was already aware his compensation would likely decrease.

The Ontario Energy Board (OEB) imposed a condition on Toronto Hydro-Electric System Limited (THESL) requiring approval from a majority of its independent directors before declaring future dividends to its affiliates, due to concerns over large dividend payouts amidst aging infrastructure.

The Divisional Court struck down this condition, finding the OEB exceeded its jurisdiction.

The OEB appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the OEB's broad rate-setting powers under the Ontario Energy Board Act included the jurisdiction to impose such a condition to protect ratepayers.

The Court found the OEB's decision was reasonable and did not improperly usurp corporate law principles, as it merely added a regulatory check to the directors' discretion.

The Crown appealed an 18-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent, who pleaded guilty to administering a noxious chemical and criminal harassment against a former intimate partner and co-worker.

The respondent repeatedly sprayed a corrosive chemical on the victim's workstation, causing severe burns and blistering over several years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in concluding the conduct was not a 'serious personal injury offence' under s. 752 of the Criminal Code, which rendered a conditional sentence unavailable.

The Court also found the original sentence demonstrably unfit given the significant breach of trust and extensive planning, varying the sentence to two years less a day of imprisonment.

The accused was denied a bail hearing for 24 days due to a lack of systemic resources in York Region.

The trial judge found a breach of the accused's section 11(e) Charter rights, stayed the proceedings, and awarded costs against the Crown.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding of systemic delay and the costs award for counsel's attendances in bail court.

However, the Court set aside the stay of proceedings, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to balance the interests served by granting a stay against society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The costs awarded for the Charter argument were also set aside.

The appellant appealed two summary judgments dismissing her medical negligence claims against two psychiatrists.

The motion judges found that the appellant failed to provide expert evidence from a qualified psychiatrist to establish a breach of the standard of care, whereas the respondents provided expert evidence that they met the standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, confirming that without expert psychiatric evidence, the appellant's claims had no hope of success.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault against two young female family members.

He argued that the verdict on one count was inconsistent with acquittals on other counts, that the verdict on the second count was unreasonable due to weak evidence, and that the trial judge failed to adequately put the theory of the defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were not unreasonable and that the jury charge, while brief, was adequate in the context of the short and uncomplicated trial.

The parties separated and signed Minutes of Settlement regarding the family business.

The husband sold the business years later and refused to pay the wife her share, arguing her rights expired after four years under paragraph 5 of the Minutes.

The trial judge found the paragraph ambiguous, admitted parol evidence, and ruled in favour of the wife.

The husband appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the provision was ambiguous and her use of parol evidence to determine the parties' intentions.

The appellant was committed to stand trial on charges of conspiracy to traffic in narcotics and conspiracy to traffic in association with a criminal organization.

The charges arose from his involvement in collecting payment for a drug deal after the drugs had already been delivered.

The appellant argued that the offence of trafficking was complete upon delivery, and therefore he could not have conspired to traffic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sale of drugs is a continuing transaction that includes the payment of consideration, and the appellant's involvement in arranging payment constituted participation in the conspiracy.