Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, who was designated a dangerous offender and given an indeterminate sentence in 1988, appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the original sentencing judge lacked jurisdiction to order a psychiatric remand under the Criminal Code and failed to invoke the Mental Health Act.

Furthermore, the sentencing judge erred by fettering his discretion when he concluded he had no choice but to impose the dangerous offender designation if statutory criteria were met.

The habeas corpus application was granted, the dangerous offender designation was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a fresh sentencing hearing.

The appellant, T.L., appealed his conviction for three counts of sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter, arguing the trial judge's reasons were inadequate for appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, as they clearly explained the acceptance of the complainant's credible evidence and the rejection of the appellant's denial, consistent with the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

The Crown applied for a sealing order and related relief in an appeal to protect the identity of two jurors.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the order, finding it necessary to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system by safeguarding juror anonymity and privacy.

The court determined that the carefully tailored order minimized impact on the open court principle, and its salutary effects clearly outweighed any minimal deleterious impact.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal his sentence of life imprisonment with 13 years parole ineligibility.

The conviction appeal raised three grounds: error in jury instruction on after-the-fact conduct evidence for provocation, error in not compelling the Crown to call a witness, and error in not permitting the defence to call that witness.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge erred by not properly considering the appellant’s immigration status and certainty of deportation in determining parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the jury instructions or the witness ruling, and upholding the sentencing decision as entitled to deference.

The appellant, Kevin Nguyen, appealed his convictions for various firearm-related offences.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's Charter ruling regarding an unlawful arrest, an illegal apartment freeze, and the validity of a subsequent search warrant.

The application judge had excluded drugs found on the appellant but admitted a handgun and cash found in his apartment.

The appellant argued errors in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis (failure to consider overall police conduct and D.C. Worth's lack of good faith), and errors in the Garofoli ruling (permitting amplification of the Information to Obtain a search warrant and failing to exercise residual discretion to set aside the warrant).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's decisions on all grounds.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder and kidnapping after a missing cocaine shipment led to the execution-style killings of two men.

On appeal, they challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding prior discreditable conduct, a Vetrovec caution, a third-party suspect defence, and the elements of aiding.

One appellant also appealed the denial of a severance application and his 23-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions or the refusal to sever the trials.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was proportionate to the gravity of the offences.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual touching and sexual assault involving a child relative and an eight‑year custodial sentence.

The offences occurred over several years when the complainant was between seven and eleven years old.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly assess his evidence, relied on implausible allegations, reversed the burden of proof, and gave inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, reasonably rejected stereotypical assumptions about victim behaviour, and gave reasons that were sufficient when read contextually with the record.

The court also found no error in principle in the sentencing analysis and held the eight‑year sentence fell within the appropriate range for serious sexual offences against a child.

This is an appeal from convictions for sexual assault, assault, and criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed an error of law by discounting the accused's credibility on the basis that his evidence was "tailored" to fit Crown disclosure or evidence heard in court.

The court reiterated that such an inference is impermissible as it turns constitutional rights against the accused.

The error was deemed prominent in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which was the central issue.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, George Olivetti, appealed a four-year sentence for possessing and accessing child pornography, which was imposed following a joint submission.

The appeal court found the original sentence to be fit, considering the large collection of child pornography and a prior criminal record for similar offences, despite the appellant's age, guilty plea, and expressed remorse.

The court dismissed the appeal, stating that updated personal and medical information did not justify a reduction and that such issues are best addressed by the Parole Board of Canada.

The appellant appealed convictions for assaulting a police officer, failing to comply with a recognizance, drug trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal centred on alleged Charter breaches: excessive force (ss. 7, 12) and denial of the right to counsel (s. 10(b)).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the excessive force argument, finding the trial judge did not misallocate the burden of proof.

However, it allowed the appeal regarding the s. 10(b) breach, finding the trial judge erred in applying the *Grant* factors and should have excluded the evidence (fanny pack contents).

Consequently, convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime were quashed, and acquittals entered, while convictions for assaulting a police officer and breach of recognizance were upheld.

The appellant, Wayne Thomas Hill, appealed his conviction and sentence for two counts of attempted abduction of a child and two counts of breaching a prohibition order.

The appeal raised two issues: a request to vary a blanket lifetime internet ban imposed as part of his sentence, and the requirement for registration in the sex offender registry.

The Court of Appeal varied the internet prohibition order to a more specific set of restrictions, aligning with the nature of the order granted in R. v. Brar, but dismissed the appeal regarding the sex offender registry and all other issues.

This is an appeal from a conviction where the respondent, Her Majesty the Queen, consented to the appeal being allowed and the conviction being set aside.

As a consequence, the charge against the appellant was withdrawn.

The appellant was convicted by jury of six sexual offences involving two young female relatives.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: (1) the admission of evidence across counts as similar fact evidence and the jury instruction on its use; (2) the trial judge's ruling preventing the appellant from referring to documents while testifying; and (3) the trial judge's inadvertent references to the appellant as "Mr. Guilty" during the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the similar fact evidence was properly admissible, the aide mémoire ruling was discretionary and reasonable, and the inadvertent misstatements were promptly corrected and caused no prejudice.

The appellant appealed her convictions for counselling murder, criminal harassment, and breaching court orders arising from a prolonged campaign of harassment against her former domestic partner and his new wife.

The trial judge found that the appellant had sought to incite her brother and ex-husband to murder her former partner by falsely claiming he had sexually assaulted her daughter.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and the sentence of 10 years effective on the counselling murder charge, finding no legal error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, evidentiary rulings, or sentencing analysis.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that found him to remain a significant threat to public safety and ordered a conditional discharge with monthly reporting requirements.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board's conclusion was reasonable based on evidence that the appellant intended to discontinue medication if absolutely discharged, had persistent persecutory delusions, and had a history of cannabis use that exacerbated his mental condition.

The court found it reasonable for the Board to conclude that absolute discharge would likely result in medication cessation, decompensation, and increased risk of threatening behaviour.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated October 16, 2016.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge from a conditional discharge, arguing the Board's decision was unreasonable.

The Board upheld the conditional discharge, finding the appellant remained a significant threat based on expert evidence that absolute discharge would lead to medication non-compliance and increased marijuana use, resulting in decompensation and threatening behavior.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable and supported by evidentiary foundation.

The appellant appealed his sentence of nine years' imprisonment and his designation as a long-term offender following guilty pleas to aggravated assault and other offences arising from a domestic stabbing.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in designating the appellant a long-term offender because she failed to find that his pattern of aggressive behaviour was 'persistent' under the dangerous offender criteria, and failed to separately analyze whether there was a substantial risk to reoffend.

The long-term offender designation was set aside, but the nine-year sentence for the predicate offences was affirmed as fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching on the sole ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He alleged his counsel incompetently refused to allow him to testify, failed to prepare him to testify, and failed to call a witness regarding an alleged prior false complaint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to establish the factual basis for his claims or demonstrate any prejudice resulting from his counsel's conduct.

The appellant was convicted of robbery of a convenience store as a party to the offence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and wrongly used his utterances to police to draw an inference of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of essential evidence and concluding the circumstantial evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence of eight years for assault causing bodily harm, robbery, extortion, forcible confinement, aggravated assault, and theft over.

The charges arose from a vicious beating and robbery where the appellant was identified by eyewitnesses and ATM surveillance footage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to exclude the appellant's criminal record under Corbett, the admission of evidence regarding a child witness's identification, or the handling of a Crown interruption during closing arguments.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the disparity between the appellant's sentence and his co-accused's was justified by the appellant's role as the instigator and his prior record.