Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellant, a corporate officer and sole director, appealed a judgment finding him personally liable for civil fraud arising from his company's failure to deliver 3 million NIOSH certified N95 masks during the COVID-19 pandemic to a Quebec hospital network, after receiving over US$11 million in advance payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct threshold for recklessness in finding civil fraud and that the law clearly supports personal liability of officers and directors for fraudulent conduct, without needing to assess whether the conduct was "tortious in itself" or exhibited a "separate identity or interest."

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of the Attorney General of Canada, setting aside the conditional certification of a class action brought by Andrew Knisley, a veteran, regarding the administration of disability benefits by Veterans Affairs Canada.

The court found that conditional certification is not permitted under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and remitted the matter for reconsideration of whether an identifiable class exists.

The court also upheld the motion judge’s finding that the claim in negligence disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages related to a failed real estate transaction involving a Hindu Temple.

The trial judge had dismissed the claims of fraud and unjust enrichment, partly because the appellant's corporations were not named as parties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the fraud claims but found the trial judge erred in her treatment of the unjust enrichment claim and in limiting the piercing of the corporate veil to cases of fraud.

The Court allowed the appeal, awarded the appellant $7,500 for mortgage payments made on behalf of the respondents, and ordered a new trial for the unjust enrichment claim regarding the remaining advances.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment order that dismissed some of his claims (spoliation, intentional infliction of mental suffering) but directed a mini-trial for others (defamation, breach of contract).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction over the interlocutory aspects without leave from the Divisional Court, that the appeal was improperly framed, and that it was premature as the summary judgment motion was not yet complete.

The court emphasized judicial economy and the need to avoid fragmented proceedings.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a Superior Court judgment concerning an oppression remedy claim.

The appellants (defendants) challenged the trial judge's valuation of shares, award of equitable damages, refusal to admit fresh evidence, and refusal to reconsider a Rule 59 motion.

The cross-appellants (plaintiffs) challenged the trial judge's findings on fiduciary duty, the 2012 share purchase agreement, quantum of equitable damages (interest), punitive damages, and transaction structure for share repurchase.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's decisions on all substantive issues, including the valuation, equitable damages, and the refusal to admit fresh evidence or reconsider motions.

Both parties' requests for leave to appeal costs were also refused.

The appellant agreed to purchase a commercial property from the respondent for $9 million, subject to a vendor take-back mortgage.

The transaction failed to close after the parties could not agree on the terms of a secondary financing agreement.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent, allowing it to retain $1.2 million in deposits.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in interpreting the agreement's secondary financing and escrow deed provisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's interpretation of the strict terms for secondary financing was commercially reasonable and supported by the record.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence and sought to introduce fresh evidence, arguing their failure to file defending material was their lawyer's fault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding that the appellants' failure to comply with numerous court orders was due to their own intransigence.

The court agreed with the motion judge that this was one of the rare cases where striking a statement of defence was appropriate.

The appellants, an author and her company, appealed a decision granting the respondent television production company a declaration that an option agreement for the television rights to her books remained in effect.

The respondent had mistakenly paid a lower extension fee under the wrong contractual clause.

The application judge interpreted the contract to allow for cumulative extensions and granted the respondent relief from forfeiture for the mistaken payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge's reasons were adequate, his interpretation of the contract was correct, and he made no error in exercising his equitable discretion to grant relief from forfeiture.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to strike her claim for negligent investigation on the basis that it was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The appellant argued that the negligent investigation claim was interconnected with her breach of privacy claim, which the motion judge had allowed to proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the two claims protect different legal interests and are distinct.

The motion judge's costs award was also upheld.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their medical malpractice claim.

The appeal turned on whether the respondent doctor met his disclosure obligations before the appellant elected to have heel surgery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the doctor provided sufficient information for informed consent was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant did not pursue his costs appeal, so leave to appeal costs was denied.

The respondent was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $8,000.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to dismiss the respondents' civil action based on statutory immunity under s. 38.1 of the Independent Health Facilities Act and abuse of process.

The respondents cross-appealed the striking of allegations relating to investigations under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeals and the cross-appeal, holding that while s. 38.1 provides immunity for losses resulting from specific regulatory orders, factual findings at trial are required to determine if any claimed losses fall outside this protection.

The abuse of process arguments were also left open for trial.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his statement of claim against the Attorney General of Quebec and its agents.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on the basis that the Province of Quebec has procedural immunity against such a suit in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that while Quebec legislation permits suits against the Crown, it only renders Quebec liable to be sued in its own courts, not in the courts of other provinces.

The appeal was dismissed.

The employee was terminated from his position as CFO but agreed to the assignment of his employment contract to an affiliated company within the corporate group.

The trial judge found that the contract was terminated and awarded the employee two years' severance pay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by concluding the contract was terminated rather than assigned, and by reversing the burden of proof regarding an alleged forbearance agreement.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the severance award, and the employee's cross-appeal for negligent misrepresentation against the individual defendant was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding adverse possession of a disputed strip of land between two properties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the respondent regularly used the disputed strip at the front of the houses, defeating the claim for adverse possession there.

However, the Court found that the application judge failed to address the back of the house, where a fence excluded the respondent and established exclusive possession for the appellant.

The judgments were amended accordingly, with costs awarded to the respondent who was substantially successful.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order permitting the respondent to withdraw an admission regarding damages after two and a half days of trial.

The trial judge had ordered a mistrial and awarded the appellant costs thrown away to allow them to consider their position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's order was a discretionary one that caused no prejudice to the appellant.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that the respondents had an ancillary right to park vehicles along a right-of-way and awarding damages for nuisance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that parking was an ancillary right based on over forty years of use and the circumstances surrounding the creation of the right-of-way.

The Court also upheld the nuisance damage award.

However, the Court varied the judgment regarding the cost of installing a holding tank, ordering the parties to split the cost equally due to mutual carelessness.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant bank sought recovery of funds paid under a clean irrevocable letter of credit, alleging the respondent beneficiary’s call was fraudulent because the proceeds were applied to a different project under a cross-collateralization agreement unknown to the bank.

The court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that there was no fraud, emphasizing the wording of the letter of credit, the legal advice obtained before the call, and the existence of formal grounds supporting the call in any event.

The related claims in mistake of fact and unjust enrichment failed because they were tied to the fraud allegation.

The respondent’s appeal from the trial costs disposition was also dismissed, including its request for solicitor-and-client costs and its effort to shift third party costs to the bank.

The defendants, a church parish and a seniors' residence, sought a stay of execution of a trial judgment that handed control of the parish to the plaintiff Diocese after a failed attempt by the parish to secede.

Following the judgment, the Diocese took control and filed a notice of abandonment of the appeal.

The moving party sought to strike the abandonment and stay the judgment to use parish funds for the appeal.

The court dismissed the stay motion and allowed the notice of abandonment to stand, noting that the true protagonists (the seceding individuals) should seek intervenor status to pursue the appeal at their own expense rather than using parish funds.