Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The moving parties sought an order under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure dismissing the appellants' appeal.

The underlying action, which alleged fraud against opposing counsel from previous litigation, had been dismissed as a frivolous and vexatious collateral attack on prior court orders.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the action and the subsequent appeal were devoid of merit and constituted an abuse of process.

The motion was granted and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants commenced a professional negligence action against their former legal counsel in March 2023.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was statute-barred, as the appellants had threatened negligence proceedings in March 2019.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants knew or ought to have known of the material facts supporting their claim more than two years before commencing the action.

The respondents (plaintiffs below) moved to quash an appeal brought by the appellant (defendant below) from two interlocutory orders.

The appellant had appealed orders dismissing his motion to vary a summary judgment order and a subsequent motion to set aside an order granting leave for a writ of possession.

The Court of Appeal determined that the orders appealed from were interlocutory in nature, meaning jurisdiction for the appeal lay with the Divisional Court with leave, not the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, the motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The moving parties, Thomas Patrick Farrell and The Midas Investment Corporation, appealed an order dismissing their action concerning the validity of two mortgages and sought a stay of the declaration of validity and enforcement of the mortgages pending the outcome of the appeal.

The court applied the three-part RJR-MacDonald test for stays pending appeal.

While a serious issue was found to exist (though barely), the court determined there would be no irreparable harm to the moving parties and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting a stay.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his action against the respondent under Rule 2.1.

The Court of Appeal found that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action against the respondent and was plainly frivolous and an abuse of process on its face.

The court upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the Superior Court justice's decision to dismiss the claim without inviting written submissions from the appellant.

The court noted that even if written submissions had been provided, based on the appellant's factum and oral argument, there would be no prospect of a different outcome.

The appellant appealed orders dismissing her action and denying her motion to set aside the dismissal.

The lower court judge dismissed the action for failure to file notice of appointment of counsel or intention to act in person within 30 days of an order removing her former lawyer.

The Court of Appeal found the dismissal order deficient because it failed to include the required text of the applicable rules, the appellant had not been properly served with the motion, and no reasons were given for the draconian remedy.

The appeal court set aside both lower court orders and imposed a 14-day deadline for the appellant to file notice of appointment of counsel.

The appellant corporation appealed an order requiring moneys to be paid into court in the context of matrimonial proceedings.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, finding the order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the appellant's interest in the funds.

The appellant was granted an extension of time to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision denying her claim against her group disability insurer for benefits.

She argued the insurer had a common law duty to inform her directly of a potential claim, and that the limitation period should not run until they did so.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no such common law duty exists for group disability insurers in these circumstances, and noting the insurer had complied with the statutory notification obligations under the Insurance Act.

The City of Guelph appealed a Superior Court decision that quashed a property standards repair order regarding a deteriorated backyard swimming pool and ordered the City to share repair costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a backyard swimming pool is not a 'dwelling' under the Municipal Act, meaning City officials did not require a warrant to enter the property.

The Court also held that the appeal judge lacked jurisdiction to order cost-sharing and erred in finding a reasonable apprehension of bias against the municipal official who issued the repair order.

The original repair order was restored.

The appellant brought a proposed class proceeding alleging the respondent bank received interest on cash advances in violation of the criminal interest rate provisions of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge refused to certify the action, finding that restitution and breach of contract claims lacked common issues and that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

The Divisional Court affirmed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and certified the class proceeding, holding that sections 23 and 24 of the Class Proceedings Act could be used to assess and distribute aggregate damages, thereby resolving the common issues problem.

The Court also found that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure to achieve judicial economy, access to justice, and behaviour modification.

The appellants perfected a construction lien, and the respondent moved to discharge it on the basis that the work was not lienable.

The motion was dismissed, and the respondent appealed to the Divisional Court.

While the decision was under reserve, the two-year period to set the action down for trial under s. 37 of the Construction Lien Act expired.

The respondent successfully moved to have the lien declared expired, which was upheld by the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal, holding that the time limits in ss. 37 and 46 are mandatory and are not suspended by a reserved judgment.

The appellant appealed an order allowing two limited partners to vote on the election of a new general partner for a limited partnership.

The appellant argued the limited partners were affiliated with and not dealing at arms length with the manager, and thus disqualified from voting under the partnership agreements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that there was no direct or indirect control establishing affiliation, and that the parties were dealing at arms length.

The appellants commenced an action against their former lawyers for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The lawyers brought third party claims against various entities involved in a real estate project.

The appellants and the third parties had previously settled other litigation and exchanged mutual releases containing 'no claims over' provisions.

The motions judge stayed the main action, finding it was an attempt to re-litigate settled matters and would inevitably lead to third party claims precluded by the releases.

The Court of Appeal upheld the stay, except to allow the appellants to amend their statement of claim to assert a claim for an accounting of funds that was not subject to a third party claim.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his insurance company and broker following a house fire.

The trial judge found that the appellant had a financial motive to set the fires, misrepresented his insurance history to the broker, and had the best opportunity to commit the arson.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, motive, opportunity, or the overwhelming evidence of arson.

The appellants sued their former solicitor for negligence, alleging he failed to properly calculate their damages in a real estate action and negligently advised them to accept a settlement.

The trial judge dismissed the claim and awarded the solicitor substantial indemnity costs from the date of a settlement offer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that even if the solicitor misunderstood the damages calculation, the settlement amount was a fair compromise and the appellants suffered no damages.

However, the Court allowed the costs appeal, reducing the trial costs to a partial indemnity basis, as the negligence claim was not frivolous and did not constitute misconduct.

The moving party sought to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The single judge had allowed a motion on short notice, granted an extension of time, and ordered the appellant's factum and compendium removed from the file because they contained fresh evidence not before the lower court.

The panel found the single judge exercised his discretion appropriately and was correct in his order.

However, on consent of the responding party to expedite the appeal, the panel varied the order to allow the materials to remain in the file, provided the moving party does not rely on the fresh evidence without leave from the panel hearing the appeal.

The motion to review was otherwise dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her claim against the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that because the appellant was not involved in the accident and did not have first party insurance, she was not entitled to statutory benefits and had no recourse against the Fund under s. 6 of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act.

The appellant police services board appealed a Divisional Court decision finding that its officers unlawfully entered the respondent's home and unlawfully arrested him.

The officers entered the respondent's apartment without a warrant or consent to arrest him for failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The Court of Appeal held that the officers were not protected from civil liability for trespass and false arrest by section 25 of the Criminal Code or the common law, as they lacked legal authorization to enter the dwelling following the Supreme Court's decision in Feeney.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the release of the main decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario received further submissions on costs.

The Court ordered that the costs of the application for leave, the motion for leave to appeal, and the appeal be awarded to the appellant in the cause.

The appellant, a federal public servant, grieved his suspension and subsequent dismissal under the collective agreement.

After his grievances were partially allowed and he was reinstated, he brought a civil action against his employer and several individuals alleging discrimination, intimidation, conspiracy, and interference with contractual relations.

The motions judge struck out the statement of claim on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the exclusive jurisdiction model from Weber v. Ontario Hydro, finding that the essential character of the dispute arose under the collective agreement and the appellant was not deprived of an ultimate remedy.