Natalya Odorico

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching.

He argued the trial judge erred in evaluating credibility, treating the case as a credibility contest, finding a neighbour's evidence corroborative, and rendering inconsistent verdicts by acquitting him on a second sexual touching count.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and concluding the verdicts were not inconsistent.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, who pleaded guilty to sexual interference.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by departing from the parties' agreement on ancillary orders, specifically a section 161 prohibition and probation terms, without applying the Anthony-Cook joint submission standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the agreement on ancillary orders did not constitute a joint submission on the core sentence, as the parties disagreed significantly on the length of custody.

The Court also held that the trial judge's discretionary orders were not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, Mahmoud Hannora, appealed his total sentence of seven years for unauthorized possession of a restricted firearm, possession of a firearm while prohibited, and receiving material benefit from sexual services.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to properly apply the totality principle to the overall sentence, which resulted in a sentence that outstripped the appellant's overall culpability, especially considering his positive prospects for rehabilitation and remorse.

The Court reduced the total sentence from seven years to four years by making the sentence for receiving material benefit concurrent to the other two counts.

The victim fine surcharge was also set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter and theft, which was based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the evidence, while suspicious, was equally consistent with the appellant becoming involved with the stolen vehicle after the break-in and thefts had occurred.

The court determined that the inferences necessary to prove possession of the vehicle or participation in the initial crimes could not be reasonably drawn, and therefore, the trier of fact could not reasonably be satisfied that guilt was the only reasonable conclusion.

The appeal was allowed, and acquittals were entered.

The appellant, Manuel Esquivel-Benitez, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding three errors by the trial judge: (1) an R. v. W.(D.) error in assessing credibility by treating it as a contest between the complainant and the appellant, failing to consider reasonable doubt on the evidence as a whole; (2) failure to meaningfully address the complainant's possible motive to fabricate; and (3) improper reliance on the appellant's presence in the courtroom to negatively assess his credibility, suggesting he tailored his evidence.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated March 6, 2019.

The appellant, declared not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, appealed a conditional discharge disposition that prohibited him from driving and required abstinence from alcohol.

The appellant argued the Board's conclusion that he posed a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence, particularly given his suspended driver's licence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable and supported by evidence, but expressed concern about the lack of information available regarding the licence suspension and directed that detailed information be obtained for the next review.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on charges of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, mischief, threatening death, and assault with a weapon, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering her continued detention in a forensic psychiatric facility.

The appellant challenged the Board's application of the significant risk test and sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding no error in the legal test applied or its application to the evidence.

The Board properly considered the appellant's history of medication non-compliance, continued cannabis use in breach of conditions, and recent aggressive incidents with co-patients as active risk factors supporting a finding of significant risk to public safety.

The appellant was convicted after trial of firearm and other offences and received a total sentence of 70 months (84 months with 14 months credit for pretrial custody).

The appellant appealed the sentence on grounds including the restraint principle, arguing that a lengthy penitentiary term was unnecessary given his lack of prior incarceration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit, finding that for serious domestic violence offences involving a lethal weapon, deterrence, denunciation, and victim protection must take precedence over the restraint principle.

The court corrected three technical sentencing errors but found no net effect on the total sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision ordering his continued detention at the Brockville Mental Health Centre.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible for reasons of mental disorder in 2008 and 2011.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on three grounds: (1) the Board improperly used the appellant's request for discharge as evidence of lack of insight; (2) the Board's analysis on whether the appellant would pose a significant risk to public safety was insufficient and conflated risk of mental health relapse with risk to public safety; and (3) the Board improperly included a finding that the appellant had sexually assaulted a minor when he had been acquitted of that charge.

The appellant was entitled to a new hearing before the Board.