Nancy J. Spies

The applicant, Tyrone Jackson, sought a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code, challenging a prior detention order.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to a new, stronger surety plan, allowing for a de novo bail application.

Despite the serious nature of the charges (firearm possession) and the applicant's criminal record, the court was persuaded that the proposed release plan, including 24/7 supervision by a strong primary surety and GPS monitoring, mitigated the risks on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court granted the bail application, ordering release on a recognizance with two sureties and strict conditions.

The defendant, Zhu Xi Shen, applied for judicial interim release following his conviction for sexual assault, after his initial bail was vacated due to flight risk concerns.

The application was based on a material change in circumstances, including a new release plan with an additional residential surety, a significant increase in the pledged bail amount, and the proposed use of ankle monitoring.

The defendant also intended to bring a Charter application to reopen the trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that despite the enhanced release plan, the defendant remained a significant flight risk due to the serious nature of the offence, the lengthy sentence sought by the Crown, his means to abscond, and the limitations of electronic monitoring in preventing flight.

The defendant, Zhuxi Xi Shen, brought a second application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application was summarily dismissed by Justice Spies.

The court refused to grant leave to hear the application due to the applicant's repeated failure to comply with filing deadlines under the Criminal Proceedings Rules and the Provincial Practice Direction, noting a flagrant disregard for prior rulings and procedural rules.

Furthermore, the court found that even if leave were granted, the application had no reasonable prospect of success, as the total delay, after accounting for periods previously addressed by another judge and exceptional circumstances (hung jury, pandemic backlog, complainant's unavailability), fell well within the presumptive Jordan timeline.

The court also found no basis to exercise residual discretion to grant a stay.

Adil Zeno, convicted of accessory after the fact to murder, brought a post-verdict application for a stay of proceedings under ss. 7 and 24(1) of the Charter, alleging abuse of process by the Crown.

The alleged abuse primarily related to a separate murder prosecution and the Crown's position on bail.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the alleged misconduct was not related to the current proceeding and that alternative remedies, such as seeking damages in the other proceeding, were available.

The court emphasized that a stay of proceedings is a drastic remedy reserved for the 'clearest of cases' and that impugned conduct must be related to the proceeding before the court.

The defendant, Adil Zeno, brought a Charter application to exclude video evidence from a cell phone, alleging breaches of his rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while there was a breach of the defendant's section 10(b) right to counsel due to an unreasonable delay, and accepted for the purpose of the application that there was a section 8 breach related to the search warrant for the cell phone, these breaches were not serious enough to warrant exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the police acted in good faith, and the evidence was reliable and relevant to the Crown's case.

The application to exclude evidence was denied.

The defendant, Adil Zeno, was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to murder.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors such as his criminal record, lack of coercion, and the compounding of victim suffering, and mitigating factors including his youth and efforts towards rehabilitation.

The Crown sought a sentence of 4-5 years, while the defence sought 18-24 months.

The court imposed a sentence of three and a half years, which was covered by the 44 months of pre-sentence custody, resulting in a sentence of one day in jail in addition to time served.

A 10-year prohibition order and a DNA order were also imposed, but probation was denied.

The accused, Andrew Douglas, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on a first-degree murder charge at the close of the Crown's case.

The application was opposed by the Crown.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a properly instructed jury to reasonably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the first-degree murder charge, particularly regarding planning and deliberation.

The case was allowed to proceed to the jury on the first-degree murder charge.

This ruling addresses a Corbett application in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused sought to limit the admissibility of his criminal record for cross-examination on credibility.

The Crown argued for the full record, contending the defence would attack the deceased's character.

The court balanced the probative value of the convictions against the prejudicial effect of propensity reasoning, particularly for violent and similar offences.

The judge ruled that only convictions for obstruction of a Peace Officer and theft (read down from robbery) would be admissible, finding that the defence's argument regarding the deceased's possession of a firearm was a direct response to the indictment, not an attack on character, thus not creating an imbalance requiring the full record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired care and control and 'over 80'.

He argued the trial judge's reasons for the impaired conviction were legally insufficient and that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice was breached.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because they failed to address exculpatory evidence and an alternative innocent inference.

The Court also found a s. 10(b) breach because police failed to inform the appellant he could wait a reasonable time for his counsel of choice, failed to facilitate contact, and failed to hold off on investigative steps.

The breath evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The defendant was convicted of intimidation of a justice system participant and uttering threats after posting images and threats on Instagram revealing the identity of an undercover police officer who was scheduled to testify against him.

The Crown sought a sentence of 2.5 years, while the defence sought 2 years plus a day.

The court sentenced the defendant to 2.5 years concurrent on each count, finding the offences struck at the heart of the justice system.

With enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, the sentence amounted to time served.

A 10-year weapons prohibition was also ordered.

The accused was stopped for speeding.

The police officer smelled burnt marijuana and questioned the accused about cannabis, eventually searching the accused's vehicle and satchel under the Cannabis Control Act, finding cocaine.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 7, 8, and 10(b) rights.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the search, rendering it unlawful under s. 8, and that there was an unreasonable delay in providing access to counsel under s. 10(b).

The court also found the officer gave misleading testimony.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) and dismissed the charge.

The defendant, Shaun Blackman, was charged with intimidation of a justice system participant (an undercover police officer, TK) and uttering threats to cause death or bodily harm to TK, contrary to ss. 423.1(1)(b) and 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The charges stemmed from Instagram posts made by Blackman revealing TK's identity and containing threats, prior to TK testifying at Blackman's preliminary inquiry.

The court found that Blackman was the account holder and that the posts were made by him.

The court concluded that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Blackman intended to provoke fear in TK to impede his duties and that the posts constituted threats of death or bodily harm.

Blackman was found guilty on both counts.

The applicant, charged with various firearm offences, sought a bail review of a detention order made by a Justice of the Peace.

The applicant argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law by finding the proposed release plan and surety inadequate to address secondary ground concerns, and that a proposed move to the Niagara region constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no error of law or misapprehension of evidence in the original decision, and concluding that the proposed change of residence was not a material change.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, sought the committal of the respondent for extradition on charges corresponding to sexual assault and accessing child pornography.

The respondent conceded committal for sexual assault but argued that the child pornography charge did not meet the requirement of double criminality due to the 'private use exception' established in R. v. Sharpe.

The court held that the private use exception is a defence, which an extradition judge has no jurisdiction to consider at the committal stage.

The court further found that even if the exception could be considered, the evidence of the prior exploitative relationship would vitiate consent.

Committal for extradition was ordered on both charges.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application following the offender's convictions for gang sexual assault, choking, forcible confinement, and uttering threats.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record involving extreme violence, often committed while intoxicated, and was diagnosed with likely schizophrenia, antisocial personality disorder, and substance use disorders.

The court found the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

Concluding that the offender's risk of violent recidivism was intractable and could not be adequately managed in the community on a long-term supervision order, the court imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The offender was convicted of armed robbery of a pharmacy while masked, and several firearms offences relating to a loaded, sawed-off SKS rifle.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record including prior armed robberies.

The Crown sought a 16-year global sentence, while the defence sought 9-10 years with significant credit for harsh pre-trial custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court applied the totality principle and considered the offender's rehabilitative prospects, imposing a global sentence of 10 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown applied for a bail review to vacate a Justice of the Peace's order granting judicial interim release to the accused, who was charged with child pornography offences and breach of probation.

The reviewing judge found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by minimizing the severity of the offences, failing to consider the potential for a lengthy sentence, and improperly limiting the Crown's cross-examination of the proposed surety.

Conducting a de novo hearing, the reviewing judge found the release plan strong enough to satisfy the secondary ground, but ordered the accused's detention on the tertiary ground due to the overwhelming evidence, the serious and inherently violent nature of the offences, and the risk of the accused accessing the internet in the proposed residence.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude a loaded handgun found in his satchel during an investigative detention.

The detention occurred in the hallway outside an apartment where police were executing a search warrant.

The police claimed they had grounds to detain the accused because an occupant of the apartment yelled at the accused's companion.

However, elevator video evidence contradicted the police timeline, showing the accused was detained within seconds of exiting the elevator.

The court found the police officers colluded and fabricated evidence to justify the unlawful detention.

The court found breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Charter and excluded the firearm under s. 24(2).

The accused was charged with five sets of robbery offences and several firearm-related offences.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance video, cell phone data, and the recovery of a modified rifle.

The court found the accused guilty of the firearm charges and the robbery of the Sheppard Warden Pharmacy, concluding that the modified rifle found in his possession was the same one used in that robbery.

However, the court found the accused not guilty of the other four robberies, as the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove his identity as one of the perpetrators beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence across multiple counts of robbery to prove the identity of the accused in a rotating group context.

The accused was charged with six robberies of banks and pharmacies.

The court applied the Handy and Perrier frameworks to assess the degree of similarity between the robberies and whether there was independent evidence linking the accused to each offence.

The court found sufficient similarities, including the use of a single firearm held in a pronated fashion, the use of stolen older model Honda Civics, and the roles of the suspects.

The court also found sufficient independent linkage evidence, such as cell phone data and the recovery of a modified rifle, for five of the six robberies.

The application was granted for all counts except those related to one bank robbery.